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ABSTRACT 
 
The Supreme Court‘s Chief Umpire: Judging the Legal Rhetoric and Judicial Philosophy 
of John G. Roberts, Jr. (August 2011) 
Jay Maurice Hudkins, B.S.E., Baylor University; 
M.A., Baylor University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
 Many Supreme Court followers contended that Judge John Roberts entered his 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings as a ―stealth candidate‖ who lacked a paper trail 
the Judiciary Committee could vet to discern the interpretive approach, or judicial 
philosophy, to which Judge Roberts‘ subscribed. This dissertation used rhetorical 
criticism as a methodological approach for examining this claim. A close-reading of 
Roberts‘ law journal articles, his writings from his service during the Reagan and Bush 
(41) administrations, the text of his appellate court confirmation testimony and published 
opinions, and the text of his Supreme Court confirmation testimony and published 
opinions reveals that Roberts was not a ―stealth candidate‖ but instead a jurist who 
resolved constitutional, judicial, political, and statutory issues by incorporating 
components of originalism and positivism into his prudentialist judicial philosophy. 
The first two chapters of the dissertation provide the requisite background for the 
study. Chapter I discusses the challenges of the nomination and confirmation processes 
for Supreme Court Justices, and the chapter discusses the crucial powers that the Chief 
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Justice possesses. Chapter II introduces readers to legal arguments, argument modalities, 
and judicial philosophies, and the chapter offers a new definition for the terms ―legal 
rhetoric‖ and provides a new methodology for studying judicial discourse. 
The subsequent chapters comprise the core of the study. Chapter III examines 
Roberts‘ law review articles and the letters, memoranda, and position papers he wrote 
while working for the Reagan and Bush administrations, Chapter IV investigates 
Roberts‘ appellate court confirmation testimony and his published opinions, and Chapter 
V investigates Roberts‘ Supreme Court confirmation testimony and his published 
opinions. Following a chronological approach reveals that Roberts consistently used 
certain argument types within corresponding argument modalities to formulate his 
argumentative strategies, and each chapter demonstrates that Roberts‘ adhered to a 
prudentialist interpretive approach to resolve constitutional and statutory questions. 
Finally, Chapter VI argues that scholars should examine judicial discourse from an 
interdisciplinary perspective and reevaluate their conceptions about legal rhetoric and 
rhetorical criticism.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: CONFIRMATION BATTLES:  
THE STRUGGLE TO SEAT A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE  
 
When Associate Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor announced her retirement from 
the United States Supreme Court on July 1, 2005,
1
 U.S. News & World Report declared 
that O‘Connor‘s retirement set the stage for ―the coming cataclysm—a political death 
match over President [George W.] Bush‘s first nomination to the Supreme Court and the 
next chapter in the nation‘s overheated culture wars.‖2 Echoing the significance of the 
                                                          
This thesis follows the style of Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 
1
 David Rohde and Kenneth Shepsle term the retirement or death of a sitting Justice as a ―nomination-
inducing event.‖ David Rohde and Kenneth Shepsle, ―Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: 
Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court,‖ Journal of Politics 69 (2007): 665 (italics in original). 
2
 Liz Halloran, Dan Gilgoff, Bret Schulte, and Terence Samuel, ―Man of the Hour: John G. Roberts 
Confounds Liberals and Reassures Conservatives. Wanna Fight?‖ U.S. News & World Report, August 1, 
2005, 18. As early as 2001, rumors circulated that both O‘Connor and Rehnquist would retire during 
Bush‘s presidency. Most commentators agreed that President Bush faced an arduous task in nominating a 
new Justice for the Court. For example, Stuart Taylor described Bush‘s nomination opportunity as ―the 
mother of all Senate confirmation battles.‖ Jeff Yates and William Gillespie predicted that Bush would 
face a ―contentious confirmation battle in trying to fill such vacancies on the Court.‖ Kenneth Manning 
predicted ―an epic political struggle.‖ Stephen Martino described the political climate as one in which ―the 
prospect of an ideologically charged, partisan fight looms. In fact, all sides . . . already have begun 
posturing for a bloody, take-no-prisoners rumble . . . the right itches for a confirmation battle.‖ Brannon 
Denning predicted a similar environment: ―[R]ancorous confirmation battles . . . are also inevitable in the 
Bush Administration.‖ See Stuart Taylor, Jr., ―Courting Trouble,‖ National Journal, June 14, 2003, 1832; 
Jeff Yates and William Gillespie, ―Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the Appropriate Role of the 
Senate in the Confirmation Process,‖ Washington & Lee Law Review 58 (2001): 1054; Kenneth L. 
Manning, Bruce A. Carroll, and Robert A. Carp, ―George W. Bush‘s Potential Supreme Court Nominees: 
What Impact Might They Have?‖ Judicature 85 (2002): 284; Stephen L. Martino, ―Change on the 
Horizon: A Prospective Review of the Nomination and Confirmation Process of the United States 
Supreme Court,‖ Washburn Law Journal 41 (2001): 166; and, Brannon P. Denning, ―The ‗Blue Slip‘: 
Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process,‖ William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 10 
(2001): 75. Viveca Novak reported that the ideological leanings of President Bush‘s candidates for the 
2 
 
   
 
retirement of the key moderate on the Court,
3
 and the potential impact her replacement 
could have on the Court, Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel of the American Center for Law 
and Justice, deemed O‘Connor‘s retirement ―the most significant Supreme Court 
resignation and nomination we‘ll see in our lifetimes.‖4 Indeed, since President Ronald 
Reagan‘s failed attempt to seat Judge Robert Bork on the Court, the appointment process 
―has become a public political battleground where groups wage holy war and the tactics 
reflect a no-prisoners approach to combat.‖5 Faced with sagging popularity in public 
opinion polls
6
 and confronted by an increasingly hostile Senate that gained Democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                           
open Court seats would determine ―whether the confirmation process is a mere brawl or a full-scale 
conflagration.‖ Viveca Novak, ―Off the Bench? Think the Ashcroft Battle was Ugly? The War Over Our 
Next Supreme Court Justice Could Start Soon,‖ Time, February 26, 2001, 54-55. David Crockett 
remarked, ―Given the reelection of President Bush . . . and [with] two Supreme Court vacancies, the issue 
of judicial nomination battles shows no sign of being permanently settled.‖ David A. Crockett, ―The 
Contemporary President: Should the Senate Take a Floor Vote on a Presidential Judicial Nominee?‖ 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 37 (2007): 313. 
3
 Most scholars agree that O‘Connor gradually became the key moderate Justice and ―swing‖ vote on the 
Court. See, for example, Thomas R. Hensley, Joyce A. Baugh, and Christopher E. Smith, ―The First-Term 
Performance of Chief Justice John Roberts,‖ Idaho Law Review 43 (2007): 627, and Andrew D. Martin, 
Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein, ―The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court,‖ North 
Carolina Law Review 83 (2005): 1275-1277. One scholar even referred to the Rehnquist Court as ―the 
O‘Connor Court (to emphasize its most decisive member).‖ See Thomas M. Keck, ―Party, Policy, or Duty: 
Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?‖ American Political Science Review 101 
(2007): 324. 
4
 As quoted in Howard Fineman and Debra Rosenberg, ―The Holy War Begins,‖ Newsweek, July 11, 
2005, 34. Sekulow, also a leading lawyer for the Religious Right, was one of the primary consultants to 
President Bush who advocated Roberts as the replacement for O‘Connor. See Peter Irons, A People’s 
History of the Supreme Court: The Men and Women Whose Cases have Shaped Our Constitution (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 529. 
5
 Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 6. 
6
 President Bush‘s job approval rating teetered near 40% at the time he nominated Judge Roberts for the 
Court. See Dan Froomkin, ―A Polling Free-Fall among Blacks,‖ Washington Post, October 13, 2005, 
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seats in the 2004 election, President Bush opted for a ‗safe‘ pick for the Court,7 and on 
July 19, 2005, he nominated John G. Roberts, Jr.,
8
 a federal judge from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, to replace O‘Connor. 
President Bush wanted the Senate to move quickly and confirm his candidate for 
the Court so that it could begin its October term with a full nine members.
9
 The Senate 
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/10/13/BL2005101300885_pf.html (accessed 
August 14, 2008). Lorraine Woellert remarked that Roberts‘ nomination by Bush was ―a shrewd gambit 
by a President who finds himself at political low ebb‖ and with his ―approval ratings at an all-time low,‖ 
and Benjamin Wittes saw Roberts‘ nomination take place ―during a weak period‖ of Bush‘s presidency. 
See Lorraine Woellert, ―Why Not Scalia?‖ Business Week, September 19, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 05_38/b3951059.htm? (accessed August 14, 2008), and 
Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 2.   
7
 A ‗safe‘ candidate for the Supreme Court is ―one who is a virtual shoo-in for confirmation. The rationale 
for such a choice is simple. A president may perceive that the [political] setting is too controversial to 
permit the appointment of a nominee who would offend a major portion of the political spectrum.‖ See 
George Watson and John A. Stookey, Shaping America: The Politics of Supreme Court Appointments 
(New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), 62. Kenneth Manning and his colleagues, when 
assessing possible Bush nominees for the Court, predicted that Bush might opt for ―a stealth candidate‖ as 
a way ―to avert a bruising fight‖ with Congress. See Manning, Carroll, and Carp, ―George W. Bush‘s 
Potential Supreme Court Nominees?‖ 284. According to David Greenberg, Bush ―made a canny selection 
in John Roberts—who brandished a sterling resume [sic] a congenial manner, and no hint of scandal in his 
background.‖ David Greenberg, ―The Supreme Court Kabuki Dance,‖ Wall Street Journal, July 18-19, 
2009, W9. 
8
 For a biography on Roberts, see Lisa Tucker McElroy, John G. Roberts, Jr.: Chief Justice (Minneapolis, 
MN: Lerner Publishing Company, 2007); Denis Steven Rutkus and Lorraine H. Tong, The Chief Justice of 
the United States (Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2006), 35-40, the chapter on 
―Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.;‖ and, Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the 
Supreme Court (New York: Doubleday, 2007). For a candid account of the days leading up to Roberts‘ 
selection for a seat on the Court, see Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the 
Struggle for Control of the United States Supreme Court (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 185-211, 226-
246. 
9
 The Supreme Court began its new term on October 3, 2005.  
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also desired a fully-staffed Court for the new term,
10
 so the Senate Judiciary Committee 
scheduled Roberts‘ confirmation hearings for Tuesday, September 6. Two days before 
the start of the hearings, though, Chief Justice William Rehnquist died after his long 
battle with thyroid cancer. President Bush withdrew Roberts‘ name as the replacement 
for O‘Connor, and that Monday, September 5, Bush announced that he had selected 
Roberts, a former law clerk for Rehnquist, to replace the deceased Chief Justice.
11
 
 Roberts survived his confirmation hearings, and the Judiciary Committee voted 
13 to 5 in favor of Roberts‘ nomination12 and it sent his name to the floor, where the full 
Senate voted along partisan lines and confirmed Roberts by a 78 to 22 vote. On 
September 29, 2005, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens swore in John G. Roberts, Jr., 
as the 17th Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
13
 
                                                          
10
 Charles Shipan and Megan Shannon argue that supporters of the president‘s nominee want to seat the 
Justice ―on the Court as soon as possible, so he or she can start influencing arguments, deliberations, and 
case decisions.‖ Opponents of the president‘s nominee, however, ―want to delay this process.‖ According 
to Shipan and Shannon, a protracted confirmation process for a nominee certain to receive Senate approval 
delays the new Justice from ―affecting the Court‘s policy decisions.‖ See Charles R. Shipan and Megan L. 
Shannon, ―Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations,‖ American Journal 
of Political Science 47 (2003): 656. For more on the president‘s motives for selecting a candidate for the 
Court, see David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme 
Court Nominees (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
11
 See, for example, Peter Baker, ―Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief Justice; President Seeks Quick 
Approval with Another Seat Left to Fill,‖ Washington Post, September 6, 2005, A01; Judy Keen and 
Richard Benedetto, ―Under Fire, President Attempts to Regain Sense of Equilibrium,‖ USA Today, 
September 6, 2005, 4A; and, Rick Klein, ―Bush Picks Roberts for Chief Justice; O‘Connor is Likely to 
Remain for Now,‖ Boston Globe, September 6, 2005, A1.  
12
 David W. Neubauer and Stephen S. Meinhold, Battle Supreme: The Confirmation of Chief Justice John 
Roberts and the Future of the Supreme Court (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 53. 
13
 The Senate voted largely along party lines: all 55 Republicans voted ―aye,‖ as did 22 Democrats and the 
lone Independent, Vermont‘s Jim Jeffords. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal suggested that ―John 
Roberts should have been confirmed 100-0, but we applaud the 22 Democrats who saw beyong [sic] 
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While Rehnquist‘s death certainly marked a saddened moment in America‘s 
storied history, his death also provided President Bush with a historic opportunity: the 
president found himself in the enviable position of having the opportunity to leave his 
legacy on the Supreme Court by potentially packing it with two conservative Justices.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
ideology and voted aye.‖ See ―The Democratic Divide,‖ Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2005, A10. 
Also see Jeanne Cummings and Jess Bravin, ―With Roberts In, Bush Looks Ahead,‖ Wall Street Journal, 
September 30, 2005, A3. Perhaps the Democrats who voted in favor of or opposed Roberts‘ confirmation 
perceived that seating Roberts on the Court simply would replace one conservative Justice with another 
conservative Justice. Additionally, perhaps for the 22 Democrats and the 1 Independent Senator who cast 
their votes for Roberts, his qualifications for the Chief Justice‘s seat trumped the ideological concerns they 
may have held. 
14
 As Lee Epstein and his colleagues note, ―The rule now is that Presidents name Justices who share their 
political ideology. If Presidents could put themselves on the bench, they would; however, they cannot, so 
they find the closest possible surrogates.‖ See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland, ―The 
Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices,‖ 
Drake Law Review 56 (2008): 197. While some scholars dispute a president‘s ability to pack the Court, 
Adam Mitzner offers a succinct response: ―The argument that presidents lack the opportunity to pack the 
Court is, simply put, wrong.‖ Adam Mitzner, ―The Evolving Role of the Senate in Judicial Nominations,‖ 
Journal of Law & Politics 5 (1989): 406. Also, as Albert Melone suggests, ―newly appointed justices . . . 
can have an immediate impact‖ on the Court. Albert P. Melone, ―The Senate‘s Confirmation Role in 
Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality,‖ Judicature 75 (1991): 79. 
For more on Court packing, see Stephen Carter, ―The Confirmation Mess,‖ Harvard Law Review 101 
(1988): 1185-1201; Horace Cooper, ―Tilting at Windmills: The Troubling Consequences of the Modern 
Supreme Court Confirmation Process,‖ Southern University Law Review 33 (2006): 444; Edward V. Heck 
and Steven A. Shull, ―Policy Preferences of Justices and Presidents: The Case of Civil Rights,‖ Law & 
Policy Quarterly 4 (1982): 327-338; John M. Lawlor, ―Court Packing Revisited: A Proposal for 
Rationalizing the Timing of Appointments to the Supreme Court,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
134 (1986): 967-1000; William H. Rehnquist, ―Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court,‖ 
Constitutional Commentary 2 (1985): 319-330; and, Jeffrey A. Segal, Richard J. Timpone, and Robert M. 
Howard, ―Buyer Beware? Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments,‖ Political Research 
Quarterly 53 (2000): 557-559. As Henry J. Abraham, one of the leading authorities on the history of the 
Court, observes, ―There is, of course, nothing wrong in a president‘s attempt to staff the Court with jurists 
who read the Constitution his way. All presidents have tried to pack the Court, to mold it in their images. 
Nothing is wrong with this, provided, however, that the nominees are professionally, intellectually, and 
morally qualified to serve.‖ Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. 
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton, New and rev. ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 328. Albert Melone and his colleagues provide a different assessment 
on the future of Court packing: ―The battle for the Court has been won. To insist upon packing further the 
Marble Palace with conservatives may unnecessarily jeopardize institutional support for the Court itself.‖ 
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President Bush initially nominated Harriet E. Miers, his Chief Counsel, to fill the 
vacancy left by O‘Connor‘s retirement. However, Miers quickly proved to be a divisive 
choice and her nomination ―quickly devolved into political black comedy,‖15 and after 
mounting criticism from both sides of the political aisle, on October 27, Miers requested 
that President Bush withdraw her name for consideration on the Court.
16
 The president 
accepted her withdrawal, and on October 31, Bush nominated 3
rd
 Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., for the open seat on the Court. After a largely 
conflict-free confirmation hearing, the full Senate confirmed Judge Alito in January.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Albert P. Melone, Alan R. Morris, and Marc-George Pufong, ―Too Little Advice, Senatorial 
Responsibility, and Confirmation Politics,‖ Judicature 75 (1992): 192. 
15
 Toobin, The Nine, 284. Ironically, as Toobin comments, ―Miers holds a unique place in the history of 
the Supreme Court as the only nominee to withdraw her name from consideration by the Senate even 
though she probably would have been confirmed.‖ For an in-depth discussion of Miers‘ background and 
qualifications for the Court, see Toobin, The Nine, 284-297. For a candid account of the days and events 
surrounding Miers‘ selection for the Court, see Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A 
History of U.S. Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II, 5
th
 ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 319-320, and Greenburg, Supreme Conflict, 257-288. For additional 
discussions of Miers‘ nomination problems, see Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 9th ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 39-40; Kevin J. McMahon, ―Presidents, Political Regimes, and 
Contentious Supreme Court Nominations: A Historical Institutional Model,‖ Law & Social Inquiry 32 
(2007): 946-947; and, Christine L. Nemacheck, Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme 
Court Justices from Herbert Hoover through George W. Bush (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2007), 136-139, 143. 
16
 See Norman Dorsen, ―The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,‖ International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 4 (2006): 653-655. 
17
 The Senate confirmed Alito 58 to 42 on January 31, 2006, and he was sworn in by Chief Justice 
Roberts. For more on Alito‘s background and history prior to his confirmation to the Court, see Toobin, 
The Nine, 298-300, 311-316. For a candid account of the days leading up to Alito‘s selection for a seat on 
the Court, see Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme Court 
Appointments from Washington to Bush II, 320-322, and Greenburg, Supreme Conflict, 285-315. Also, for 
a more in-depth look at how Alito might impact the Court, see Akhil Reed Amar, ―Criminal Justice,‖ 
Pepperdine Law Review 34 (2007): 522-535, and ―Special Edition: Alito Nomination,‖ Southern 
University Law Review 33 (2006): 421-527. 
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With his nominees successfully seated on the Court, and with the addition of two 
seemingly conservative Justices added to the Court, President Bush realized his goal of 
shaping the Supreme Court for the years to come.
18
 As Jan Crawford Greenburg notes,  
With the unwitting help of his Democratic opponents, George W. Bush ended up 
placing two of the most conservative justices on the Supreme Court in years. And 
together with [Antonin] Scalia and [Clarence] Thomas, the Roberts Court is more 
conservative than any other in a half century. . . . Although their outlook on the 
law and the proper role of the Court may be similar to that of Scalia and Thomas, 
their impact on its direction over the next three to four decades will be more 
substantial. The Court is now poised to recede from some of the divisive cultural 
debates. George W. Bush and his team of lawyers will be shaping the direction of 
American law and culture long after many of them are dead.
19
  
                                                          
18
 For an excellent analysis of why ―a single president can almost never make the Court extreme‖ and why 
―[a] single Justice, no matter how extreme, cannot make the Court itself extremist,‖ see Richard D. 
Friedman, ―Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations,‖ Yale Law 
Journal 95 (1986): 1283-1320. For similar views regarding a president‘s ability to alter the extremity of 
the Court, see Rehnquist, ―Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court,‖ 319-330; Christopher E. 
Smith and Kimberly A. Beuger, ―Clouds in the Crystal Ball: Presidential Expectations and the 
Unpredictable Behavior of Supreme Court Appointees,‖ Akron Law Review 27 (1993): 115-139; and, 
Christopher E. Smith and Thomas R. Hensley, ―Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush,‖ Albany Law Review 57 (1994): 1111-1131. Adam Mitzner, however, offers 
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first of many. Therefore, the argument that a single appointment is harmless fails because it is never 
certain that others will not follow.‖ Mitzner, ―The Evolving Role of the Senate in Judicial Nominations,‖ 
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if a president secures the confirmation of more than one Justice for the Court, those Justices must vote as a 
bloc to influence public policy in a manner consistent with the president‘s agenda and influence the 
outcome of a case. See Stefanie Lindquist, David A. Yalof, and John A. Clark, ―The Impact of Presidential 
Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting within Presidential Blocs,‖ 
Political Research Quarterly 53 (2000): 795-814. Regardless of the number of presidential appointments, 
Tracey George and Lee Epstein argue that the ―special relationships‖ between presidents and sitting 
Justices often result in ―presidential preferences‖ being written ―into particular opinions.‖ See Tracey E. 
George and Lee Epstein, ―On the Nature of Supreme-Court Decision Making,‖ American Political Science 
Review 86 (1992): 325-326. Some scholars even suggest that a new appointment to the Court votes 
―concordantly‖ with the president who appointed the Justice, but that tendency declines as the tenure of 
the Justice increases. See Segal, Timpone, and Howard, ―Buyer Beware?‖ 569.  
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 Greenburg, Supreme Conflict, 314-315. Lee Epstein and his colleagues argue that Greenburg‘s book is 
―famous for [this] punchline [sic].‖ See Lee Epstein, Kevin Quinn, Andrew D. Martin, and Jeffrey A. 
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John G. Roberts, Jr.: The Elusive Court Candidate? 
 Many Supreme Court watchers agreed that the nomination of John Roberts, first 
as an Associate Justice and then as the Chief Justice, was a ‗safe‘ pick for the Court. 
They viewed Roberts as the ―stealth candidate,‖20 a Justice David Souter-like nominee 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Segal, ―On the Perils of Drawing Inferences about Supreme Court Justices from Their First Few Years of 
Service,‖ Judicature 91 (2008): 169. Many scholars concluded that President Bush‘s potential nominees 
could significantly alter the Court. For example, as Stephen Martino suggested, ―A change in even one 
Justice could tip the balance of power,‖ and ―[t]he departure of any Justice could unsettle the Court‘s 
equilibrium. . . . The confirmation of one or two Justices in the mold of Justices Scalia and Thomas could 
firmly shift the Court to the right.‖ Martino, ―Change on the Horizon,‖ 167, 172-173. Kenneth Manning 
and his colleagues reached a similar conclusion: ―[A] single vacancy could produce a dramatic shift in the 
ideological direction of future rulings. . . . A departure by any of these [Rehnquist, Stevens, or O‘Connor] 
could have enormous policy consequences.‖ Manning, Carroll, and Carp, ―George W. Bush‘s Potential 
Supreme Court Nominees,‖ 278. Other scholars offered different assessments. One suggested that since 
the Court ―is conservative on most issues, and moderate on some . . . a George W. Bush presidency is not 
likely to have any immediate affect on the Court;‖ instead, a Bush appointment would ―preserve‖ the 
conservative tilt of the Court rather than ―alter the direction of the [C]ourt.‖ Paul Finkelman, ―You Can‘t 
Always Get What You Want. . .: Presidential Elections and Supreme Court Appointments,‖ Tulsa Law 
Journal 35 (2000): 475. Some scholars even predicted that if Bush appointed a Justice, the Court would 
shift to the left rather than to the right. See Martin, Quinn, and Epstein, ―The Median Justice,‖ 1275-1322. 
Both of these scholars‘ studies, however, did not consider the shift-implications for the Court if President 
Bush seated two Justices on the Court. 
20
 Joyce Baugh defines ―stealth‖ candidates as ―individuals who share [the president‘s] ideological 
perspectives but lack a ‗paper trail‘ of controversial writings and speeches.‖ Joyce A. Baugh, Supreme 
Court Justices in the Post-Bork Era: Confirmation Politics and Judicial Performance (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2002), 4. Regarding both Democratic and Republican fears that Roberts, too, was a stealth 
candidate, Cathleen Kaveny wrote: ―Liberals worry that Roberts is a stealth Antonin Scalia. Conservatives 
worry that he is a stealth David Souter.‖ Cathleen Kaveny, ―The Martyrdom of John Roberts,‖ 
Commonweal, September 9, 2005, 7. One scholar, however, suggests, ―David Souter‘s ‗stealth‘ 
nomination to the Court cast a shadow over the [selection] process. . . . This raises the question of whether 
the possibility for such stealth nominations has decreased.‖ See Nemacheck, Strategic Selection, 143-144. 
Much scholarship exists that critiques the ‗stealth‘ nomination strategy. One criticism centers on the 
competency of the nominee. Michael Comiskey argues that ―the modern confirmation process‖ involves 
the search for nominees‘ ―paper trails,‖ which actually ―discourages presidents from nominating especially 
able figures who have thought and written much about legal issues.‖ Michael Comiskey, Seeking Justices: 
The Judging of Supreme Court Nominees (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 85. Sharing the 
same concern, as two other scholars suggest, ―The politicization of the confirmation process has also 
created an incentive for the president to select nominees whose paper record will not excite serious 
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lacking a lengthy paper trail that might potentially derail his confirmation during the 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, as occurred with President Reagan‘s selection of 
Robert Bork.
21
 Bork‘s paper trail included an abundance of controversial articles he 
penned and speeches he delivered, which thereby provided Senators with a vast corpus 
                                                                                                                                                                           
opposition or who have no paper record at all.‖ See Norman Vieira and Leonard Gross, Supreme Court 
Appointments: Judge Bork and the Politicization of Senate Confirmations (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1998), 251. Also see David R. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, ―The Senate, the 
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process,‖ Yale Law Journal 101 (1992): 1492. A second criticism of 
the ―stealth strategy,‖ according to Albert Melone and his colleagues, is that nominating a perceived 
stealth candidate for the Court ―does nothing for maintaining judicial impartiality . . . nor supports the 
principle of judicial independence.‖ Melone, Morris, and Pufong, ―Too Little Advice,‖ 188. For additional 
criticisms relating to stealth nominees, see Richard Davis, ―Supreme Court Nominations and the News 
Media,‖ Albany Law Review 57 (1994): 1063. On the value of a nominee‘s paper trail and the subsequent 
questioning about the nominee‘s ―speeches and writings and expert analysis of those speeches and 
writings,‖ see Gary J. Simson, ―Mired in the Confirmation Mess [book review essay],‖ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (1995): 1045. Additional discussions include Elena Kagan, ―Confirmation 
Messes, Old and New [book review essay],‖ University of Chicago Law Review 62 (1995): 937; Melone, 
―The Senate‘s Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 79; William G. Ross, ―The 
Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating 
the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees,‖ Tulane Law Review 62 (1987): 167; 
and, Nadine Strossen, ―The Constitutional Litmus Test,‖ American Prospect 14 (1993): 99-105. 
21
 George Watson and John Stookey explain the rationale behind Justice Souter‘s nomination to the Court: 
―Dubbed the ‗stealth nominee‘ because so few people knew anything about him and having virtually no 
paper trail to link him one way or another to key issues, Souter represented a reasonably safe nominee in a 
setting not particularly favorable for the president.‖ Watson and Stookey, Shaping America, 63. Souter 
earned the label ‗stealth candidate‘ since he had ―written no books, no appellate court opinions, and one 
law review article.‖ ―Succeeding Souter,‖ Wall Street Journal, May 2-3, 2009, A10. On Souter as a stealth 
candidate, see Tinsley E. Yarbrough, David Hackett Souter: Traditional Republican on the Rehnquist 
Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 94-116. Aptly, Yarbrough titles chapter three, ―Stealth 
Candidate.‖ For more on the Souter nomination, see Michael Comiskey, ―Can the Senate Examine the 
Constitutional Philosophies of Supreme Court Nominees?‖ PS: Political Science and Politics 26 (1993): 
495-500; Comiskey, Seeking Justices, 10; Halloran, Gilgoff, Schulte, and Samuel, ―Man of the Hour,‖ 18; 
Thomas M. Keck, ―David H. Souter: Liberal Constitutionalism and the Brennan Seat,‖ in Rehnquist 
Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic, ed. Earl M. Maltz, 185-215 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2003), especially ―The ‗Stealth Nominee‘ Joins the Court,‖ 186-189; and, Vieira and Gross, 
Supreme Court Appointments, 193-199. 
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of artifacts from which they could discern Bork‘s judicial temperament.22 Roberts, on 
the other hand, largely remained an enigma with respect to any significant paper trail. As 
Hermann Schwartz, a law professor at American University, noted, Roberts ―doesn‘t 
make speeches. He doesn‘t write articles.‖23 One reporter following the president‘s 
selection of Roberts concluded, ―Bush placed a premium on choosing a conservative 
without an extensive or controversial trail of writings and speeches that can be dissected 
                                                          
22
 For more on Bork, his judicial philosophy, and his confirmation hearings, see Robert H. Bork, The 
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Ethan 
Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America (New York: Union Square Press, 
2007); David P. Bryden, ―How to Select a Supreme Court Justice: The Case of Robert Bork,‖ American 
Scholar 57 (1988): 201-217; Stephen L. Carter, ―Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the 
People to Rise and Battle for Justice,‖ Texas Law Review 69 (1991): 759-793; David J. Danelski, 
―Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 
84 (1990): 900-920; Dennis DeConcini, ―The Confirmation Process,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal 
Commentary 7 (1991): 1-13; Bruce Fein, ―A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role,‖ Harvard Law 
Review 102 (1989): 672-687; Mark Gitenstein, Matters of Principle: An Insiders Account of America’s 
Rejection of Robert Bork’s Nomination to the Supreme Court (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); 
Greenburg, Supreme Conflict, 48-52; Stephen M. Griffin, ―Politics and the Supreme Court: The Case of 
the Bork Nomination,‖ Journal of Law & Politics 5 (1989): 551-604; Lawrence C. Marshall, ―Intellectual 
Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 832-850; Thomas 
B. McAffee, ―The Role of Legal Scholars in the Confirmation Hearings for Supreme Court Nominees—
Some Reflections,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 211-244; Gary L. McDowell, ―The 
War for the Constitution,‖ Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2007, A19; Patrick B. McGuigan and Dawn 
M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice: The Fight for Bork (Washington, D.C.: Free Congress Foundation, 1990); 
Robert F. Nagel, ―Advice, Consent, and Influence,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 858-
875; Johnathan O‘Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 161-189; Lori J. Owens, Original Intent and the Struggle for 
the Supreme Court: The Politics of Judicial Appointments (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2005), 99-146; Michael Pertschuk and Wendy Schaetzel, The People Rising: The Campaign Against the 
Bork Nomination (New York: Thunder‘s Mouth Press, 1989); Scott R. Ryther, ―Advice and Consent: The 
Senate‘s Political Role in the Supreme Court Appointment Process,‖ Utah Law Review 1988 (1988): 411-
433; and, Vieira and Gross, Supreme Court Appointments. For selected transcripts from the hearings that 
include Senators‘ questions and Bork‘s answers, see Ralph E. Shaffer, ed. The Bork Hearings: Highlights 
from the Most Controversial Judicial Confirmation Battle in U.S. History (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2005). 
23
 As quoted in Halloran, Gilgoff, Schulte, and Samuel, ―Man of the Hour,‖ 20. 
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and attacked by critics.‖24 For many observers, then, it appeared that Roberts could 
survive the scrutiny of the confirmation hearings in the post-Bork era of Supreme Court 
politics.  
Other Court watchers, however, disagreed with the assessment of Roberts as a 
stealth candidate. Several noted that Roberts ―brings with him solid conservative 
credentials and a paper trail on abortion and civil liberties that will give opponents 
ammunition in a confirmation battle.‖25 Responding to President Bush‘s announcement 
of nominating Roberts for Chief Justice, Senate Judiciary Committee member Edward 
M. Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts, commented that after reading ―the limited 
available parts of his record‖ Senators had ―serious concerns about his role in the 1980s 
in seeking to weaken voting rights, roll back women‘s rights, and impede our progress 
toward a more equal nation.‖26 Ultimately, however, no one discovered a ‗smoking gun‘ 
that could significantly affect Roberts‘ confirmation, so prior to the hearings Roberts 
appeared certain to avoid a Bork- or Clarence Thomas-like interrogation by the Judiciary 
Committee. 
 Roberts‘ qualifications for the High Court, though, did pose a problem for many 
who had anticipated President Bush‘s selection for a Chief Justice. Both Democrats and 
Republicans ―could barely hide their disappointment with Roberts‘ lack of a red-meat 
                                                          
24
 Kenneth T. Walsh, ―The President‘s Shrewd Surprise,‖ U.S. News & World Report, August 1, 2005, 20. 
25
 Susan Page and Kathy Kiely, ―Praise on One Side; Questions on the Other,‖ USA Today, July 20, 2005, 
6A. 
26
 As quoted in Klein, ―Bush Picks Roberts for Chief Justice,‖ A1. 
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résumé.‖27 Some critics focused on Roberts‘ limited adjudicative experience, noting that 
Roberts ―had only two years as a judge under his belt before getting the nod for the high 
court, following years in private practice,‖28 though other observers found that Roberts 
had ―a sterling record as a lawyer‖29 and that he possessed ―outstanding legal 
qualifications.‖30 Indeed, Roberts‘ academic, political, and judicial pedigree justifies his 
supporters‘ claims: Roberts graduated summa cum laude from Harvard University and 
magna cum laude from Harvard Law School; during the Reagan administration he 
served in the Justice Department as Special Assistant to the Attorney General and in the 
White House Counsel‘s office as Associate Counsel to the President, and during the 
George H. W. Bush administration he served in the Justice Department as Principal 
Deputy Solicitor General; he held judicial clerkships with the Second Circuit Court‘s 
Judge Henry J. Friendly and with Associate Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist; and, 
Roberts successfully litigated with the Washington D.C. firm Hogan & Hartson, during 
which time he argued 39 cases before the Supreme Court.
31
 As Roberts‘ confirmation 
hearings grew closer, opinion polls revealed that the majority of the public found 
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 Evan Thomas and Stuart Taylor, Jr., ―Judging Roberts,‖ Newsweek, August 1, 2005, 24. 
28
 Jess Bravin, ―What Résumé Does a Justice Really Need?‖ Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2005, A5. 
29
 Dorsen, ―The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,‖ 654. 
30
 Lee Epstein, René Lindstädt, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland, ―The Changing Dynamics of 
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees,‖ Journal of Politics 68 (2006): 297. Also see Lincoln Caplan, 
―Litmus Tests,‖ Legal Affairs 4 (2005): 1. 
31
 See Toobin, The Nine, 262-264. Also see Hensley, Baugh, and Smith, ―The First-Term Performance,‖ 
628, and Neubauer and Meinhold, Battle Supreme, 3-4. 
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Roberts qualified to hold the position of Chief Justice,
32
 so the experience and 
qualifications‘ debate became moot points on which to attack the president‘s candidate 
for the Court. 
 With little else on which to thwart the president‘s selection for a new Chief 
Justice, Judge Roberts‘ confirmation hearings began without a cloud of controversy 
hovering above his head. Consequently, as Newsweek predicted, ―Roberts seems 
destined to be confirmed without the kind of stormy melodrama that boosts cable-TV 
ratings and fills the coffers of activist groups in Washington.‖33 Perhaps, then, Roberts‘ 
appearance and testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee would provide candid 
insight about the man nominated for the Chief Justice‘s position. 
The Confirmation Hearings: An Exercise in Futility? 
 There is little doubt that the confirmation hearings that take place before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee serve a vital purpose in America‘s democratic system.34 
While the Constitution grants power to the president to appoint Justices to the Supreme 
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 See Neubauer and Meinhold, Battle Supreme, 16-17. 
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 Thomas and Taylor, Jr., ―Judging Roberts,‖ 24. 
34
 See, for example, Comiskey, Seeking Justices, 35-39; Trevor Parry-Giles, The Character of Justice: 
Rhetoric, Law, and Politics in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process (East Lansing: Michigan State 
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the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate,‖ University of Illinois Law Review 1988 (1988): 101-117. 
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Court, the Constitution also delegates to the Senate the role of ―advice and consent.‖35 
The Senate‘s constitutional charge, therefore, allows the legislative branch to serve as a 
check on the executive branch‘s appointment power for seats on the nation‘s highest 
court in the judicial branch.  
During the early twentieth century, though, even when exercising its ‗advice and 
consent‘ role, Senators traditionally deferred to the president‘s prerogative in appointing 
a new member for the Court.
36
 In fact, prior to 1954, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
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 United States Constitution, Article II, §2, clause 2. For excellent discussions on the historical grounds 
for clause 2 and the advice and consent process, see W. William Hodes, ―The Overtly ‗Political‘ Character 
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 As Mark Silverstein notes, the nomination and confirmation process traditionally followed a ―politics of 
acquiescence.‖ Mark Silverstein, ―Bill Clinton‘s Excellent Adventure: Political Development and the 
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Cornell Clayton, 133-147 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 136. While Senators may have 
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rarely requested that a nominee for the Court appear before the Committee.
37
 Two 
important events, however, significantly altered both the nomination and the 
confirmation processes. 
The first major event that changed the processes resulted from the Supreme 
Court‘s 1954 landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education38 that banned 
segregation. Largely due to the conservative Southern Democrats on the Committee and 
their disapproval with the Court‘s decision, Senators wanted to scrutinize more 
thoroughly candidates for the Court. Future nominees, therefore, began regularly 
appearing before the Committee. More importantly, however, the post-Brown 
confirmation hearings ushered in the Committee practice of questioning nominees on 
their views toward the Constitution and their views on particular Court decisions, two 
areas traditionally considered outside the purview of the confirmation hearings process.
39
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 According to William Ross, the ―first personal appearance by a nominee‖ before the Judiciary 
Committee took place in 1925, when Attorney General Harlan F. Stone briefly testified to respond to 
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The second major event that changed the processes resulted from a series of 
rather surprising events: three speeches delivered by Edwin Meese, the Attorney General 
for the Reagan administration.
40
 Appointed to his post in 1984, Meese delivered a 
controversial speech before the American Bar Association on July 9, 1985.
41
 In his 
speech, Meese discussed the position held by the Reagan administration, which 
supported a ―jurisprudence of original intention,‖ or a view of the Constitution in which 
Justices should take ―the words of the document to mean now what they meant in the 
eighteenth century,‖ as drafted and written by the Framers.42 In his address, Meese 
criticized the Supreme Court‘s liberal decisions in the areas of federalism, criminal law, 
and religion, respectively.
43
 On July 17, 1985, Meese delivered a similar speech in 
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 For an excellent discussion of the three speeches and Meese and Brennan‘s views on the Constitution, 
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A&M University Press, 2005). 
42
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London, England, before the American Bar Association.
44
 Meese‘s speeches ―ignited a 
firestorm‖ and Associate Justice William J. Brennan delivered a speech at Georgetown 
University on October 12 in which he ―responded vigorously‖ to Meese‘s criticism of 
the Court.
45
 Brennan described the ‗original intention‘ view as ―little more than 
arrogance cloaked as humility‖ and he defended how the Justices‘ interpreted and used 
the Constitution‘s text in their decision-making.46 Not to be outdone by a member of the 
Court, Meese responded to Brennan‘s speech with a speech of his own a month later, on 
November 15.
47
 The oratorical debate did not remain limited to Meese and Brennan; the 
content of their speeches generated a larger debate in the legal community over the 
appropriate approaches to constitutional interpretation, especially approaches that 
involved deference to the doctrine of ‗original intention.‘ More importantly, however, 
the exchange between Meese and Brennan mobilized Congress, and the debate 
foreshadowed the partisan climate that any Reagan nominees to the Court would face. 
President Reagan soon discovered how extensive the fallout from Meese‘s speech would 
be.  
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 See William J. Brennan, Jr., ―The Great Debate: [Speech] To the Text and Teaching Symposium, 
Georgetown University,‖ October 12, 1985, http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.50/default.asp (accessed 
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In 1987, President Reagan had a third opportunity to fill a Court vacancy,
48
 and 
he nominated Judge Robert Bork from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia for the open seat on the Court. The Judiciary Committee seized the 
opportunity to vet Bork‘s résumé. The Senators uncovered a ‗paper trail‘ of controversial 
opinions, speeches, and writings on which Committee members could focus their 
attention during Bork‘s confirmation hearing. The Committee quickly demonstrated 
through its questioning that Bork, sounding like a clone of Meese, adhered to an 
‗original intention‘ approach to resolving constitutional questions, and with the Judiciary 
Committee‘s recommendation against seating Bork on the Court, the full Senate 
resoundingly rejected Bork‘s nomination.  
As a consequence of the Meese/Brennan debate, the Bork confirmation hearings 
added two new dimensions to the Judiciary Committee‘s practices that further expanded 
upon the post-Brown changes. The first change involved the Committee‘s exercise of 
questioning nominees not only on their views toward the Constitution, but also on their 
judicial philosophy as it relates to how they interpret the Constitution. The second, and 
more important, change involved not simply questioning nominees on their views on 
particular Court decisions, but widening the scope to include questions to elicit answers 
on how a nominee would resolve particular issues that came before the Court. In other 
words, Senators wanted to know how the nominee would cast a vote on a case before the 
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 Reagan‘s previous Court nominees included the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O‘Connor (confirmed) 
and the 1986 nomination of Antonin Scalia (confirmed). Reagan also elevated Justice William Rehnquist 
to the Chief Justice‘s seat upon the retirement of Warren Burger in 1986. Justice Scalia took Rehnquist‘s 
seat on the Court. 
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Court. While scholars concur that the Committee‘s inquiry process gradually changed 
further throughout the twentieth century, the majority of scholars agree that the Bork 
hearings ushered in a new manner in which Senators questioned nominees during the 
confirmation hearings.
49
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 Many scholars contend that the Bork hearings changed the focus from a nominee‘s competency and 
qualifications for sitting on the Court to a focus on the nominee‘s judicial and/or political ideology. For 
example, as G. Calvin Mackenzie described the event, ―The turning point [in nominations] came with the 
Senate rejection of Robert Bork‘s nomination to the Supreme Court…This was nothing less than scorched-
earth politics and it changed the rules of the game in judicial appointments.‖ G. Calvin Mackenzie, 
―Starting Over: The Presidential Appointment Process in 1997,‖ A Twentieth Century Fund/Century 
Foundation White Paper, The Twentieth Century Fund Foundation, 1998: 20. John Frank notes that the 
Bork hearings were ―truly important in the history of Supreme Court appointments because it was the first 
out-and-out examination of ideology.‖ John Frank, ―Are the Justices Quasi-Legislators Now?‖ 
Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 924. Jan Crawford Greenburg offers a similar view: ―The 
battle over Robert Bork redefined and reshaped the Senate confirmation process and influenced the 
decisions of future presidents and the preparation of future nominees.‖ Greenburg, Supreme Conflict, 52. 
According to John Felice and Herbert Weisberg, ―the Bork proceedings opened the doors for intensive 
screening and questioning of future candidates‘ judicial philosophies and ideological beliefs.‖ John D. 
Felice and Herbert F. Weisberg, ―The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region in 
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 1953-1988,‖ Kentucky Law Journal 77 (1988-1989): 510. For 
a discussion on the resultant changes to the confirmation and nomination criteria as a result of the Bork 
hearings, see Epstein, Lindstädt, Segal, and Westerland, ―The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on 
Supreme Court Nominees,‖ 296-307; Parry-Giles, The Character of Justice; and, Vieira and Gross, 
Supreme Court Appointments, 247-254. There are scholars, however, who disagree with the claims that 
Bork‘s confirmation hearings significantly altered the confirmation hearings‘ process and the confirmation 
criteria. James Gauch, for example, notes, ―Although many decried the injection of politics into Robert 
Bork‘s nomination and rejection in 1987, political attacks on judicial nominees are nothing new.‖ James E. 
Gauch, ―The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments,‖ University of Chicago Law 
Review 56 (1989): 337. Elena Kagan shares a similar perspective: ―That so-called [confirmation] mess . . . 
ended right after it began, with the defeat of the nomination of Robert Bork,‖ and ―[t]he problem is not 
that the Bork hearings have set a pattern for all others; the problem is that they have not.‖ Kagan, 
―Confirmation Messes, Old and New,‖ 929, 942. Also see Frank Guliuzza III, Daniel J. Reagan, and 
David M. Barrett, ―Character, Competency, and Constitutionalism: Did the Bork Nomination Represent a 
Fundamental Shift in Confirmation Criteria?‖ Marquette Law Review 75 (1992): 405-437, and Frank 
Guliuzza III, Daniel J. Reagan, and David M. Barrett, ―The Senate Judiciary Committee and Supreme 
Court Nominees: Measuring the Dynamics of Confirmation Criteria,‖ Journal of Politics 56 (1994): 773-
787. While the post-Bork debate continues, two scholars conclude that faced with a potential confirmation 
battle, a ―president‘s action on judicial nominations may be influenced by the post-Bork confirmation 
atmosphere, even when the prospects for confirmation are generally favorable.‖ Vieira and Gross, 
Supreme Court Appointments, 254. 
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Clearly, the post-Brown and post-Bork confirmation hearings significantly differ 
from the confirmation practices of the early twentieth century. Today, every candidate 
for the Court must appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
50
 engage in several 
days of often adversarial hearings where Senators interrogate the nominee and the 
nominee offers testimony before the inquisitors, and then hope the Committee submits 
the nominee‘s name to the floor of the Senate for a confirmation vote.51 The 
disappearance of ‗presidential deference‘ and the appearance of ‗congressional distrust‘ 
now loom large in the effort to seat new Justices on the Court.
52
 
In fact, the political climate for potential nominees remains less than friendly. As 
Judge Clarence Thomas quickly discovered, confirmation hearings can rapidly digress 
into a character inquisition (or assassination, depending on one‘s political ideology).53 
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 Margaret Williams and Lawrence Baum describe a nominee‘s appearance before the Committee as ―the 
heart of the confirmation process.‖ Margaret Williams and Lawrence Baum, ―Questioning Judges about 
Their Decisions: Supreme Court Nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee,‖ Judicature 90 (2006): 
74. 
51
 If the Judiciary Committee votes to approve a nominee, it automatically sends that nomination to the full 
Senate for a vote. The Committee also may vote that it does not approve of the nominee, and the 
Committee then has the option of either sending or not sending the nomination to the full Senate for a 
vote. See Bryon J. Moraski and Charles R. Shipan, ―The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A 
Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices,‖ American Journal of Political Science 43 (1999): 1092. 
For alternative submission processes that involve the use of the blue slip, or the deference to the approval 
or disapproval recommendation from the senator from a nominee‘s home state, see Denning, ―The ‗Blue 
Slip,‘‖ 75-101, and Brannon P. Denning, ―The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip,‖ 
Judicature 85 (2002): 218-226.  
52
 See, for example, Yvette M. Barksdale, ―Advise and Consent,‖ Case Western Law Review 47 (1997): 
1399. Barksdale argues that while the Senate still follows the ―current standard of deference to presidential 
nominees,‖ she notes that senators will oppose nominees who are extremely partisan (too conservative or 
too liberal) and/or extremely ideological.  
53
 For scholarship on Clarence Thomas‘ nomination and subsequent confirmation troubles, see Dow and 
Westin, ―What We Should Learn from the Hill vs. Thomas Fiasco,‖ 81-91; J. James Exon, ―Is a 
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And while not all subsequent Court nominees suffered through similar Thomas-like 
hearings, the reality is that in the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court—and seats on 
it—has become ―a political battle ground.‖54 The majority of scholars continually 
conclude that the Senate has abdicated its ‗advice and consent‘ role and replaced it with 
an ‗admonition and refusal‘ role. For example, consider how legal scholars characterize 
the current confirmation process: one describes it as ―a political donnybrook,‖55 another 
                                                                                                                                                                           
‗Philosophically Balanced‘ Supreme Court Possible?‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 
25-29; Charles E. Grassley, ―The Judicial Nomination Process,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 
7 (1991): 31-39; Martin Shefter, ―Institutional Conflict over Presidential Appointments: The Case of 
Clarence Thomas,‖ PS: Political Science and Politics 25 (1992): 676-679; Simon, ―Advice and Consent,‖ 
41-47; and, Christopher E. Smith, Critical Judicial Nominations and Political Change: The Impact of 
Clarence Thomas (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). On calls to reform the confirmation process as a result of 
the Thomas hearings, see Donald P. Judges, ―Confirmation as Consciousness Raising: Lessons for the 
Supreme Court from the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearings,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal 
Commentary 7 (1991): 147-177, and Theodore B. Olson, ―The Thomas Hearings, Confirmations and 
Congressional Ethics,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 245-255. 
54
 Mary Katherine Boyte, ―The Supreme Court Confirmation Process in Crisis: Is the System Defective, or 
Merely the Participants?‖ Whittier Law Review 14 (1993): 544. Despite the views of many Court watchers 
regarding President George W. Bush‘s potential nominees, with most Court nominations, the majority of 
senators, regardless of their political party, do not want to ―engage in political bloodletting over Supreme 
Court nominations.‖ See Comiskey, ―Can the Senate Examine the Constitutional Philosophies of Supreme 
Court Nominees?‖ 495. 
55
 Davis, ―Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media,‖ 1066. Stephen Martino terms the 
constitutionally-stipulated nomination and confirmation process ―a Beltway two-step.‖ Martino, ―Change 
on the Horizon,‖ 165. William Bradford Reynolds concurs, and he notes, ―Judicial appointments (like 
many others) have thus become political free-for-alls, with . . . little meaningful examination of the 
nominee.‖ William Bradford Reynolds, ―Revisiting the Confirmation Process Only to Find It in the Same 
State of Disrepair,‖ Judicature 75 (1992): 228. Perhaps Davis‘ claim alludes to President George H.W. 
Bush‘s nomination of Clarence Thomas for the Court in 1991. Referring to Bush‘s efforts to pack the 
Court with conservative Justices, Leslie Gelb stated, ―No President has the right to transform the Court 
into an ideological hit squad.‖ Leslie Gelb, New York Times, October 13, 1991, E15. Also see John 
Anthony Maltese, ―Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process under Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush,‖ Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 5 (2001): 1-28. 
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calls it ―the political circus,‖56 and yet another deems the process ―confirmation-by-
litmus test.‖57 Some scholars even suggest that today‘s confirmation hearings amount to 
little more than Senators attempting ―to ‗catch‘ the nominee‖ making a statement during 
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 Gerald Walpin, ―Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial Nominations Confirmation Process,‖ Texas 
Review of Law & Politics 8 (2003): 90. Calvin Massey offers a similar assessment of the process, and 
notes, ―politics are at the heart of the confirmation process. There is no way to drain the politics from this 
swamp.‖ Calvin R. Massey, ―Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court 
Appointments,‖ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 19 (1991): 16. Also see David M. O‘Brien, 
Judicial Roulette: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Judicial Selection (New York: 
Priority Press Publications, 1988). 
57
 William Bradford Reynolds, ―The Confirmation Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent,‖ 
Judicature 75 (1991): 80. Much has been written on the Senate‘s role in the confirmation process. Some 
Court scholars support the position that Barbara Perry and Henry Abraham advocate: ―[A] candidate‘s 
merit should be the primary criterion for selection to the Supreme Court.‖ Barbara A. Perry and Henry J. 
Abraham, ―A ‗Responsive‘ Supreme Court? The Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer Appointments,‖ 
Judicature 81 (1998): 165. Other scholars believe that ―[i]f nominees refuse to answer legitimate 
questions, then senators need not confirm them.‖ Melone, Morris, and Pufong, ―Too Little Advice,‖ 189. 
Other scholars oppose litmus tests for nominees. As one suggests, ―Perhaps some substantial changes are 
in order to increase the focus of attention on Supreme Court nominees‘ legal skills and capacities rather 
than their abilities to surpass whatever prevailing litmus test is being promoted at the moment.‖ Robert C. 
Bradley, ―Who are the Great Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?‖ in Great Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Ratings & Case Studies, ed. William D. Pederson and Norman W. Provizer, 1-31 (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1993), 23. Even one of the longest-serving members of the Judiciary Committee, 
Senator Joseph Biden, advises that ―the Senate must not apply litmus tests of its own. No party to the 
process of naming federal judges has any business attempting to foreclose upon the future decisions of the 
nominees.‖ Biden, ―The Constitution, the Senate, and the Court,‖ 954. Ironically, however, the Committee 
seems prone to engaging in the type of questioning that Biden criticizes, where nominees must navigate 
treacherous litmus test subjects such as abortion, affirmative action, economic rights, environmental 
protection, and federal powers. Law professor Charles Black alludes to these subjects as ―the large issues 
of the day,‖ and he argues that the Senate should inquire into a nominee‘s ―views‖ on these issues, 
especially if holding particular views ―will make it harmful to the country for him to sit and vote on the 
Court . . .‖ See Charles L. Black, ―A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,‖ Yale 
Law Journal 79 (1970): 657. For more on litmus tests, see Bruce Fein, ―Supreme Court Nominations; No: 
Don‘t Get Down to Cases,‖ American Bar Association Journal 79 (1993): 43; John Paul Jones, ―Making 
Judicial Nominees Answer Senate Questions,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 139-
145; Jon O. Newman, ―Probing Views and Allegations in the Confirmation of Federal Judges,‖ St. John’s 
Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 15-24; Roger Pilon, ―How Constitutional Corruption Has Led to 
Ideological Litmus Tests for Judicial Nominees,‖ Policy Analysis, August 6, 2002: 1-18; and, Watson and 
Stookey, Shaping America.  
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the hearings that ―reveals a belief so extreme‖ that the nominee poses an imminent 
danger to the public if seated on the Court.
58
 Court nominees now encounter a Senate 
that in its confirmation voting ―deemphasizes ethics, competence, and integrity and 
stresses instead politics, philosophy, and ideology,‖59 or what Professor of Law Stephen 
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 Strauss and Sunstein, ―The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process,‖ 1491. As another 
scholar notes, ―senators questioning candidates for the Court have repeatedly asked whether they would 
‗follow the Constitution‘ and precedent, even though no consensus has existed as to what ‗following the 
Constitution‘ means.‖ Stephen E. Gottlieb, ―The Rehnquist Court (1986-[2005]): Radical Revision of 
Constitutional Law,‖ in The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice, ed. Christopher 
Tomlins, 327-356 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005): 331. 
59
 Epstein, Lindstädt, Segal, and Westerland, ―The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme 
Court Nominees,‖ 296. Many legal scholars have written on the problems with the nomination and 
confirmation processes. See, for example, Sarah A. Binder, ―The Senate as a Black Hole? Lessons 
Learned from the Judicial Appointments Experience,‖ in Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the 
Presidential Appointments Process, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie, 173-195 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2001); Stephen L. Carter, ―Why the Confirmation Process Can‘t be Fixed,‖ University of 
Illinois Law Review 1993 (1993): 1-19; Davis, ―Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media,‖ 1061-
1079; Friedman, ―Tribal Myths,‖ 1316-1318; Paul A. Freund, ―Appointment of Justices: Some Historical 
Perspectives,‖ Harvard Law Review 101 (1988): 1146-1163; Kagan, ―Confirmation Messes, Old and 
New,‖ 919-942; Massey, ―Getting There,‖ 1-16; Moritz, ―‗Statistical Judo,‘‖ 341-394; Reynolds, ―The 
Confirmation Process,‖ 80-82; Strauss and Sunstein, ―The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process,‖ 1491-1524; and, Jeffrey K. Tulis, ―Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, the President, and 
Appointments to the Supreme Court,‖ Case Western Reserve Law Review 47 (1997): 1331-1357. For 
scholarship that offers specific proposals for reforming the nomination and confirmation processes, see 
Brannon P. Denning, ―Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing ‗Despise and Resent‘ with 
‗Advice and Consent,‘‖ Administrative Law Review 53 (2001): 1-44; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Next 
Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2007); Ray Forrester, ―A Call for Integrity,‖ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 19 (1991): 17-21; 
Arthur S. Leonard, ―A Proposal to Reform the Process for Confirming Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 193-202; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
―Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process,‖ Southern 
California Law Review 65 (1992): 1577-1582; Ross, ―The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at 
Senate Confirmation Hearings,‖ 109-174; Tuan Samahon, ―The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of 
Nomination and Advice and Consent,‖ Ohio State Law Journal 67 (2006): 783-847; and, Walpin, ―Take 
Obstructionism Out,‖ 89-112. Some scholars do, however, oppose making changes to the nomination and 
confirmation processes. See, for example, Martino, ―Change on the Horizon,‖ 164-190, and William G. 
Ross, ―The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for Synthesis,‖ Albany Law Review 57 (1994): 
993-1042. 
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Carter terms ―disqualifying factors.‖60 Consequently, few Court scholars believe the 
confirmation process, as nominees experience it today, actually functions as a process 
that thoroughly investigates the nominee‘s competence and qualifications for serving on 
the Court; discovering the nominee‘s ideological leanings and ascertaining potential 
voting behaviors have become the determinate criterion for judging a nominee‘s fitness 
for the Court.
61
  
Has the Judiciary Committee‘s search for ‗disqualifying factors,‘ though, 
hampered or improved the confirmation process? There is little doubt that the search 
primarily centers on asking questions to elicit responses to which ‗judicial philosophy‘ 
the nominee adheres and on how the nominee will resolve cases before the Court.
62
 Yet 
despite the Committee‘s efforts to ascertain a nominee‘s ideological leanings and the 
constitutional theory to which a nominee subscribes, and how those might influence the 
nominee‘s vote on a case, Court scholars continue to debate whether the Committee‘s 
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 See Stephen L. Carter, ―The Confirmation Mess, Continued,‖ University of Cincinnati Law Review 62 
(1993): 75-100, and Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointment 
Process (New York: Basic Books, 1994). For critiques of Carter‘s book, see Michael J. Gerhardt, ―The 
Confirmation Mystery [book review],‖ Georgetown Law Journal 83 (1994): 395-459; Kagan, 
―Confirmation Messes, Old and New,‖ 919-942; Paulsen, ―Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess,‖ 
549-579; and, Simson, ―Mired in the Confirmation Mess,‖ 1035-1063. 
61
 As Lee Epstein and his colleagues note, while Senators ―attend to the nominees‘ qualifications, 
ideological compatibility now takes precedence.‖ See Epstein, Segal, and Westerland, ―The Increasing 
Importance of Ideology,‖ 102. 
62
 See Boyte, ―The Supreme Court Confirmation Process in Crisis,‖ 517-547; Carter, ―The Confirmation 
Mess,‖ 1185-1201; and, Arlen Specter, ―Concluding Address: On the Confirmation of a Supreme Court 
Justice,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1990): 1037-1046.   
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hearings, and the nominee‘s testimony, actually produce either result.63 Part of the blame 
rests with the type of questions posed to the nominees; part of the blame rests with the 
manner in which nominees respond to their interrogators.
64
 Consider, for example, Law 
Professor Bruce Ackerman‘s explanation: 
[M]ost nominees can blandly assure the Senate that they have yet to grapple with 
the large questions of constitutional law that await them on the bench, and 
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 For general discussions on the effectiveness of hearings and questioning, see Michael Comiskey, ―The 
Usefulness of Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judicial Nominees: The Case of Ruth Bader Ginsburg‖ 
PS: Political Science and Politics 27 (1994): 224-227; Comiskey, Seeking Justices, 39-48; Cooper, 
―Tilting at Windmills,‖ 443-452; Dorsen, ―The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,‖ 661; Heck and 
Shull, ―Policy Preferences of Justices and Presidents,‖ 335-336; Jan Palmer, ―Senate Confirmation of 
Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court,‖ Review of Social Economy 41 (1983): 152-162; and, Nina 
Totenberg, ―The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know,‖ Harvard Law Review 
101 (1988): 1213-1229. Writing about the nominations of Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist and 
the Committee‘s attempts to flesh out each nominee‘s judicial and political philosophy, Barry Goldwater 
cites the voting record of Justice Felix Frankfurter to illustrate that ―the judicial philosophy test . . . is an 
utterly fallacious practice.‖ Barry Goldwater, ―Political Philosophy and Supreme Court Justices,‖ 
American Bar Association Journal 58 (1972): 140. Similarly, as Richard Friedman argues, ―ideological 
consideration at the time of [a Justice‘s] nomination is futile to the extent that it is impossible to predict 
what those views will be over the course of his career on the Court.‖ Friedman, ―Tribal Myths,‖ 1316-
1291. Former Senator Paul Simon, a Committee member during both the Bork and Thomas hearings, 
argues that nominees should not have to reveal how they would rule on a particular case or issue but that 
they should tell Committee members the judicial ideology and/or philosophy to which they adhere. See 
Paul Simon, Advice and Consent: Clarence Thomas, Robert Bork and the Intriguing History of the 
Supreme Court’s Nomination Battles (Washington, D.C.: National Press Books, 1992), 308. For similar 
accounts, see Steven Lubet, ―Advice and Consent: Questions and Answers,‖ Northwestern University Law 
Review 84 (1990): 879-885; Jonathan Mallamud, ―Supreme Court Nominations and ‗Political‘ Decision-
Making,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 203-210; Melone, ―The Senate‘s 
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 68-79; Adam Mitzner, ―The Evolving Role of the 
Senate in Judicial Nominations,‖ 387-428; Ross, ―The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate 
Confirmation Hearings,‖ 109-174; Ross, ―The Supreme Court Appointment Process,‖ 993-1042; and, 
Ryther, ―Advice and Consent,‖ 411-433. Stephen Carter, however, argues that nominees should reveal 
neither their judicial philosophy nor signal how they might vote on a case before the Court, and attempts 
to commit a nominee to a vote or philosophy poses ―a terrible threat to the independence of the judiciary‖ 
if the Committee rejects a nominee based on the how the nominee answers the Senators‘ queries. See 
Carter, ―The Confirmation Mess,‖ 1197-1200. 
64
 As Edward Lazarus notes, ―After Bork, nominees mastered the art of not answering dangerous 
questions.‖ Edward Lazarus, ―Four Myths about the Supreme Court,‖ Time, June 8, 2009, 30. 
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promise that they will judge each case on its merits as the Lord allows them to 
grasp those merits.
65
 
 
While perhaps tinged with a bit of irony, Ackerman‘s explanation reveals that nominees 
often successfully avoid disclosing their judicial philosophy and their potential voting 
behavior; hence, the post-Brown and post-Bork changes to the confirmation process 
seem rather ineffectual in screening out ‗radical‘ Court nominees. 
The confirmation hearings, though, serve a secondary purpose as well: the 
hearings also provide an opportunity for Senators to check the president‘s attempts to 
pack the Court with Justices who may share the president‘s political ideology or who 
may potentially support the president‘s agenda.66 Attributed largely to Robert Dahl‘s 
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 Bruce A. Ackerman, ―Transformative Appointments,‖ Harvard Law Review 101 (1988): 1168. Also see 
Melone, ―The Senate‘s Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 68; Grover Rees III, 
―Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution,‖ Georgia 
Law Review 17 (1983): 913-967; and, Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, ―Ideological Values and the 
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,‖ American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 560-561. More 
importantly, though, how a nominee presages a possible opinion or vote on a case does not guarantee that 
the nominee will actually vote on a case consistent with his or her testimony before the Committee. For an 
extended discussion on this issue, see Ross, ―The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate 
Confirmation Hearings,‖ 141-144. Some scholars also suggest that Justices change their voting patterns 
after serving extensive time on the Court. See Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Harold 
J. Spaeth, ―Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,‖ 
Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 801-818. 
66
 While an important check on presidential power, Lloyd Cutler persuasively argues that ideally, neither 
the president nor congress should attempt to seat a Justice on the Court who conforms to either‘s political 
ideology. See Lloyd N. Cutler, ―The Limits of Advice and Consent,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 
84 (1990): 876-878. David Crockett suggests that in an effort to advance the president‘s agenda, the 
president is likely to nominate an individual who shares the president‘s constitutional philosophy. 
Consequently, as Crockett argues, ―the Senate is within its rights to evaluate that criterion in its 
deliberations.‖ David A. Crockett, ―The Contemporary President,‖ 321. Joel Grossman and Stephen 
Wasby support Crockett‘s claim, and they argue, ―[o]pposition to a presidential nominee is a traditional 
and effective way of challenging‖ a president‘s nominee who might support a president‘s policy 
initiatives. See Joel B. Grossman and Stephen L. Wasby, ―The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: 
Some Reflections,‖ Duke Law Journal 1972 (1972): 557-558. Also see Barksdale, ―Advise and Consent,‖ 
1399-1418; Joerg W. Knipprath, ―The Judicial Appointment Process: An Appeal for Moderation and Self-
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seminal study of the Supreme Court and his ‗ruling regime‘ thesis,67 and perhaps further 
fueled by Judge Bork‘s testimony at his hearings, many Court watchers believe Justices 
align their voting behaviors with the policies pursued by their appointing president.
68
 In 
theory, then, the hearings should provide an opportunity for the Committee to voice its 
opposition to the president‘s candidate by sending a declination recommendation to the 
full Senate, which can then vote to reject the Court nominee. Yet despite the reservations 
with seating a potential presidential puppet on the Court, and even with a Senate hostile 
to the president or when the opposition party of the president controls the Senate, the full 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Restraint,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 179-191; and, Donald E. Lively, ―The 
Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities,‖ Southern 
California Law Review 59 (1986): 551-579. 
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Andrew D. Martin, ―The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,‖ Emory Law Journal 50 
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Change,‖ Law and Social Inquiry 23 (1998): 941-965; Herbert M. Kritzer and Mark J. Richards, 
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Clause Cases,‖ Law & Society Review 37 (2003): 827-840; Daniel R. Pinello, ―Linking Party to Judicial 
Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-analysis,‖ Justice System Journal 20 (1999): 219-254; Mark J. 
Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer, ―Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making,‖ 
American Political Science Review 96 (2002): 305-320; and, Keith E. Whittington, ―Once More Unto the 
Breach: PostBehavioralist [sic] Approaches to Judicial Politics [book review essay],‖ Law & Social 
Inquiry 25 (2000): 601-634. On Dahl, see Jonathan D. Casper, ―The Supreme Court and National Policy 
Making,‖ American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 50-63, and Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Theory, 1953-1993 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994): 7-10. 
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 See, for example, Segal, Timpone, and Howard, ―Buyer Beware?‖ 557-573. 
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Senate still confirms almost every presidential nominee.
69
 In fact, since 1900, the full 
Senate has confirmed 55 nominees and rejected only four nominees.
70
 It appears, 
                                                          
69
 This holds true for ―weak‖ or ―lame duck‖ presidents as well. The key factor seems to be nominating a 
highly qualified candidate for the open seat on the Court. See, for example, Charles M. Cameron, Albert 
D. Cover, and Jeffrey A. Segal, ―Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model,‖ 
American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 525-534; Comiskey, Seeking Justices, 63-68; Epstein, 
Lindstädt, Segal, and Westerland, ―The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court 
Nominees,‖ 296-307; Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointments (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 102-106, 119-124; Timothy R. Johnson and 
Jason M. Roberts, ―Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations,‖ Congress & 
The Presidency 32 (2005): 31-48; Palmer, ―Senate Confirmation of Appointments,‖152-162; Simon, 
Advice and Consent, 35. Additionally, ―going public‖ and touting the candidate‘s qualifications, especially 
in the president‘s nomination speech, aids the president in securing the confirmation of his candidate. For 
more on ―going public‖ and the confirmation process, see Lisa M. Holmes, ―Presidential Strategy in the 
Judicial Appointment Process: ‗Going Public‘ in Support of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals,‖ 
American Politics Research 35 (2007): 567-594; Lisa M. Holmes, ―Why ‗Go Public‘? Presidential Use of 
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals,‖ Presidential Studies Quarterly 38 (2008): 110-122; Timothy R. 
Johnson and Jason M. Roberts, ―Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process,‖ 
Journal of Politics 66 (2004): 663-683; and, Glen S. Krutz, Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond, ―From Abe 
Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate,‖ American Political Science 
Review 92 (1998): 878. On challenging the nominee during the lame duck period or when the opposition 
party of the president controls the Senate, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Albert D. Cover, and Charles M. Cameron, 
―Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of 
Supreme Court Justices,‖ Kentucky Law Journal 77 (1988-1989): 485-507. 
70
 See Moraski and Shipan, ―The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 1069-1095, and Wayne 
Sulfridge, ―Ideology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court Nominations,‖ Journal of 
Politics 42 (1980): 560-567. The Senate rejected President Herbert Hoover‘s nominee, John J. Parker, a 
judge for the 4
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals and who many suspected was a racist, on May 7, 1930, by a 39 
to 41 vote; President Richard M. Nixon‘s nominee, Clement Haynsworth, Jr., also from the 4 th Circuit 
Court, on November 21, 1969, by a 45 to 55 vote, largely due to conflict-of-interest improprieties relating 
to a case he adjudicated; a second Nixon nominee, G. Harrold Carswell, a judge for the 5
th
 Circuit Court of 
Appeals and who many thought lacked judicial experience, on April 8, 1970, by a vote of 45 to 51; and, 
President Ronald Reagan‘s nominee, Robert H. Bork, a ―strict constructionist‖ judge from the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on October 23, 1987, by a vote of 42 to 58. For more on 
the rejection of these four nominees, see Baum, The Supreme Court, 45-47; Grossman and Wasby, ―The 
Senate and Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 557-591; Massey, ―Getting There‖ 1-16; McMahon, 
―Presidents, Political Regimes, and Contentious Supreme Court Nominations,‖ 919-954; and, Denis S. 
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Judiciary Committee, and the President.‖ CRS Report for Congress, CRS-1 to CRS-42. 
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/59367.pdf (accessed January 5, 2006). 
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therefore, that the procedural changes made to the confirmation process have not 
improved the ‗advice and consent‘ role of the Senate, nor have the changes ‗disqualified‘ 
nominees for the Court;
71
 instead, the president faces a ―new politics of [the] nomination 
and confirmation‖ process that remains ―nasty, brutish, and anything but short.‖72   
Given that a largely ‗unpopular‘ and seemingly partisan president might have the 
opportunity to nominate one or more Justices for the Court,
73
 perhaps the Committee 
would return to the ―glory days‖ of the Bork hearings and challenge President Bush‘s 
nominee during the confirmation process. Indeed, the political climate seemed ripe for a 
showdown with the president and for a battle over the future of the Supreme Court. 
With the nomination of Judge John Roberts, though, President Bush hoped to 
avoid an impending political confrontation with both the Judiciary Committee and the 
Senate over his nominee‘s ideological and political leanings, as well as over his 
nominee‘s judicial philosophy. By selecting a ‗stealth candidate‘ to assume Justice 
O‘Connor‘s seat and later, Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s seat, the president hoped his ‗safe‘ 
pick for the Court would survive any Senatorial assault during the confirmation process. 
                                                          
71
 I purposefully do not include the Clarence Thomas hearings in this discussion, as most scholars 
conclude that Thomas‘ fitness for the Court centered on the allegations leveled against him regarding his 
interactions and relationship with Anita Hill. While Thomas‘ judicial philosophy and potential voting 
behavior may have been initial concerns, most scholars agree that the Hill allegations and subsequent 
witness testimony largely supplanted any prior concerns regarding Thomas‘ qualifications for the Court. 
See Vieira and Gross, Supreme Court Appointments, 200-224. 
72
 Mark Silverstein, ―Conclusion: Politics and the Rehnquist Court,‖ in Rehnquist Justice: Understanding 
the Court Dynamic, ed. Earl M. Maltz, 277-291 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 280. 
73
 At the time President Bush nominated Judge Roberts to fill Justice O‘Connor‘s seat, the president‘s 
public approval ratings were low. See footnote six. 
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President Bush, it appeared, made the correct choice, as Roberts‘ hearings defied media 
predictions and remained largely uneventful.   
More importantly, though, the hearings provided little, if any, insight into Judge 
Roberts‘ ideology or judicial philosophy. For some Court watchers who closely followed 
the hearings, Roberts did not tactfully evade a particular line of questioning; rather, the 
Democratic Committee members mishandled the opportunity before them. As Randy 
Barnett, a Professor of Law at Boston University, explains, 
Judiciary Committee Democrats spent half their time making speeches rather 
than questioning. What questions they did ask were not carefully designed to 
ferret out the nominee‘s judicial philosophy, favoring instead to inquire about his 
feelings, or whether he would stand up for the ―little guy,‖ or bemoaning his 
refusal to telegraph how he would rule on particular cases likely to come before 
the court.
74
 
 
Likewise, the Republicans on the Committee failed to respond appropriately to the 
president‘s nomination. Barnett continues: 
By refusing to demand a nominee with a judicial philosophy of adherence to the 
text of the Constitution—the whole text, including the parts that limit federal and 
state powers—Republicans did nothing to induce the White House to send up a 
nominee who was at least as committed to limits on federal power as Chief 
                                                          
74
 Randy E. Barnett, ―Cronyism,‖ Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2005, A26. As Theodore Ruger also 
notes, ―the Senate Judiciary Committee declined a rare opportunity to discuss many of the issues‖ related 
to the Chief Justice‘s power ―during the confirmation hearings last summer.‖ Theodore W. Ruger, ―The 
Chief Justice‘s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 154 (2006): 1574. For more on Roberts‘ testimony, especially his answers to Senators‘ questions, 
see Ronald Dworkin, ―Judge Roberts on Trial,‖ New York Review of Books 52 (2005): 14-17; Hensley, 
Baugh, and Smith, ―The First-Term Performance,‖ 629-630; and, Parry-Giles, The Character of Justice, 
159-161. In fact, as early as 1976 law professor L.A. Powe found the confirmation hearings and the 
Senators‘ questioning of the nominees ―astonishingly ineffective in eliciting the desired information.‖ 
Consequently, after ―reading all the available Senate confirmation hearings,‖ Powe recommended that the 
Committee ask nominees questions ―about actions rather than philosophy.‖ L.A. Powe, Jr., ―The Senate 
and the Court: Questioning a Nominee [book review],‖ Texas Law Review 54 (1976): 893, 897. 
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Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor had been.75 
 
Judge Roberts‘ confirmation hearings, therefore, lacked the scrutiny and the hostility of 
the Bork hearings, the drama of the Thomas hearings, and once again the post-Brown 
and post-Bork procedural changes did little to affect the outcome of the ‗advice and 
consent‘ process. 
Ultimately, the apocalyptic predictions of an epic ―battle‖ between the president 
and the senate instead played out as ―yet another skirmish‖ in the process of Court 
nominations and confirmations,
76
 and the Senate Judiciary Committee‘s confirmation 
hearings of Judge Roberts lacked the fanfare and media frenzy that the Bork and Thomas 
hearings generated. Unlike with Bork, no one could claim that Roberts experienced a 
‗confirmation conversion,‘77 and unlike that which occurred during the Thomas‘ 
hearings, no witnesses appeared before the Committee and accused Roberts of 
occupational improprieties.
78
 Barring the discovery of a ‗smoking gun‘ to prove that 
Roberts posed a realistic threat to America and her Constitution, perhaps the Senators on 
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 Barnett, ―Cronyism,‖ A26. Italics in original. Despite the criticisms of Barnett and others, Henry J. 
Abraham believes ―the modern Senate confirmation process has not affected the quality of United States 
Supreme Court Justices adversely.‖ See Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. 
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Clinton, 330. 
76
 Neubauer and Meinhold, Battle Supreme, 57. 
77
 Ethan Bronner, in his appropriately titled chapter, ―Confirmation Conversion,‖ discusses the scenario in 
which a nominee, during the confirmation hearings, modifies a stance previously taken in an article or a 
speech. See Bronner, Battle for Justice, 211-230. 
78
  As Lawrence Baum succinctly stated, ―Nothing like a smoking gun emerged for Roberts.‖ Baum, The 
Supreme Court, 48.  
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the Judiciary Committee concluded that Roberts was qualified for a seat on the Court
79
 
and that his elevation to the Court simply would replace one conservative vote 
(Rehnquist‘s) with another conservative vote (Roberts‘). An apocalyptic showdown 
avoided, the Committee sent Roberts‘ name to the full Senate, and he received the 
Senate‘s partisan blessing for the Chief Justice‘ seat on the Supreme Court and he 
became the Court‘s 17th Chief Justice. 
The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court 
Save for a few memorable baseball analogies,
80
 the confirmation hearings of the 
new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court seemed rather uneventful. For some, the 
hearings lacked the climax of a good political drama; for others, the hearings 
demonstrated that America‘s constitutional democracy functioned as designed. The 
Senate exercised its ‗advice and consent‘ role, and the president secured his appointment 
for the Court, thereby satisfying two important aspects of the constitutional process. 
Even though Roberts‘ nomination did generate the to-be-expected partisan criticism, that 
the president and the senate avoided an apocalyptic showdown demonstrates that 
Roberts appears to have been the ‗safe‘ pick for the Court. Given these factors, one 
might pose the following question: Is there a reason to conduct a more in-depth study of 
John Roberts and his elevation to the High Court? This project attempts to provide 
                                                          
79
 On how senators vote for a nominee based on their perception of the nominee‘s qualifications, See 
Epstein, Segal, and Westerland, ―The Increasing Importance of Ideology,‖ 101-127. 
80
 See Dworkin, ―Judge Roberts on Trial,‖ 14-17; Parry-Giles, The Character of Justice, 157-164; Luiza 
Ch. Savage, ―‗Justices are Like Umpires‘: The Roberts Hearings Prove Downright Civilized,‖ Maclean’s, 
September 26, 2005, 36; Neil S. Siegel, ―Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation,‖ Constitutional 
Commentary 24 (2007): 701-732; and, ―Umpires,‖ Commonweal, September 27, 2005, 5. 
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answers to that question, especially considering that Chief Justice Roberts now holds 
―one of the most important, and least studied, major offices in American government.‖81 
My project, therefore, offers four rationales for studying the new Chief Justice. 
The first rationale for studying John Roberts and his elevation to Chief Justice 
involves the unique position that the Chief Justice holds.
82
 Even though there are nine 
                                                          
81
 Theodore W. Ruger, ―Foreword: The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary,‖ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1323. Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist echo Ruger‘s claim: 
―The office of the Chief Justice . . . has been the subject of relatively little research.‖ Frank B. Cross and 
Stefanie Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice: The Decisional Significance 
of the Chief Justice,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1665. Ruger does caution that a 
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Commentary 7 (1991): 56-58; Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren, ―Term Limits for the Supreme 
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered,‖ Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 29 (2006): 769-787; James E. 
DiTullio and John B. Schochet, ―Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the 
Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms,‖ Virginia Law Review 90 (2004): 
1093-1149; Lawlor, ―Court Packing Revisited,‖ 967-1000; Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How the 
Supreme Court is Destroying America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005), 201-202; 
Henry Paul Monaghan, ―The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?‖ Harvard Law Review 101 (1988): 
1202-1212; Todd E. Pettys, ―Choosing a Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative or a Job for the Court?‖ 
Journal of Law & Politics 22 (2006): 231-281; Judith Resnik and Lane Dilg, ―Responding to a Democratic 
Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States,‖ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1575-1664; and, Edward T. Swaine, ―Hail, No: Changing the Chief 
Justice,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1709-1728. For scholarship refuting the calls 
to alter the tenure of the Justices, see Ward Farnsworth, ―The Ideological Stakes of Eliminating Life 
Tenure,‖ Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 29 (2006): 887-889, and Kevin T. McGuire, ―Are the 
Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court,‖ Judicature 89 (2005): 
8-15. 
82
 For an excellent account on the expanse of the Chief Justice‘s powers, see Drew Noble Lanier and 
Sandra L. Wood, ―Moving on Up: Institutional Position, Politics, and the Chief Justice,‖ American Review 
of Politics 22 (2001): 93-127. Also see Baum, The Supreme Court, 137-142; Rutkus and Tong, The Chief 
Justice of the United States; and, Swaine, ―Hail, No,‖ 1709-1728. 
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Justices on the Court, the Chief Justice‘s ―position is the most powerful on the Court.‖83 
There are several reasons that support this claim. Initially, a Chief Justice brings his own 
leadership style to the Court,
84
 which consequently ―affects the norms of Court 
behavior‖85 among the Justices. Few scholars would disagree with the characterization 
of the Court as a frequently contentious site for constitutional adjudication. As such, the 
Chief leads a group of Justices who hold differing ideologies and policy aims and who 
approach and make their decisions from a variety of judicial philosophies, all of which 
influence their interactions with one another. Consequently, the Chief‘s leadership style 
can either further, or further impede, the collegiality of the Justices.
86
 By promoting 
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 Palmer, ―Senate Confirmation of Appointments,‖ 158. Also see Sue Davis, ―The Chief Justice and 
Judicial Decision-Making: The Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court,‖ in Supreme 
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, 
135-154 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
―May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court,‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 40 (1996): 421-422; P. S. Ruckman, Jr., ―The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the 
Senate Confirmation Process,‖ Journal of Politics 55 (1993): 793-805; Robert J. Steamer, Chief Justice: 
Leadership and the Supreme Court (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); and, Lawrence 
S. Wrightsman, The Psychology of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 199-
228. 
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 Stacia L. Haynie, ―Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court,‖ Journal of Politics 54 
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 As retired Associate Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor noted, ―The new Chief can bring tremendous 
changes in the operations of the court, from the way cases are discussed and opinions written to the very 
guiding ethos and atmosphere. Sandra Day O‘Connor, ―John Roberts,‖ Time, April 30, 2006,  
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collegiality, the Chief can lessen the polarization that frequently exists among the 
Justices, and theoretically, a less polarized Court should produce more unanimous 
decisions.
87
 A second, and related, reason involves how the Justices discuss and debate 
cases amongst themselves in conference meetings, as well as how they write the final 
drafts that become their published opinions. One of the leading legal authorities on the 
Supreme Court, Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, explains the extent to which the 
Chief Justice influences the discussion and writing process: 
[A] Chief Justice can influence the substantive decision making of the Court. The 
Chief plays a key role in leading the conferences that determines which cases 
will be heard. The Chief leads the discussions at conferences where the cases are 
decided. The Chief assigns the majority opinion when in the majority, and this 
often can be important in keeping the majority. In all these ways and others, a 
Chief can have a significant effect on the decisions. All of these forms of 
influence are invisible outside the Court, except by looking at the results and the 
decisions themselves.
88
  
                                                                                                                                                                           
as well as his power to appoint individuals to specialized courts and committees. See Edwin Chemerinsky, 
―Keynote Address: Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
154 (2006): 1332-1333.  On consensus building and the Court, see Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: 
The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Random House, 
1998). 
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 By ―unanimous‖ I mean, and as supported by the literature on Court voting, a decline in the number of 5 
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How the Chief leads the conference discussions and to whom he assigns the writing of 
the majority opinion,
89
 then, also functions as an effort to ease the Court‘s ideological 
polarization.
90
 At the same time, having the ability to assign authorship of the majority 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Saul Brenner, ―Strategic Voting for Damage Control on the Supreme Court,‖ Political Research 
Quarterly 57 (2004): 565-573. 
89
 The Chief Justice assigns authorship of the majority opinion when the Chief votes with the majority. If 
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Opinion Assignment on the Burger Court,‖ Western Political Quarterly 39 (1986): 520-527. For a 
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opinion ―is one of the chief justice‘s most important tools,‖91 and assignment also allows 
the Chief Justice to ―influence doctrinal form and rationale,‖ and the subsequent manner 
in which the authors write their opinions ―often resonate[s] in future cases and lower 
courts much more significantly than the unadorned ‗outcome‘ of a Supreme Court 
case.‖92 This holds especially true when the Chief self-assigns the majority opinion, 
especially on important decisions or potentially landmark cases.
93
 Perhaps most 
significant, however, is that holding these powers creates an opportunity for the Chief to 
move the Justices toward reaching a larger consensus in their decisions,
94
 which thereby 
                                                          
91
 Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs, II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The 
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sends a signal both to the lower courts and to those who practice within the courts that 
the Supreme Court‘s decisions carry greater weight.95 For these reasons, then, it seems 
prudent to examine how Chief Justice Roberts leads the Court, how his leadership 
influences the published opinions being released by the Court, and when he elects to 
self-assign an opinion.  
The second rationale for conducting an in-depth study of Chief Justice John 
Roberts centers on the importance legal scholars place on a Justice‘s judicial, or 
constitutional, philosophy. In brief, and which the next chapter discusses at greater 
length, a judicial philosophy is the ―internalized view of the Constitution‖ to which a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3
rd
 ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 552-
553. Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist suggest, however, that the Chief Justice may not have ―the power 
to reverse the frequency of dissents and concurrences.‖ Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic 
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the Chief‘s ―internal strategic leadership . . . only has a limited effect on the Court‘s outcomes.‖ Theodore 
W. Ruger, ―The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice,‖ University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 7 (2004): 349, 350. Italics in original. Craig M. Bradley offers a similar assessment: 
―[T]he Chief Justice has little formal power over his fellow Justices . . . Thus, no Chief Justice is likely to 
exert much sway over the votes of his or her fellows.‖ Craig M. Bradley, ed. The Rehnquist Legacy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4. While some dispute the claim that the Court achieves 
consensus, as Epstein and his colleagues note, ―a norm of consensus did, in all likelihood, exist during 
much of the Court‘s history.‖ Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth, ―The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court,‖ 376. 
95
 Michael Sean Quinn notes that for lawyers arguing cases before the Court, many ―believe that five-to-
four opinions constitute weak, pale, or somehow-faded authority.‖ Michael S. Quinn, ―Argument and 
Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles,‖ 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 74 (1999): 719. Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg offers a similar claim: 
―But overindulgence in separate opinion writing may undermine both the reputation of the judiciary for 
judgment and the respect accorded court dispositions. The rule-of-law virtues of consistency, 
predictability, clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court routinely fails to act as a collegial body.‖ 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ―Speaking in a Judicial Voice,‖ in The Unpredictable Constitution, ed. Norman 
Dorsen (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 75. Also see John F. Davis and William J. 
Reynolds, ―Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,‖ Duke Law Journal 1974 (1974): 
59-86. 
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Justice subscribes,
96
 and which provides ―a theory or a framework of principles to guide 
constitutional interpretation.‖97 Some of the leading constitutional theories include 
Dworkinism,
98
 formalism,
99
 positivism,
100
 pragmatism,
101
 realism,
102
 and the most 
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 Barnett, ―Cronyism,‖ A26. According to Stephen Gottlieb, ―justices decide cases in line with their own 
private, preexisting philosophies of law.‖ Stephen E. Gottlieb, Morality Imposed: The Rehnquist Court 
and Liberty in America (New York: New York University Press, 2000), ix. Anthony D‘Amato echoes this 
claim, noting, ―[W]e understand that judges (from their internal point of view) believe that their own 
theories explain the law.‖ Anthony D‘Amato, ―The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions,‖ 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 74 (1999): 527. Specifically, D‘Amato offers brief summaries on five of the 
primary legal theories to which judges subscribe: formalism, legal realism, natural law, positivism, and 
pragmatism. 
97
 Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitutional Theory (Savage, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991), 1. Goldstein ―catalogues‖ the major legal theories as 
intentionalism, textualism (interpretivism), extratextualism (noninterpretivism), indeterminacy, and 
Dworkinism (pp. 2-3). For an excellent collection of articles on legal theories compiled in one source, see 
―Symposium: The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy: The Crisis in 
Legal Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence,‖ Cornell Law Review 73 (1998): 281-446. For 
discussions that generally address, via comparisons and contrasts, the prominent legal theories, see 
Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992); Frank B. Cross, ―Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case 
of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance,‖ Northwestern University Law Review 92 (1997): 251-326; 
D‘Amato, ―The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions,‖ 517-527; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ―‗The 
Rule of Law‘ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,‖ Columbia Law Review 97 (1997): 1-56; Stephen 
M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 140-191; Geoffrey D. Klinger, ―Law as Communicative Praxis: Toward a Rhetorical 
Jurisprudence,‖ Argumentation and Advocacy 30 (1994): 236-247; H.W. Perry, Jr. and L.A. Powe, Jr., 
―The Political Battle for the Constitution,‖ Constitutional Commentary 21 (2004): 641-696; and, Richard 
D. Rieke, ―The Rhetoric of Law: A Bibliographic Essay,‖ Today’s Speech 18 (1970): 48-57. On 
intentionalism, see John B. Gates and Glenn A. Phelps, ―Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions,‖ 
Political Research Quarterly 49 (1996): 245-261.  
98
 Ronald Dworkin often engages in scholarly debates in which he argues against positivism and/or 
pragmatism. For the influential texts that outline his theory, consult Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of 
Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); and, Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008). Concerning Dworkin‘s refutation of 
pragmatism (and, therefore, Judge Richard A. Posner and/or Professor Cass Sunstein‘s position), see 
Ronald Dworkin, ―In Praise of Theory,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 353-376, and Ronald 
Dworkin, ―Reply,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 431-456. For additional discussions of 
Dworkinism, see Ofer Raban, ―Dworkin‘s ‗Best Light‘ Requirement and the Proper Methodology of Legal 
Theory,‖ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2003): 243-264; E. Philip Soper, ―Legal Theory and the 
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Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute,‖ Michigan Law Review 75 (1977): 473-519; and Robin 
West, ―Taking Moral Argument Seriously,‖ Chicago-Kent Law Review 74 (1999): 499-516. On critiques 
of Dworkin and his theory, see Peter de Marneffe, ―But Does Theory Lead to Better Legal Decisions?: 
Response to Ronald Dworkin‘s In Praise of Theory,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 427-430; F.M. 
Kamm, ―Theory and Analogy in Law,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 405-425; Stefanie A. 
Lindquist and Frank B. Cross, ―Empirically Testing Dworkin‘s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of 
Precedent,‖ New York University Law Review 80 (2005): 1156-1206; Richard S. Markovits, Matters of 
Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 91-109; Richard A. Posner, ―Conceptions of Legal ‗Theory‘: A Response to 
Ronald Dworkin,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 377-388; Daniel J. Solove, ―Postures of Judging: 
An Exploration of Judicial Decisionmaking,‖ Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 9 (1997): 173-228; 
and, Cass R. Sunstein, ―From Theory to Practice,‖ Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 389-404. 
99
 Many consider Harvard Law School‘s Christopher Columbus Langdell as the leading proponent of 
formalism. For scholarship on formalism, see David M. Driesen, ―Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of 
Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication,‖ Cornell Law Review 89 (2004); 808-891; 
Charles C. Goetsch, ―The Future of Legal Formalism,‖ American Journal of Legal History 24 (1980): 221-
256; Richard H. Pildes, ―Forms of Formalism,‖ University of Chicago Law Review 66 (1999): 607-621; 
Frederick Schauer, ―Formalism,‖ Yale Law Journal 97 (1988): 509-548; and, Cass R. Sunstein, ―Must 
Formalism Be Defended Empirically?‖ University of Chicago Law Review 66 (1999): 636-670. 
100
 Many scholars consider H.L.A. Hart the first proponent of positivism. The primary texts from Hart 
include H.L.A. Hart, ―Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,‖ Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 
593-629, and H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). For 
additional commentary on Hart and his works, see Robert S. Gerstein, ―Hart‘s Positivism [book review],‖ 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1985 (1985): 629-638, and Cristóbal Orrego, ―H.L.A. Hart‘s 
Understanding of Classical Natural Law Theory,‖ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2004): 287-302. 
For additional guidance on positivism, see Stefano Bertea, ―Certainty, Reasonableness and Argumentation 
in Law,‖ Argumentation 18 (2004): 465-478; Jules L. Coleman, ―Negative and Positive Positivism,‖ 
Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1982): 139-164; ―Commentary on Constitutional Positivism,‖ Connecticut 
Law Review 25 (1993): 829-946; David Dyzenhaus, ―The Incoherence of Constitutional Positivism,‖ in 
Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory, ed. Grant Huscroft, 138-160 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008); Matthew H. Kramer, ―Once More into the Fray: Challenges for Legal 
Positivism,‖ University of Toronto Law Journal 57 (2008): 1-38; and, Frederick Schauer, ―Constitutional 
Positivism,‖ Connecticut Law Review 25 (1993): 797-828. 
101
 Those individuals most often cited as the key proponents of pragmatism include Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Karl Llewellyn. For scholarship on pragmatism, see Thomas C. Grey, 
―Freestanding Legal Pragmatism,‖ Cardozo Law Review 18 (1996): 21-42; Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A 
Study in Reputation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990); Richard A. Posner, Overcoming 
Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Richard A. Posner, ―Pragmatic Adjudication,‖ 
Cardozo Law Review 18 (1996): 1-20; Richard A. Posner, ―Against Constitutional Theory,‖ in The 
Unpredictable Constitution, ed. Norman Dorsen, 217-238 (New York: New York University Press, 2002); 
Richard A. Posner, ―Foreword: A Political Court,‖ Harvard Law Review 119 (2005): 32-102; Margaret 
Jane Radin and Frank Michelman, ―Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice,‖ University of 
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contentious of all the legal theories, originalism, which some scholars also label as 
textualism
103
 or refer to using a similar descriptor.
104
 With Roberts‘ appointment to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991): 1019-1058; Richard Rorty, ―Pragmatism and Law: A Response to 
David Luban,‖ Cardozo Law Review 18 (1996): 75-83. For critiques of pragmatism, see Kamm, ―Theory 
and Analogy in Law,‖ 405-425; David Luban, ―What‘s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?‖ Cardozo 
Law Review 18 (1996): 43-73; and, Michel Rosenfeld, ―Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: 
Posner‘s and Rorty‘s Justice without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech‖ Cardozo Law Review 18 (1996): 
97-151. 
102
 Most legal scholars attribute the origins of the legal realist movement to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Other key legal realists include Jerome Frank, and even though they often are labeled as pragmatists, some 
scholars identify Benjamin Cardozo and Karl Llewellyn as realists (see chapter 2 for a discussion on these 
attributions). For readings on realism, see John Brigham, ―The Upper Courts: Scholarship and Authority,‖ 
Social Epistemology 5 (1991): 16-19; John Brigham and Christine Harrington, ―Realism in the Authority 
of Law,‖ Social Epistemology 5 (1991): 20-25; Anthony D‘Amato, ―The Limits of Legal Realism,‖ Yale 
Law Journal 87 (1978): 468-513; Hanoch Dagan, ―The Realist Conception of Law,‖ University of Toronto 
Law Journal 57 (2007): 607-660; William W. Fisher, III, Morton J. Horwitz, and Thomas A. Reed, eds., 
American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-8; L. L. Fuller, ―American Legal 
Realism,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 82 (1934): 429-462; Michael Steven Green, ―Legal 
Realism as a Theory of Law,‖ William and Mary Law Review 46 (2005): 1915-2000; Dale Hample, 
―Motives in Law: An Adaptation of Legal Realism,‖ Journal of the American Forensic Association 15 
(1979): 156-168; Marouf Hasian, Jr., ―The Domestication of Legal Argumentation: A Case Study of the 
Formalism of the Legal Realists,‖ Communication Quarterly 46 (1998): 430-445; ―Holmes, Peirce and 
Legal Pragmatism,‖ Yale Law Journal 84 (1975): 1123-1140; Hans A. Linde, ―Judges, Critics, and the 
Realist Tradition,‖ Yale Law Journal 82 (1972): 227-256; Karl N. Llewellyn, ―A Realistic 
Jurisprudence—The Next Step,‖ Columbia Law Review 30 (1930): 431-465; Karl N. Llewellyn, ―Some 
Realism about Realism,‖ Harvard Law Review 44 (1931): 1222-1256; James O‘Brien, ―Conclusion: Legal 
Institutions and Limitations to Cognition and Power,‖ Social Epistemology 5 (1991): 44-60; Richard 
Posner, ―Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism,‖ Cornell Law Review 73 (1988): 326-330; Hilary 
Putnam, ―Pragmatism and Realism,‖ Cardozo Law Review 18 (1996): 153-170; Martin H. Redish, ―Legal 
Realism and the Confirmation Process: A Comment on Professor Nagel‘s Thesis,‖ Northwestern 
University Law Review 84 (1990): 886-888; Wilfred Rumble, American Legal Realism: Skepticism, 
Reform, and the Judicial Process (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968); and, William Twining, 
―Talk about Realism,‖ New York University Law Review 60 (1985): 329-384. 
103
 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia is the leading originalist/textualist on the Court. For Scalia‘s account 
of originalism/textualism, see Antonin Scalia, ―Originalism: The Lesser Evil,‖ University of Cincinnati 
Law Review 57 (1989): 849-865; Antonin Scalia, ―The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,‖ University of 
Chicago Law Review 56 (1989): 1175-1188; and, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). For excellent analyses of Scalia‘s 
judicial philosophy, see Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., ―Justice Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Discourse, and the 
Legalistic State,‖ Western Political Quarterly 44 (1991): 1005-1038; J. Richard Broughton, ―The 
Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia‘s Unwritten Constitution,‖ West Virginia Law Review 103 
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(2000): 19-80; Shawn Burton, ―Justice Scalia‘s Methodological Approach to Judicial Decision-Making: 
Political Actor or Strategic Institutionalist?‖ University of Toledo Law Review 34 (2003): 575-609; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., ―The New Textualism,‖ UCLA Law Review 37 (1990): 621-692; Ralph A. 
Rossum, ―Text and Tradition: The Originalist Jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia,‖ in Rehnquist Justice: 
Understanding the Court Dynamic, ed. Earl M. Maltz, 34-69 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2003); Ralph A. Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2006); David A. Schultz and Christopher E. Smith, The Jurisprudential Vision of Justice 
Antonin Scalia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996); James B. Staab, The 
Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the Supreme Court (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006); and, David M. Zlotnick, ―Justice Scalia and His Critics: An 
Exploration of Scalia‘s Fidelity to his Constitutional Methodology,‖ Emory Law Journal 48 (1989): 1377-
1429. For general discussions on originalism/textualism, see Jack M. Balkin, ―Original Meaning and 
Constitutional Redemption,‖ Constitutional Commentary 24 (2007): 427-532; Randy E. Barnett, Restoring 
the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 89-
117; Randy E. Barnett, ―Underlying Principles,‖ Constitutional Commentary 24 (2007): 405-416; Belz, A 
Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 221-272; Steven G. Calabresi, ―The Right Judicial Litmus 
Test,‖ Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2007, A23; Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of 
Debate (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007); Emily C. Cumberland, ―Originalism in a 
Nutshell,‖ Engage 11 (2010): 52-56; Eskridge, Jr., ―The New Textualism,‖ 621-691; Daniel A. Farber, 
―The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,‖ Ohio State Law Journal 49 (1989): 1085-1106; 
Philip P. Frickey, ―Transcending the Routine: Methodology and Constitutional Values in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist‘s Statutory Cases,‖ in The Rehnquist Legacy, ed. Craig M. Bradley, 266-278 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate over 
Originalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Graglia, ―How the Constitution 
Disappeared,‖ 19-27; Robert M. Howard and Jeffrey A. Segal, ―An Original Look at Originalism,‖ Law & 
Society Review 36 (2002): 113-138; Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, ―Originalism as a Legal Enterprise,‖ 
Constitutional Commentary 23 (2006): 47-80; Charles A. Lofgren, ―The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent?‖ Constitutional Commentary 5 (1988): 77-113; Joseph M. Lynch, Negotiating the 
Constitution: The Earliest Debates over Original Intent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Earl 
M. Maltz, ―Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism,‖ Utah Law Review 1987 (1987): 773-805; Earl M. 
Maltz, Rethinking Constitutional Law: Originalism, Interventionism, and the Politics of Judicial Review 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994); John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, ―Original 
Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism,‖ Constitutional Commentary 24 (2007): 371-382; 
Henry Paul Monaghan, ―Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,‖ Columbia Law Review 88 (1988): 
723-773; O‘Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics; ―Original Meaning and Its Limits,‖ Harvard 
Law Review 120 (2007): 1279-1300; Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over 
Original Intent (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in 
Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2004); Eileen A. Scallen, ―Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence,‖ American 
University Law Review 44 (1995): 1717-1816; ―Symposium: Can Originalism be Reconciled with 
Precedent?‖ Constitutional Commentary 22 (2005): 257-348; John T. Valauri, ―The Varieties of 
Constitutional Theory: A Comment on Perry and Hoy,‖ Northern Kentucky Law Review 15 (1988): 499-
512; and, Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and 
Judicial Review (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). For extended critiques of 
originalism/textualism, see William D. Bader, ―Meditations on the Original: James Madison, Framer with 
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Court, several scholars offer prudentialism as yet another way to examine a Justice‘s 
judicial framework.
105
 According to legal scholars, adherence to a constitutional 
philosophy leads, either theoretically or practically, a Justice ―through the constitutional 
minefield that the Supreme Court must navigate.‖106 Understanding a Justice‘s 
philosophy, therefore, allows one to envision how a Justice may approach, and 
ultimately resolve, a case. The ability to discern a Justice‘s philosophy takes on greater 
importance when recognizing that a ―constitutional theory (or combination of theories), 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Common Law Intentions—Ramifications in the Contemporary Supreme Court,‖ Vermont Law Review 20 
(1995): 5-17; Paul Brest, ―The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,‖ Boston University 
Law Review 60 (1980): 204-238; William N. Eskridge, Jr., ―Should the Supreme Court Read The 
Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?‖ George Washington Law Review 66 (1998): 1301-1323; 
Dennis J. Goldford, ―The Political Character of Constitutional Interpretation,‖ Polity 23 (1990): 255-281; 
James H. Hutson, ―The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record,‖ Texas 
Law Review 65 (1986): 1-39; H. Jefferson Powell, ―The Original Understanding of Original Intent,‖ 
Harvard Law Review 98 (1985): 885-948; Richard B. Saphire, ―Enough about Originalism,‖ Northern 
Kentucky Law Review 15 (1988): 513-538; Laurence H. Tribe, ―How Relevant is ‗Original Intent‘ 
Doctrine?‖ Legal Times, December 26, 1986, 12, 14; and, Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, On 
Reading the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). For an extensive discussion 
of originalism and nonoriginalism as applied to a sampling of Supreme Court opinions, see T. R. van Geel, 
Understanding Supreme Court Opinions, 5
th
 ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2007), 52-79. For a look 
at originalism in the early Republic, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). See especially ―Madison and the Origins of 
Originalism,‖ 339-365. 
104
 Bassham, for example, notes that many scholars also refer to ―originalism‖ as ―constitutional 
originalism,‖ ―historicism,‖ ―intentionalism,‖ ―interpretivism,‖ ―preservatism,‖ as well as a ―host of 
cognate locutions.‖ See Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution, 17. 
105
 See, for example, Daniel Breen, ―Avoiding ‗Wild Blue Yonders‘: The Prudentialism of Henry J. 
Friendly and John Roberts,‖ South Dakota Law Review 52 (2007): 73-135, and Edward A. Hartnett, 
―Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative 
Competence of Courts,‖ SMU Law Review 59 (2006): 1735-1760. 
106
 Barnett, ―Cronyism,‖ A26. Yvette Barksdale argues that ―a Justice‘s institutional views on the structure 
of government, a Justice‘s philosophy of constitutional interpretation, and a Justice‘s view of the nature of 
the world‖ justifies  making ―ideology‖ a qualification for a seat on the Court. Barksdale, ―Advise and 
Consent,‖ 1413. Also see Kagan, ―Confirmation Messes, Old and New,‖ 935-936.  
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as a matter of sheer fact, does underlie every judicial opinion deciding a constitutional 
case.‖107 Admittedly, it may be difficult to assign a single constitutional theory to one of 
the current Justices; yet legal scholars who study the Court continually engage in fervent 
academic debates over the theory that best describes a Justice‘s approach to his or her 
decision-making. My project, therefore, is an attempt to join the ongoing conversation 
and debate by providing an answer for those Court scholars who seek insight into the 
constitutional philosophy to which the new Chief Justice subscribes, which I suspect 
extends beyond the baseball diamond and home plate (though I, and other scholars, may 
discover that a Roberts‘ opinion seemed to come from ‗left field‘).  
A third rationale for my study of Chief Justice Roberts centers on the claims that 
the Supreme Court frequently engages in policy-making and that Justices often base 
their decisions, and hence cast their votes, on their individual ideological dispositions, 
though there are scholars who dispute these claims.
108
 Despite the validity or invalidity 
                                                          
107
 Goldstein, In Defense of the Text, 2. Professor Barnett stresses that any Justice must, prior to his or her 
arrival on the Court, grasp ―what role text and original meaning should play in constitutional interpretation 
in the context of close cases and very difficult decisions. The Supreme Court is no place to confront these 
issues for the first time.‖ Barnett, ―Cronyism,‖ A26. 
108
 As Philip Kurland argues, ―It can no longer be said that the judiciary is merely juridical in its power; it 
is now legislative and executive as well.‖ Philip B. Kurland, ―Public Policy, the Constitution, and the 
Supreme Court,‖ Northern Kentucky Law Review 12 (1985): 197. For more on the policy-making 
functions of the Court, see Anawalt, ―Choosing Justice,‖ 49-60; Anderson IV and Tahk, ―Institutions and 
Equilibrium,‖ 811-825; Michael Barone, ―Justices Have Typically Felt Little Compunction about 
Overturning Laws and Making Public Policy,‖ Chicago Sun-Times, July 13, 2005, 55; Lawrence Baum, 
―What Judges Want: Judges‘ Goals and Judicial Behavior,‖ Political Research Quarterly 47 (1994): 749-
768; Baum, The Supreme Court, 3-5; Pamela C. Corley, ―Bargaining and Accommodation on the United 
States Supreme Court,‖ Judicature 90 (2007): 157-165; Dahl, ―Decision-Making in a Democracy,‖ 279-
295; Roy B. Flemming and B. Dan Wood, ―The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice 
Responsiveness to American Policy Moods,‖ American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 468-498; 
Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Noble Lanier, ―I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, and 
Policymaking on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1999,‖ Review of Policy Research 21 (2004): 429-445; 
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of these claims, the Chief Justice is the one member of the Court who can influence the 
policy-making process of the Court, since the position affords the Chief the opportunity 
―to steer the Court in a particular direction.‖109 One way in which the Chief can 
accomplish this aim involves the selection of cases the Court elects to hear each term. 
The Chief leads the Court‘s conferences at which the Justices meet and discuss the cases 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory; Thomas Moylan Keck, The Most Activist Supreme 
Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004); Keith Krehbiel, ―Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game,‖ American Journal 
of Political Science 51 (2007): 231-240; Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1964); Katherine C. Naff, ―From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme 
Court as a Policymaking Institution,‖ Review of Policy Research 21 (2004): 405-427; Karen O‘Connor, 
―The Supreme Court and the South,‖ Journal of Politics 63 (2001): 701-716; Donald Grier Stephenson, 
Jr., Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999); and, Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman, and Andres Sawicki, Are 
Judges Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 2006). Not all legal scholars agree with the attitudinalist or behavioralist views of policy-
making. See, for example, Cornell W. Clayton, ―The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and 
Old Institutionalisms,‖ in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell 
W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, 15-41. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999, and Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, ―Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases,‖ Cornell Law Review 93 (2007): 1-43. For an early discussion of the behavioralist trend toward 
evaluating decision-making, see Robert A. Dahl,‖ The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph 
for a Monument to a Successful Protest,‖ American Political Science Review 55 (1961): 763-772. Frank 
Cross identifies the four models of decision-making: legal, political, strategic, and litigant-driven. See 
Frank B. Cross, ―Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,‖ California Law Review 91 
(2003): 1457-1516. Also see Harry T. Edwards, ―The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (2003): 1639-1690. 
109
 Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice,‖ 1667. Elliot Slotnick 
holds a similar belief: ―Chief Justices have ample room for pursuing their unique policy concerns through 
the use of their assignment prerogative.‖ Slotnick, ―Who Speaks for the Court,‖ 76. As James Gimpel and 
Robin Wolpert note, ―Who sits on the Court has important implications for the direction of Court policy.‖ 
James G. Gimpel and Robin M. Wolpert, ―Opinion-Holding and Public Attitudes toward Controversial 
Supreme Court Nominees,‖ Political Research Quarterly 49 (1996): 164. There are scholars, however, 
who refute the notion that the Court or particular Justices can play a policy-making role. For instance, Lee 
Epstein and his colleagues argue that ―the institutional constraints imposed on the Court‖ by the other 
branches of government require that the Court ―adapt their decisions to the preferences‖ of the other 
branches. Epstein, Knight, and Martin, ―The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,‖ 585. 
Also see Barksdale, ―Advise and Consent,‖ 1411-1412. 
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to accept that came to the Court via writ of certiorari, which is a written petition asking 
the Supreme Court to hear a case.
110
 Additionally, the Chief usually creates a list of 
cases from the certiorari petitions that the Chief wants the Justices to discuss at length;
111
 
at times, many of the cases the Chief includes on the list are ones that allow the Chief to 
advance particular policy goals. While the other Justices participate in the selection and 
                                                          
110
 The primary situations for which the Court accepts cases via writs of certiorari include an instance in 
which an important issue exists that the Court has yet to decide; when the courts of appeals are in conflict 
on an issue; when disagreement exists between lower court, circuit court, and Supreme Court precedent; 
and, when a question arises as to whether the lower court departed from the customary judicial 
proceedings. See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, ―Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court,‖ American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 1114. Caldeira and Wright also note 
that the Supreme Court tends to grant certiorari when an appellate court reverses a lower court ruling, and 
when a decision from the court immediately below generates one or more dissents. For more on the case 
selection process, see Saul Brenner and John F. Krol, ―Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court,‖ Journal of Politics 51 (1989): 828-840; Stephen G. Breyer, ―Reflections on the Role of 
Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court,‖ Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 8 (2006): 
91-97;  and, William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, Rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 224-
238. On the influence of the Solicitor General and the Court‘s certiorari acceptance, see Michael A. 
Bailey, Brian Kamoie, and Forrest Maltzman, ―Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the 
Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making,‖ American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005): 
72-85; Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1988); Louis Fisher, ―Is the Solicitor General an Executive or a Judicial Agent? Caplan‘s Tenth 
Justice [book review],‖ Law & Social Inquiry 15 (1990): 305-320; Stephen S. Meinhold and Steven A. 
Shull, ―Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General,‖ Political Research Quarterly 
51 (1998): 527-537; Karen O‘Connor, ―The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme 
Court Litigation,‖ Judicature 66 (1983); 256-264; and, Jeffrey A. Segal and Cheryl D. Reedy, ―The 
Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General,‖ Western Political Quarterly 
41 (1988): 553-568. For more on the case selection process, including the ―Rule of Five,‖ or the number of 
Justices who must vote ―yes‖ to hear a case, see H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Conscience: The 
Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
111
 As Martin Mayer notes, ―Arguably the most important part of the chief justice‘s job is that he lays out 
the case for all the judges when the petition to appeal is filed.‖ Mayer, The Judges, 136. Also see Gregory 
A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, ―The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court,‖ Law & 
Society Review 24 (1990): 807-836, and Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the 
Chief Justice,‖ 1669-1672, 1680. For more on writ of certiorari, writ of certification (a request from a 
lower federal court), and writ of appeal (cases that arrive via the federal courts of appeal), see Brian L. 
Porto, May It Please the Court: Judicial Processes and Politics in America (New York: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc., 2001), 38-39. 
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discussion process, these two benefits that result from holding the Chief Justice‘s seat 
afford the Chief with the opportunity to influence the final docket of cases the Court 
agrees to hear each term and therefore reflects the Chief‘s agenda-setting power in the 
case selection process.  
While the Chief may hold a pre-docket agenda-setting power, the Chief also may 
bring an agenda-setting power to the conferences at which the Justices meet to discuss 
and vote on the outcome of the cases argued before the Court. Again, the Chief leads the 
conference discussions and usually speaks first during these meetings, which allows the 
Chief to frame and structure the subsequent discussion about the case.
112
 By doing so, 
the Chief attempts to sway the other Justices toward resolving and voting on a case 
consistent with the Chief‘s position on that case. While the Justices cast their final votes 
on a case at a later conference meeting,
113
 and the position each Justice takes on a case 
often depends on that Justice‘s own ―ideological and policy preferences‖114 and/or on the 
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 See Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice,‖ 1668-1669, and 
Wahlbeck, ―Strategy and Constraints,‖ 1731. 
113
 One factor that generates criticism regarding the Court‘s decision-making process is that ―justices 
change their minds between the start of discussion and the preparation of written opinions.‖ Mayer, The 
Judges, 309. As a result, as Brian Porto notes, ―justices do not try to persuade their colleagues of the 
correctness of their views in conference; they do that in their written opinion drafts instead.‖ Porto, May It 
Please the Court, 41. Law Professor Stephen Calabresi offers a criticism of the process: the Justices ―vote 
on cases without actually debating them,‖ and they do not ―actually deliberate with one another before 
they vote or join opinions.‖ Calabresi, ―Don‘t Split the Baby,‖ A7. For a concise account of the Justices‘ 
bargaining practices, see Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II, and Forrest Maltzman, ―Marshalling the 
Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme,‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 42 (1998): 294-315, and Maltzman, Spriggs, II, and Wahlbeck, ―Strategy and Judicial Choice.‖ 
114
 Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice,‖ 1670. Lawrence Baum 
offers a similar assessment: ―But policy preferences certainly provide the best explanation for differences 
in the positions that the nine justices take in some cases, because no other factor varies so much from one 
justice to another.‖ Baum, The Supreme Court, 121. Reaching a similar conclusion, Robert Dorff and Saul 
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Brenner conclude, ―[T]he justices are people who bring their own personal policy preferences into a group 
decision-making context in which they must interact with other people who have their own personal policy 
preferences.‖ Robert H. Dorff and Saul Brenner, ―Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme 
Court,‖ Journal of Politics 54 (1992): 774. For more on the Court‘s policy-making, see Corley, 
―Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court,‖ 157-165; Stephen M. Feldman, 
―The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court 
Decision Making,‖ Law & Social Inquiry 30 (2005): 89-135;  Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood, and John 
Bohte, ―Attention Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy 
Agendas,‖ Journal of Politics 61 (1999): 76-108; Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs, II, The 
Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); 
Maltzman, Spriggs, II, and Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court; Kevin T. McGuire and 
Barbara Palmer, ―Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court,‖ American Political 
Science Review 90 (1996): 853-865; David W. Rohde, ―Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the 
Supreme Court,‖ Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (1972): 208-224; James F. Spriggs, II, and 
Thomas G. Hansford, ―The U.S. Supreme Court‘s Incorporation and Interpretation of Precedent,‖ Law & 
Society Review 36 (2002): 139-160; and, Wrightsman, The Psychology of the Supreme Court, 177-198. On 
how amicus curiae briefs influence the Justices‘ ideological and policymaking preferences, see Robert C. 
Bradley and Paul Gardner, ―Underdogs, Upperdogs and the Use of the Amicus Brief: Trends and 
Explanations,‖ The Justice System Journal 10 (1985): 78-96; Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, 
―Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?‖ Journal of Politics 
52 (1990): 782-806; Caldeira and Wright, ―Organized Interests and Agenda Setting,‖ 1109-1127; Paul M. 
Collins, Jr., ―Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. 
Supreme Court Litigation,‖ Law & Society Review 38 (2004): 807-832; Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Lisa A. 
Solowiej, ―Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court,‖ Law & 
Social Inquiry 32 (2007): 955-984; Charles R. Epp, ―External Pressure and the Supreme Court‘s Agenda,‖ 
in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell W. Clayton and Howard 
Gillman, 255-279 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, 
―Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae,‖ in Supreme Court 
Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, 215-235 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Victor E. Flango, Donald C. Bross, and Sarah 
Corbally, ―Amicus Curiae Briefs: The Court‘s Perspective,‖ Justice System Journal 27 (2006): 181-190; 
Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, ―The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme 
Court,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148 (2000): 743-855; Kelly J. Lynch, ―Best Friends? 
Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs,‖ Journal of Law & Politics 20 (2004): 33-
75; and, James F. Spriggs, II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, ―Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the 
Supreme Court,‖ Political Research Quarterly 50 (1997): 365-386. On how the Justice‘s use oral 
argument before the Court to advance their preferences, see Timothy R. Johnson, Oral Arguments and 
Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court (Albany: State University Press of New York, 
2008); Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, 239-251; Stephen M. Shapiro, ―Oral Argument in the Supreme 
Court of the United States,‖ Catholic University Law Review 33 (1984): 529-553; Sarah Levien Shullman, 
―The Illusion of Devil‘s Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions 
during Oral Argument,‖ Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 6 (2004): 271-293; Stephen L. Wasby, 
Anthony D‘Amato, and Rosemary Metrailer, ―The Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme 
Court,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976); 410-422; and, Wrightsman, Oral Arguments before the 
Supreme Court. 
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content contained within the final draft of another author‘s opinion,115 the fact remains 
that the Chief Justice plays a large role in attempting to shape the discussion, voting, and 
opinion authorship processes.
116
 Recognizing that ―the justices‘ opinion writing is classic 
judicial policymaking,‖117 the Chief Justice‘s ability to assign the Court‘s majority 
opinion and to influence the content of other opinions allows the Chief ―to direct the 
Court‘s policy-making agenda‖118 while simultaneously easing the polarization on the 
                                                          
115
 For example, in their study of the Burger Court, Theodore Arrington and Saul Brenner conclude, ―it 
probably makes more sense to conform after the justices read one or more drafts of the majority and other 
opinions. At this time, the justices will be in a better position to determine whether it is more beneficial to 
her to conform or to dissent.‖ See Arrington and Brenner, ―Strategic Voting for Damage Control,‖ 572. 
Also see Baum, Judges and Their Audiences, 50-53; Stephen M. Feldman, ―The Rule of Law or the Rule 
of Politics?‖ 89-135; and, James F. Spriggs, II, Forrest Maltzman, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, ―Bargaining on 
the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices‘ Responses to Majority Opinion Assignment,‖ Journal of Politics 61 
(1999): 485-506.  
116
 For more on the Chief Justice‘s influence, see G. Edward White, ―The Internal Powers of the Chief 
Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1463-
1510. As White notes, ―In short, the Court‘s current protocols make opinion assignment a more delicate, 
and arguably a more important, power than it was for most of the Court‘s history‖ (p. 1507). Also see 
Kevin M. Scott, ―Shaping the Supreme Court‘s Federal Certiorari Docket,‖ Justice System Journal 27 
(2006): 191-207. 
117
 Hurwitz and Lanier, ―I Respectfully Dissent,‖ 430. Hurwitz and Lanier also conclude that a Justice‘s 
decision as to whether to write a concurring or dissenting opinion depends on that Justice‘s policy goals. 
For a general discussion of opinion writing, see van Geel, Understanding Supreme Court Opinions, 37-47, 
and Patricia M. Wald, ―The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,‖ University 
of Chicago Law Review 62 (1995): 1371-1419. On a Justice‘s decision to write a separate opinion for the 
Court, see David M. O‘Brien, ―Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the 
Rise of Individual Opinions,‖ in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. 
Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, 91-113 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
118
 Wahlbeck, ―Strategy and Constraints,‖ 1730. Wahlbeck also notes that majority opinion assignment is 
―a means by which the Chief Justice pursues his policy goals‖ (p. 1733). Perhaps more importantly, 
selection of an author for the opinion ―affects the policy content of the opinion as well as the breadth of 
the legal doctrine.‖ Maltzman, Spriggs, II, and Wahlbeck, ―Strategy and Judicial Choice,‖ 54. For more on 
opinion assignment and policy-making, see Maltzman, Spriggs, II, and Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the 
Supreme Court; Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck, ―A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment 
on the Supreme Court,‖ Political Research Quarterly 57 (2004): 551-563; and, Forrest Maltzman and Paul 
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Court. It seems a worthwhile goal, therefore, to explore how Chief Justice John Roberts 
engages in agenda-setting and whether his leadership affects the policy-making features 
of the Court since the Chief Justice‘s influence can ―shift the Court‘s decisions in a 
particular direction over time.‖119 
A fourth rationale for my study of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court 
addresses the public‘s knowledge—or lack thereof—of the Court. In an age where the 
public can access video via cellular phones and the Internet,
120
 the practices of the Court 
seem arcane and out of step with the technological advances and devices present during 
the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court does not televise its proceedings;
121
 the 
closest an interested person can come to ‗watching‘ the oral arguments before the Court 
requires tuning to the cable channel C-SPAN, where one can ‗listen‘ to a Justice speak 
                                                                                                                                                                           
J. Wahlbeck, ―Opinion Assignment on the Rehnquist Court,‖ Judicature 89 (2005): 121-126, 181. On the 
agenda setting process, see Joel B. Grossman and Charles R. Epp, ―Agenda Formation on the Policy 
Active U.S. Supreme Court,‖ in Constitutional Courts in Comparison: The U.S. Supreme Court and the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, ed. Ralf Rogowski and Thomas Gawron, 103-124 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2002), and H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States 
Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
119
 Cross and Lindquist, ―Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice,‖ 1679. For general 
comments relevant to Chief Justice Roberts that ―extrapolate lessons‖ from this agenda setting and policy-
making perspective, see Wahlbeck, ―Strategy and Constraints,‖ 1754-1755.  
120
 For an interesting view on Internet blogs and the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings, see Marcia 
Coyle, ―Evaluating the New Justices in Light of the Confirmation Ordeal,‖ Pepperdine Law Review 34 
(2007): 621-625. 
121
 As one editorial noted, ―news shows might use short snippets of oral arguments out of context,‖ and 
―the main cost of the justices‘ ongoing camera shyness . . . is to inhibit robust, timely, and well-informed 
discourse on the important, often vexing legal and social issues that land at the court.‖ See ―The Supreme 
Court Club,‖ New York Times, January 16, 2008, A22. For an Associate Justice‘s perspective on the 
rationale behind prohibiting cameras in the Court, see Breyer, ―Reflections on the Role of Appellate 
Courts,‖ 97-98. 
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while staring at a still photograph of the Justice who is speaking.
122
 Consequently, unless 
a member of the public is fortunate enough to visit Washington D.C. and can gain access 
to one of the limited seats within the hallowed building where oral arguments take place, 
where the Justices query the counsels for the plaintiff and defendant, and where the 
Justices may orally deliver an opinion from the bench, few members of the public 
actually witness the day-to-day business that takes place within the nation‘s highest 
court. One of the only times at which the public has the ability to watch a (potential) 
Supreme Court Justice ‗in action‘ occurs during that nominee‘s televised confirmation 
hearings. Unfortunately, ―[t]elevised hearings now escalate the potential for conflict‖ 
during the confirmation process,
123
 and thus the time at which the public learns the most 
about the Court and focuses its attention on the Court (and thereby formulates an opinion 
about the Court and the judicial branch) occurs during protracted battles over a 
contentious nomination.
124
 In the absence of regular media coverage, Professor Stephen 
Burbank reports that academic studies continually conclude ―that the public knows very 
little about the Court or its decisions.‖125 According to Burbank, what little knowledge 
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 As two Court followers noted, ―oral arguments . . . are the only chance the public has to see the justices 
in action.‖ Jess Bravin and Justin Scheck, ―Look for Sotomayor to Add Heat,‖ Wall Street Journal, June 2, 
2009, A4. 
123
 Silverstein, ―Bill Clinton‘s Excellent Adventure,‖ 137. 
124
 See Friedman, ―Tribal Myths,‖ 1317, and Gimpel and Wolpert, ―Opinion-Holding and Public 
Attitudes,‖ 164. 
125
 Stephen B. Burbank, ―The Selection, Tenure, and Extrajudicial Authority of the Chief Justice and Other 
Justices: Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices,‖ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1527. As Martin Mayer comments, ―Most Americans don‘t know 
the name . . . of any justice on the United States Supreme Court.‖ Mayer, The Judges, 197. Stephen Carter 
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the public acquires comes via the mass media, and that ―knowledge of the Court‘s 
decisions‖ largely depends on ―the extent and duration of the media coverage and the 
perceived salience of the contested issue.‖126 Given that the Supreme Court‘s decisions 
both directly and indirectly impact the public at large, it seems prudent to provide a 
comprehensive study that illuminates the Supreme Court, discusses the impact that the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
offers an equally dismal assessment: ―For most of the people, most of the time, Constitution and Court 
alike are dimly seen, indistinguishable abstracts.‖ Carter, ―The Confirmation Mess,‖ 1190. Josina Makau 
echoes Carter‘s claim, and she notes that one of the audiences for the Court‘s decisions is ―educated 
members of the body politic.‖ See Josina M. Makau, ―The Supreme Court and Reasonableness,‖ Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 381. Another scholar commented, ―Although these [Supreme Court] 
opinions are available to anyone, they are not read, and a precious few public citizens and journalists 
watch oral arguments in the Supreme Court. Television coverage is nearly nonexistent.‖ Martin Grabus, 
The Next 25 Years: The New Supreme Court and What It Means for Americans (New York: Seven Stories 
Press, 2007): 3. Another legal scholar notes, ―Supreme Court opinions have little apparent effect upon 
public opinion.‖ Christopher L. Eisgruber, ―Is the Supreme Court and Educative Institution?‖ New York 
University Law Review 67 (1992): 963. Also see David L. Gregory, ―Judging the Justice in the Television 
Age,‖ St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 7 (1991): 105-107, and Barbara A. Perry, The Priestly 
Tribe: The Supreme Court’s Image in the American Mind (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999). It seems the 
Court knows more about the public‘s mood than the public knows about the Court‘s mood. See, for 
example, Flemming and Wood, ―The Public and the Supreme Court,‖ 468-498. 
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 Stephen B. Burbank, ―The Selection, Tenure, and Extrajudicial Authority of the Chief Justice and Other 
Justices,‖ 1528. Thirty years ago, as Gregory Casey reported, ―[Regarding] a given Supreme Court 
decision . . . Few read it; some may read an account of it in a newspaper, perhaps even read excerpts; 
others may read only a cryptic article or headline or hear of it on the broadcast media; and many may 
never hear of it. . . . Confusion can easily result as various sectors of the public acquire divergent and 
conflicting information on the decision‘s content.‖ Irving Kaufman offered a similar claim, and he 
commented that the mass media reports ―only the barest outlines of the decisions,‖ and that coverage of 
the Court‘s decisions by television and the press ―is all too often inaccurate or superficial.‖ Law Professor 
Philip Kurland offered a more scathing attack on the media: ―[T]he most appropriate adjective I can 
propose for the press coverage of the Supreme Court is ‗abominable.‘ Were I not fairly sure that the cause 
is ineptitude, I should suspect malevolence.‖ See Gregory Casey, ―Popular Perceptions of Supreme Court 
Rulings,‖ American Politics Quarterly 4 (1976): 4-5; Irving R. Kaufman, ―Helping the Public Understand 
and Accept Judicial Decisions,‖ American Bar Association Journal 63 (1977): 157; and, Philip B. 
Kurland, ―On Misunderstanding the Supreme Court,‖ University of Chicago Law School Record 9 (1960): 
31. Based on my research, these charges against the media largely ring true even today. For more on the 
‗secrecy‘ of the Court, see Everette E. Dennis, ―How the Press Fails the Supreme Court,‖ Christian 
Science Monitor, February 21, 1979, 22, and Robert E. Drechsel, ―Accountability, Representation and the 
Communication Behavior of Trial Judges,‖ Western Political Quarterly 40 (1987): 685-702. 
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new Chief Justice might make on the Court, and more importantly, examines and 
dissects a variety of published opinions, many of them unheralded and underreported by 
the media, in a manner in which lay readers can understand them, and hopefully, can 
become more interested in closely following the proceedings and the outcomes of the 
nation‘s High Court. 
The final rationale for my project, and perhaps the rationale most important to 
this author, is restoring honor to the term ―rhetoric‖—especially when speaking of ―legal 
rhetoric‖ and ―judicial rhetoric.‖ At the same time, I hope to dismantle ―the popular 
pejorative‖ connotations (and permutations) associated with the term.127 Far too often, 
individuals who closely follow the Court and scrutinize the Court‘s opinions rebuke the 
Justices for their use of ‗rhetoric,‘ even though the term rarely receives definition or 
qualification as to why its use deserves disdain.
128
 Judge Richard Posner, himself a 
staunch critic of the Justices‘ writings, offers valuable insight into the dilemma faced by 
those who examine judicial opinions: ―[M]uch of the current writing on the rhetoric of 
judicial opinions reflects a still broader usage in which rhetoric assumes ethical 
                                                          
127
 Erwin Chemerinsky, ―The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,‖ Michigan Law Review 100 (2002): 2008. 
One scholar‘s study reflects the extent of the disdain for ―rhetoric.‖ In the study, the scholar used the 
LegalTrac online database and conducted a search using the word ―rhetoric.‖ The search returned 900 law 
review and professional journal articles in which ―rhetoric‖ appeared in abstract, key word, or title lists. 
According to the scholar, ―Altogether, rhetoric in its impoverished sense constituted the theme of 400 of 
the 900‖ articles from the search. See Frances J. Ranney, ―Sizing Up Legal ‗Rhetoric‘: Law from the 
Outside In,‖ in Sizing Up Rhetoric, ed. David Zarefsky and Elizabeth Benacka, 141-152 (Long Grove, IL: 
Waveland Press, Inc., 2008), 142.   
128
 On the lack of providing a definition for ―rhetoric‖ when critiquing its use in legal scholarship, see 
Ranney, ―Sizing Up Legal ‗Rhetoric.‘‖ On the problem of defining ‗rhetoric‘ and the wide array of 
definitions for the term, see David W. Smit, ―The Uses of Defining Rhetoric,‖ Rhetoric Society Quarterly 
27 (1997): 39-50.   
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overtones (absent from Aristotle), so that to praise or criticize the rhetoric of a judicial 
opinion is virtually synonymous with praising or criticizing the opinion, period.‖129 
Another legal scholar laments, ―To the extent that the rhetorical practices of our times 
require some muffling of the language of rights and the language of duties, rhetoric 
impedes truly serious legal argument.‖130 Perhaps Susan Burgess best captures how 
many people within the legal community view the use of ‗rhetoric‘:  
[P]olitical actors use law or legal rhetoric to manipulate political outcomes to 
their favor. . . . According to the dominant view, legal rhetoric cannot foster or 
locate shared understanding in the community. . . . Legal rhetoric is nothing more 
than judicial mystification or manipulation of the law.
131
 
 
The critique of a judicial opinion and a Justice‘s use of ‗rhetoric,‘ which often remains 
undefined in the piece of criticism, too often centers not on the arguments contained 
within the opinion, but rather on the critic‘s view of the ‗rightness‘ or ‗wrongness‘ of an 
opinion, based on the critic‘s predisposition toward how the Court should have decided 
the case. For these critics, and others who share their views, Plato‘s attacks against the 
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 Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1988), 271. Posner does, though, offer his own criticism of the use of rhetoric within the judicial 
opinion: ―A more serious objection to trying to improve the style of judicial opinions is that style, and 
more broadly rhetoric, are amoral in point of both means and ends. The purpose of rhetoric is to persuade, 
and we have seen that emotive, nonrational [sic]—even false and misleading—rhetorical devices abound 
for persuading.‖ See Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, 298. 
130
 Quinn, ―Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication,‖ 665. Martin Mayer 
offers a similar claim: ―Instead of discussing the legal profession and the court system we have, we 
wander in a haze of rhetoric about the rule of law and the role of law, equal justice under law, the 
adversary system as a search for truth, fair trials, due process, et. cetera. This rhetoric is false, and in no 
small part dishonest.‖ See Mayer, The Judges, 29-30.  
131
 Susan R. Burgess, ―Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New Institutionalism, Legal Rhetoric, & Judicial 
Supremacy,‖ Polity 25 (1993): 445-446. I do note that Burgess disagrees with this view.  
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purveyors of rhetoric
132
 rule the day and Aristotle‘s primer on the value of rhetoric and 
argument
133
 remains safely tucked away on the bookshelf.  
My project, however, advances both a more objective and more clearly defined 
definition of ‗rhetoric‘ as used in judicial opinions, and the project advocates for an 
interdisciplinary approach to studying the law, an approach that argues that 
communication scholars can use an interpretive methodology, grounded in the legal 
field‘s argument types, to examine Court opinions and reveal how judicial rhetoric 
functions both internal to, and external of, the text. Such a project appears justified, since 
many legal scholars agree that ―rhetorical criticism can be a powerful response to legal 
discourse.‖134  Given that several legal scholars‘ work examines Court opinions using 
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―Historical Aspects of Legal Interpretation,‖ Indiana Law Journal 61 (1986): 331-354; Leigh Hunt 
Greenhaw, ―‗To Say What the Law Is‘: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric,‖ Valparaiso University 
Law Review 29 (1995): 861-896; Bruce McLeod, ―Rules and Rhetoric,‖ Osgoode Hall Law Journal 23 
(1985): 305-329; Eileen A. Scallen, ―Judgment, Justification and Junctions in the Rhetorical Criticism of 
Legal Texts,‖ Southern Communication Journal 60 (1994): 68-74; and, Gerald B. Wetlaufer, ―Rhetoric 
and Its Denial in Legal Discourse,‖ Virginia Law Review 76 (1990): 1545-1597. From a communication 
scholar‘s perspective, see Anita Shmukler, ―Some Challenges to the Student of Rhetoric and Law,‖ 
Today’s Speech 18 (1970): 45-47. 
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Lloyd Bitzer‘s conception of the ‗rhetorical situation,‘135 I believe communication 
scholars can contribute equally valuable work to the legal field. In fact, one of the crucial 
ways to overcome the ―strong pejorative connotations‖ associated with the term 
‗rhetoric‘ involves examining ―legal interpretation as [a] particular type of 
argumentation.‖136 My project, therefore, aims to answer this call. 
Judge Roberts: The Newest Stealth Candidate? 
To address the larger questions associated with studying the Supreme Court, this 
project aims to answer a crucial question, and one related to what many viewed as 
President Bush‘s rationale for selecting his candidate for the position of Chief Justice: 
Was Judge John G. Roberts truly a ‗stealth candidate‘ lacking a paper trail for Senate 
Judiciary Committee members, the media, and interested Court followers to examine? 
Consider that shortly after Roberts‘ nomination to the Court, Newsweek offered the 
following assessment regarding Roberts‘ paper trail: ―Efforts to predict his future 
Supreme Court votes from past judicial opinions and legal writings . . . have proved 
mostly fruitless or meaningless.‖137 Two other reporters suggested that anyone who 
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 See, for example, Gold, ―The Mask of Objectivity,‖ 455-510; Greenhaw, ―‗To Say What the Law Is,‘‖ 
861-896; Linda Levine and Kurt M. Saunders, ―Thinking Like a Rhetor,‖ Journal of Legal Education 43 
(1993): 108-122, and Robert A. Prentice, ―Supreme Court Rhetoric,‖ Arizona Law Review 25 (1983): 86. 
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 Eileen A. Scallen, ―American Legal Argumentation: The Law and Literature/Rhetoric Movement,‖ 
Argumentation 9 (1995): 707-708. Also see Eileen A. Scallen, ―Presence and Absence in Lochner: Making 
Rights Real,‖ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 23 (1996): 621-626. 
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 Thomas and Taylor, Jr., ―Judging Roberts,‖ 24. Comiskey likewise suggests that analyzing ―published 
opinions . . . offers only limited promise,‖ and he notes that reading opinions from federal judges has 
―proved unhelpful,‖ and opinions from ―federal appeals court judge[s] may reveal surprisingly little.‖ See 
Comiskey, ―Can the Senate Examine the Constitutional Philosophies of Supreme Court Nominees?‖ 498.  
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analyzed Roberts‘ ―relatively few appellate-court opinions found a genuinely cautious 
judge, a hard-to-attack model of nonactivism [sic] deferential to the will of legislatures 
and the presidency.‖138 During the Judiciary Committee‘s hearings, senators attempted 
to explore these concerns, but most Court watchers concluded that the hearings failed to 
reveal Roberts‘ judicial philosophy and how he would vote on a particular case.  
That the Judiciary Committee failed to achieve its goals presents an interesting 
quandary given the access to information about a nominee the senators acquire before 
the confirmation hearings commence. Prior to a nominee‘s appearance before the 
Committee, each senator has his or her aides prepare a briefing book on the candidate 
that becomes ―a veritable library on the nominee.‖139 The aides tailor the briefing book 
to ―the particular needs of the senator,‖ and the book usually consists of ―reference 
sources [that] will provide background information on the nominee, on significant 
political and constitutional issues likely to catch the senator‘s attention, and other 
relevant matters‖ so that the senator can find the information and ―process it easily.‖140 
The senators, then, use their briefing books throughout the hearings, drawing from the 
books the pertinent information about which they want to query the nominee. To 
                                                                                                                                                                           
As discussed earlier in this chapter, this project aims to test these claims regarding Roberts‘ speeches and 
writings.     
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 Howard Fineman and Debra Rosenberg, ―Threading the Needle,‖ Newsweek, August 1, 2005, 30. 
Similarly, an editorial in USA Today noted that Roberts‘ record includes ―40 largely non-controversial 
opinions.‖ See ―Does Roberts Represent Mainstream Law, Values?‖ USA Today, July 20, 2005, 11A. 
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confirm whether Senators utilized a briefing book for the Roberts‘ hearings, I placed a 
telephone call to the office of Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, the chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and I spoke with one of Leahy‘s aides involved in 
preparing Leahy for Roberts‘ confirmation hearings. Leahy‘s aide asked the other 
senatorial aides in his (the aide‘s) office, and the aide confirmed that all of the aides had 
prepared briefing books for their respective senators.  
While the briefing books provide senators with a valuable tool for their use 
during the hearings, in reality the books only provide a largely condensed record of the 
nominee‘s entire paper trail. In fact, most senators do not read every artifact generated 
during the entirety of a nominee‘s career. More revealing, however, is that even with an 
abridged library, in many cases, senators (and their staff) lack the knowledge to vet 
successfully the most relevant information about a nominee on which to query the 
candidate.
141
 Considering these limitations offers an opportunity to investigate the claim 
that John Roberts lacked a paper trail and therefore entered the confirmation process as a 
stealth candidate. 
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 Based on the extant literature regarding the Senator‘s handling of Roberts‘s confirmation hearings, this 
project sides with Stephen Carter‘s assessment:  
Senators and their staff members will not have read deeply or broadly in the literature on judicial 
philosophy or adjudication or interpretation; even if they have, they will be unlikely to have the 
scholarly turn of mind vital to making sense of it all. This is no knock on the senators; it is, if 
anything, a knock on the notion that something as obscure and subtle as ―judicial philosophy‖ is a 
sensible measuring stick for use in the essentially political process of selecting judges. 
Carter, ―The Confirmation Mess,‖ 1195. 
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My project, therefore, advances the position that rather than questioning a 
nominee with a paper trail carefully hidden by the Bush administration, senators on the 
Judiciary Committee did, in fact, have access to a vast corpus of documents written by 
and relating to Roberts.
142
 In advancing this position, my project proceeds in what I term 
a ―chronologically archival‖ fashion; that is, to support my contention that Roberts did, 
in fact, provide Senators and Court watchers with an extensive paper trail to investigate, 
I chronologically track Roberts‘ political and judicial career and I examine the archival 
texts that Roberts‘ generated during his career.   
Unlike those who vetted Roberts‘ paper trail and concluded that Roberts lacked a 
lengthy paper trail, this project contends that a chronologically archival investigation 
reveals that Roberts left an extensive paper trail for the Judiciary Committee to 
investigate. Two archival text data sources exist to support this project‘s contention. 
 The first time period, or the pre-judicial period, to investigate from Roberts‘ 
career involves examining the relevant texts from Roberts‘ service during the Reagan 
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 One point of contention, for example, involved the Bush administration‘s denial of access to Roberts‘ 
writings when he served as the deputy solicitor general during the George H.W. Bush administration. 
Senator Edward Kennedy, for example, wrote: ―The White House concealed information about its 
nominees. . . . The Senate should insist on having the same access as the administration does to the 
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confirmation hearing begins.‖ Edward M. Kennedy, ―The Supreme Court‘s Wrong Turn—And How to 
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question actually were withheld as a result of an executive order President George W. Bush signed in 
2001. See ―Reagan-Era Roberts Documents Released,‖ American Libraries, October 2005, 13. For more 
on the withholding of records, see Jo Becker, ―Roberts Papers Being Delayed,‖ Washington Post, August 
10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/09/AR200508091232.html, 
(accessed September 12, 2008); ―White House Won‘t Release All Roberts Records,‖ 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8689573 (accessed May 19, 2008); and, ―Umpires,‖ 5. Additionally, as 
Toobin notes, ―reporters obtained access to about 75,000 pages of documents from Roberts‘s days as a 
young lawyer in the Reagan White House.‖ See Toobin, The Nine, 280. 
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and Bush administrations, and the National Archives & Records Administration 
(NARA), the governmentally-charged organization responsible for cataloguing and 
making available to the public all of the documents from a president‘s administration, 
provides the first data source for examination. Despite Senator Kennedy‘s claims that the 
Bush administration refused to release documents relating to Roberts‘ political service, 
and at the Judiciary Committee‘s request, the NARA released from the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum, and therefore made public and open for investigation, 
almost 61,500 pages of documents from John Roberts‘ service during the Reagan 
administration.
143
 The George Bush Presidential Library and Museum in College 
Station, Texas, also made documents available; however, the library had far fewer 
records available for examination. The pre-judicial period also includes an examination 
of any articles Roberts wrote and any speeches he delivered during his tenure with the 
two administrations. 
The second time period, or the judicial period, to investigate from Roberts‘ 
career involves discovering the relevant texts from Roberts‘ two-year tenure as a judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The January 29, 2003, 
confirmation hearings
144
 for a seat on the appellate court and the eighty-one pages of 
questionnaire responses Roberts provided to the Committee, as well as his published 
opinions from his term as an appellate court judge, provide the second data source for 
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 The document releases occurred in several stages. On August 18, the NARA released 38,000 pages; on 
September 2, it released 18,000 pages. See ―Reagan-Era Roberts Documents Released,‖ 13.  
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 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Confirmation Hearing on Federal 
Appointments, 108
th
 Congress, First Session, January 29, 2003: 297-339, 412-461. 
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examination. Again, this data source also includes an examination of any articles 
Roberts wrote and any speeches he delivered during his tenure an as an appellate court 
judge. 
Approaching the study of the new Chief Justice and investigating whether he 
entered his confirmation hearings as a stealth candidate via a chronologically archival 
method holds promise for several reasons. As several legal and political science scholars 
note, articles, speeches, and opinions written by nominees offer fertile ground for 
analyzing a nominee‘s ideological leaning, judicial philosophy, and their potential stance 
on cases that come before the Court.
145
 My project investigates Roberts‘ paper trail in a 
manner consistent with these scholars‘ views, and it expands their ground by including 
advisory and position papers, letters, memoranda, and other writings by Roberts while he 
served in the Reagan and Bush administrations. By examining the relevant artifacts that 
Roberts‘ authored that relate to the judicial branch, I aim to discover the types of 
argumentative and rhetorical strategies that Roberts utilized when advocating a 
particular position, and to discern whether his advocacy reveals an ideological tilt or a 
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 Segal and Cover, ―Ideological Values,‖ 560-561. Albert Melone offers a similar claim: Nominees‘ 
―publications including law review and other writings can serve to reveal a wealth of attitudinal 
information.‖ Melone, ―Judicial Discretion and the Senate‘s Role in Judicial Selection,‖ 564. Also see 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, and Harold J. Spaeth, ―Ideological Values and the 
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judicial philosophy. Most important, such an approach allows the project to answer three 
questions that address the central points contained within this chapter:  
(1) Was Judge John G. Roberts truly a ‗stealth candidate‘ lacking a paper trail for 
Senate Judiciary Committee members, the media, and interested Court followers to 
examine? 
(2) What types of argumentative and rhetorical strategies does Roberts utilize in 
his oral and written discourse to justify a position on a constitutional or legal issue?  
 (3) Do Roberts‘ pre-Court argumentative and rhetorical strategies reveal his 
judicial temperament and constitutional philosophy?  
At the same time, approaching the study of the new Chief Justice would be 
incomplete without examining Roberts‘ eighty-three page response to the Judiciary 
Committee‘s questionnaire146 prior to his first scheduled confirmation hearings for a seat 
as an Associate Justice, as well as his testimony during his confirmation hearings for the 
Chief Justice‘s seat. A complete investigation also requires an examination of the 
opinions Roberts‘ wrote as a member of the Court. As David Scott and Robert Gobetz 
suggest, ―If the language a rhetor uses reveals something about the rhetor, then the 
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 The content of Roberts‘ answers to the questionnaire include a list of delivered speeches and granted 
interviews; a list of the 39 cases he argued before the Supreme Court between 1986 and 2003; a list of his 
amicus curaie briefs filed with the Court; a list of his published and unpublished opinions; and, his 
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published opinions of the Court represent a reasonable, and tangible, source of data.‖147 
 Roberts‘ appellate court and Supreme Court opinions, therefore, provide two 
additional fertile sources from which to discover a potential ideological leaning, the 
argumentative and rhetorical strategies, and a potential judicial philosophy of the new 
Chief Justice.
148
 At the same time, some scholars argue that the ―relatively younger and 
relatively less experienced Justices‖ pen a majority of the Court‘s opinions, especially 
during their second year on the Court,
149
 while several other legal scholars note that ―the 
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 Scott and Gobetz, ―The U.S. Supreme Court 1969-1992,‖ 212. The authors also contend that the 
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court,‖ Journal of Politics 41 (1979): 643-644. Timothy Hagle suggests that new Justices undergo an 
acclimation period on the Court before they begin writing more concurring and dissenting opinions. 
Timothy M. Hagle, ―‗Freshman Effects‘ for Supreme Court Justices,‖ American Journal of Political 
Science 37 (1993): 1142-1157. Mark Hurwitz and Joseph Stefko make a similar finding in their study, 
which concludes that as a result of an acclimation process, new justices on the Court are more likely to 
comply with precedent. See Mark S. Hurwitz and Joseph V. Stefko, ―Acclimation and Attitudes: 
‗Newcomer‘ Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court,‖ Political Research Quarterly 
57 (2004): 121-129. Saul Brenner concludes that first-year Justices are assigned majority opinion writing 
in salient cases far less often than the more tenured Justices. See Saul Brenner, ―Majority Opinion 
Assignment in Salient Cases on the U.S. Supreme Court: Are New Associate Justices Assigned Fewer 
Opinions?‖ Justice System Journal 22 (2001): 209-221. Also see Saul Brenner and Timothy M. Hagle, 
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Roberts Court has developed an initial three-Term record scholars can use in analyzing 
performance and anticipating likely developments in the near future.‖150 My project, 
therefore, investigates Roberts‘ opinions from his first four Terms on the Court (the 
October 2005 Term through the October 2008 Term), and these Term periods allow me 
to investigate these claims as well as to investigate whether the new Chief Justice takes a 
policy-making or agenda-setting approach in how he leads the Court. Roberts‘ published 
opinions, then, also offer another chronologically archival source that can be compared 
against the pre-Court archival sources, which allows this project to answer two 
additional questions: 
(4) Do Roberts‘ pre-Court argumentative and rhetorical strategies parallel the 
argumentative and rhetorical strategies he utilizes in his published appellate court and 
Supreme Court opinions?   
(5) Do Roberts‘ published opinions reflect a discernable judicial temperament 
and constitutional philosophy?  
Chief Justice Roberts: A New Conservative Court 
Upon Chief Justice Roberts‘ arrival to the Court, two scholars concluded that 
―Roberts is unlikely to shift the direction of the Court.‖151 These scholars‘ claim assumes 
that once seated on the Court, a Justice will adhere to the ideological label 
                                                                                                                                                                           
―the freshmen effect hypothesis,‖ see Melone, ―Judicial Discretion and the Senate‘s Role in Judicial 
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(‗conservative‘ or ‗liberal‘) that has been ascribed to him or her, and that Justice‘s 
decisions will reflect the ideological ―box‖ into which a Court follower or critic placed 
the Justice. Moreover, the presumption exists that a Justice will remain true to this 
ideological label throughout his or her tenure on the Court.
152
 
Many scholarly endeavors, therefore, attempt to predict how a Justice, based on 
the ideology attributed to him or her, will resolve a case before the Court.
153
 As Lee 
Epstein and his colleagues note, however, ―predicting the future ideology of any given 
nominee may be a risky business‖154 and that ―drawing inferences about their future 
behavior . . . is an enterprise doomed to failure.‖155 According to these political 
scientists, Justices, during their first few years of service on the Court, may initially 
resolve cases consistent with the ideological label ascribed to them. During their tenure 
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 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal, ―Ideological Drift among 
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on the Court, though, most Justices experience an ―ideological drift‖ in which they move 
either to the left or to the right (or switch directions several times) ―before hitting the 
first-decade mark‖ of their time on the Court.156 Epstein and his colleagues conclude that 
―[d]rift to the right or, more often, to the left is the rule, not the exception.‖157 
My project, therefore, aims to provide answers to the aforementioned questions, 
and offers insight into whether Chief Justice Roberts has begun his ideological drift 
away from the conservative ship that many hoped would power the Court for years to 
come. In order to address with these questions and to adequately conduct a study from 
an interdisciplinary perspective, the next chapter discusses the major concepts required 
for understanding and examining the relevant artifacts for conducting a chronologically 
archival study: rhetoric, argument, and judicial philosophies. 
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CHAPTER II 
MAKING SENSE OF THE LAW: 
RHETORIC, ARGUMENTS, AND JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES 
 
 Legal experts engage in fervent academic debates over the manner in which 
Supreme Court Justices decide the cases that appear before them, and the judicial 
philosophy to which the Justices adhere and utilize to resolve cases. To adequately 
address these topics—or any others that attempt to discern or question the Justices‘ legal 
reasoning—requires a more in-depth understanding of the decision-making practices of 
the Court; both Court critics and followers must move beyond stamping a nominee or 
Justice as a conservative or liberal, a Republican or Democrat, or any other convenient 
label. The most current research, as discussed in the first chapter, reveals that Justices 
often experience ―ideological drift,‖ and as stealth candidate David Souter and many of 
his decisions demonstrate, neither the political ideology of the nominee nor the party 
affiliation of the appointing president offer valid assumptions about the nominee‘s long-
term decision-making once he or she takes a seat on the Court.
158
 To better capture the 
dynamic nature of the decision-making process, therefore, necessitates a discussion on 
three key concepts that comprise the legal reasoning process in which the Justices 
engage: rhetoric, arguments, and judicial philosophies. This chapter, therefore, provides 
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the requisite background for understanding the legal reasoning process, and hence the 
writing process, as well as advocates an approach for examining the Court‘s output that 
makes deciphering the judicial opinion accessible both to scholars and laypersons.   
The Supreme Court and Rhetoric: Pejorative or Constructive?  
 Similar to politicians who utilize their position or office as a platform for 
promoting their ideas, or what scholars refer to as using the ―bully pulpit,‖ Christopher 
Eisgruber suggests that ―judicial opinions give judges a bully pulpit from which to 
propound their ideas.‖159 For it is through the published majority (five or more Justices) 
or plurality (a majority of the majority) opinion of the Court that a decision becomes the 
proverbial ―Law of the Land.‖ That is, the pronouncement contained within a majority or 
plurality opinion provides the rationale for what is and is not ‗legal‘ or ‗constitutional.‘ 
In making its pronouncement, the Court serves the role of which Alexander Hamilton 
wrote in The Federalist #78, in which he argued that ―the judiciary, from the nature of 
its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution.‖160 Hamilton based his contention on the prospect of a three-branch system 
for the new Republic‘s government. As the judicial branch, the Supreme Court would 
neither head the country nor the states; that aspect of governing would be left to the 
executive branches of the federal, state, and local governments. As the judicial branch, 
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the Supreme Court would not establish laws nor enact policies; that task would be 
reserved for the legislative branches of the federal, state, and local governments. Instead, 
as the highest appellate court in America, the Supreme Court would serve as the final 
arbiter in deciding whether an executive or legislative branch, or an institution, or an 
individual had acted within or beyond the parameters of the ‗legal‘ or the 
‗constitutional.‘ In making such a determination, the Supreme Could would uphold the 
Hamiltonian idea that an independent judiciary would provide ―an essential safeguard 
against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.‖161  
 The Court often explains its decision of the ‗legal‘ or ‗constitutional‘ through a 
written, or what is termed a ‗published,‘ opinion.162 In an ideal world, the judicial 
opinion will ―provide a compelling story in a pragmatic fashion, in a form that 
laypersons can understand and accept.‖163 In reality, however, for most citizens of the 
Land, deciphering and understanding a judicial opinion, and attempting to assess its 
applicability for their own lives, largely remains a futile process; instead, the sense-
making associated with the judicial opinion is reserved primarily for those with specific 
training in the field of law and for those who understand and ―engage in law-talk.‖164 
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Third Circuit Court Judge Ruggero Aldisert suggests that ―an opinion writer‘s sole 
purpose [is] to persuasively communicate an argument to the opinion readers,‖165 yet as 
Professor Roger Stahl notes, ―Supreme Court decisions are awash in competing 
philosophies and language games.‖166 Consequently, very few people, save those 
associated with the legal profession or the media, actually read a published opinion of 
the Court.
167
  
 Perhaps the sheer complexity of the judicial opinion and the opinion writer‘s 
discursive choices and strategies deter the average citizen from reading a judicial 
opinion. In fact, as Martin Mayer observes, ―[t]here is some feeling among legal 
academics that the Court‘s opinions mimic law review articles, which is not necessarily 
good for the country.‖168 A typical opinion discusses complex statutes and references 
prior Court decisions, often contains detailed footnotes, and includes a variety of 
argument types, historical allusions, literary devices, and persuasive techniques; or, as 
Professor Frederick Schauer explains, judicial opinions ―draw scorn‖ due to their 
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―complexity, inaccessibility to nonspecialists, and dullness.‖169 As a result, examining a 
judicial opinion, or the official ‗text‘ of the Court,170 involves recognizing that the 
diversity of discursive choices a Justice utilizes to convey his or her method of legal 
reasoning to gain ―the adherence of minds‖ of the audience171 for the decision firmly 
situates the judicial opinion, which Professor Jim Aune argues ―[is] a distinctive form of 
rhetoric,‖172 within the fields of both law and rhetoric, hence James Boyd White‘s claim 
that ―law is most usefully seen . . . as a branch of rhetoric.‖173 While other scholars agree 
that law is a rhetorical activity,
174
 those interested in studying the Court and its opinions 
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‗as a branch of rhetoric‘ or from a rhetorical perspective face two challenges: defining 
―rhetoric‖ and justifying ―rhetorical criticism‖ as a valid methodology for studying legal 
texts, especially judicial opinions.  
 The first challenge, which legal scholar Eileen Scallen identifies as ―[t]he most 
fundamental problem,‖ involves attempting to define the term ‗rhetoric.‘175 Legal 
scholars, for example, offer starkly contrasting meanings for the term. Stanley Fish 
suggests that ―rhetoric is by definition the forceful presentation of an interested 
argument—rhetoric is another word for force,‖176 while Marc Gold simply defines 
rhetoric ―as the use of argument to persuade.‖177 Robert Prentice, though, offers a more 
Classical meaning and he defines rhetoric ―as it was used by Aristotle, to denote 
persuasive strategies in discourse.‖178 Scholars within academe, such as the 
communication field, provide an equally diverse range of meanings for the term. As 
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David Smit notes, ―the ways we define rhetoric are complex and open to 
interpretation,‖179 and he argues that ―formally defining rhetoric seems to have been 
restricted to theorists and critics, and in the last forty years academic definitions have 
increasingly broadened the term.‖180 As a result, Smit explains, ―rhetoric‖ now 
encompasses ―some aspect of discourse, such as informative or persuasive speaking; all 
of verbal discourse, both spoken and written; or all of human meaning-making, whether 
verbal or not . . . ‖181  
 As a result of these disparate definitions, interdisciplinary approaches struggle to 
situate legal discourse within the ‗branch of rhetoric.‘ When scholars limit ―rhetoric‖ 
only to the linguistic choices made for suasory effects, they view ―rhetoric‖ as a 
disparaging practice, a practice which ―to modern ears‖ is ―oratorical emptiness.‖182 
Consequently, as Peter Goodrich explains, ―[t]he most common modern acceptations of 
the term [rhetoric] are pejorative. . . . Ordinary usage now defines rhetoric as the 
specious, bombastic, or deceitful use of language; rhetoric, in other words, is the abuse 
of language.‖183 Perhaps as a result of this view, or as a response to this view, ―[o]pening 
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up legal discourse to insights from other disciplines . . . inevitably upsets lawyers‘ claim 
to specialized knowledge and expertise.‖184 
 The second challenge facing those interested in studying the Court and its 
opinions, according to Scallen, involves ―explaining the utility of rhetorical criticism of 
legal texts.‖185 Like the term rhetoric, rhetorical criticism also has a variety of 
meanings.
186
 For some scholars, rhetorical criticism ―impose[s] on the reader the 
author‘s view of the meaning, both denotative and connotative, of the work.‖187 A more 
objective stance on rhetorical criticism, however, regards the practice as the ―[a]nalysis, 
explanation, and interpretation‖ of a text.188 In utilizing this critical approach for legal 
texts, however, scholars must overcome two assumptions held by those in the legal 
community: first, that ―legal rhetoric only consists of the arguments made to a judge or 
jury‖ and the corresponding linguistic ornamentation contained within a judicial opinion, 
and second, ―justifying the use of ‗criticism,‘‖ which for many in the legal community 
simply means ―criticizing a legal text [by] pointing out what is wrong with it, ignoring 
the possibility that criticism can also celebrate what is right about a text.‖189 Law 
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Professor Jack Balkin considers ―the process of analyzing a discourse in terms of 
recurring tropes or moves ‗rhetorization,‘‖ and he suggests that ―to ‗rhetorize‘ a 
discourse is to see its arguments as moves as repeatable rhetorical forms.‖190 
 Given these two challenges—defining rhetoric and justifying rhetorical 
criticism—one might ask: why do these dilemmas matter, and why are they relevant to 
the study of law and judicial opinions? While neither question presents an easy answer, 
several compelling reasons exist for answering them. 
 The simplest justification for resolving the dilemmas involves the recognition 
that ―rhetoric unites the theory and practice of law.‖191 The opinion of the Court is ―[t]he 
quintessential legal message‖ that must ―utilize rhetorical strategies to be truly 
effective.‖192 Discerning how rhetoric operates within an opinion is vital for 
understanding not only the content of the opinion, but also for recognizing the 
argumentative strategies a Justice utilized to determine the legality or constitutionality of 
the issue before the Court, for understanding the ―techniques and devices and forms of 
argument‖ contained within an opinion subsequently allows one to understand ―the 
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rhetoric of legal reasoning.‖193 At the same time, understanding the use of rhetoric 
allows one to analyze effectively how the author of the opinion evaluated the prior 
history, tradition, and jurisprudence of the Court, and whether any of those influenced 
the resolution of the case before the Court, or whether a Justice utilized a different 
approach for resolving the case. In other words, one must first understand rhetoric before 
one can attempt to discern the judicial philosophy or temperament of a Justice since the 
Justices‘ ―ideologies [are] revealed in their language and discourse,‖194 and as appellate 
court Judge Patricia Wald notes, a judge‘s ―rhetoric will generally follow that of the 
analytical mode chosen‖ to decide a case.195 
 To better capture the legal reasoning and decision-making process of a Supreme 
Court Justice, as well as to alleviate the pejorative connotations associated with the term 
‗rhetoric,‘ this project offers a more succinct definition that guides the subsequent 
analysis regarding Chief Justice Roberts and his writings: Legal rhetoric is the use of 
argumentative strategies within a text to advance a position and to ground the rationale 
and reasoning for that position. This definition provides a foundation for an 
interdisciplinary study of those texts in which a writer must advocate and justify a 
position on a particular issue, as well as recognizes that the reasoning process involves 
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the deliberate and purposeful selection of arguments and linguistic devices to advance 
and justify a position. At the same time, the definition forces the critic of a text to focus 
attention on the crucial portions of that text central to the writer‘s primary objective: 
justifying the outcome of the decision. This definition also serves an important function 
for the study of the law and the opinions of the Supreme Court—the definition allows 
scholars to justify the use of rhetorical criticism as a methodological approach for 
examining legal texts.  
Rhetorical Criticism and the „Law and Rhetoric‟ Movement 
 While the public hesitates to study the law or judicial opinions, scholars within 
academe approach their studies from a variety of critical approaches. Many of these 
studies fall within a ―Law and‖ category, such as the ―Law and Literature‖ movement, 
which examines judicial opinions as narratives or as examples of storytelling,
196
 or for 
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their use of literary devices.
197
 While this approach provides interesting insight into the 
judicial texts, many legal scholars remain critical of examining judicial opinions from 
the ―Law and Literature‖ perspective.198 
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 A second critical approach within the ―Law and‖ category is the ―Law and 
Rhetoric‖ movement, an interdisciplinary movement to which both legal and 
communication scholars belong. My project aims to contribute to this growing 
movement and dialogue by demonstrating that an interdisciplinary approach that 
comprehensively analyzes legal and judicial texts within the purview of a more succinct 
definition of ‗rhetoric‘ avoids many of the criticisms attributed to the ―Law and‖ 
movements.
199
 In fact, both legal and communication scholars are using the rhetorical 
approach to study legal argumentation,
200
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and Reason in Judicial Opinions (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), and Robert L. 
Tsai, ―Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making,‖ Georgetown Law Journal 93 (2004): 181-239. 
198
 See Jane B. Baron, ―Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity,‖ Yale Law Journal 108 
(1999): 1059-1085. Specifically, Baron criticizes the ―law and‖ scholars, and she primarily focuses her 
attention on the law-and-literature scholarship.  Richard Posner, an avowed ―‗intentionalist‘ (with 
qualifications),‖ comments: ―The proposition that literary critics can point the way to solving the puzzles 
of statutory and constitutional interpretation is the falsest of the false hopes of the law and literature 
movement.‖ See Posner, Law and Literature, 17. Also see Robin L. West, ―Adjudication is Not 
Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-as-Literature Movement,‖ Tennessee Law Review 54 
(1986): 203-278 and Robin L. West, ―Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and 
Literature Movement,‖ Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 1 (1988): 129-156. 
199
 See James Arnt Aune, ―On the Rhetorical Criticism of Judge Posner,‖ Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 23 (1996): 658-669 and Warren E. Wright, ―Judicial Rhetoric: A Field for Research,‖ Speech 
Monographs 31 (1964): 64-72. For additional assistance in understanding Aune‘s critique, see Posner, 
Overcoming Law, 498-530. Several scholars, in fact, suggest that the communication field provides 
tangible benefits to students interested in studying the law or in attending law school, especially when an 
emphasis in class includes the study of communication, judicial argumentation, and court opinions. See, 
for example, Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R. Falk, ―Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to 
Texts,‖ Cornell Law Review 78 (1993): 163-205; Ronald J. Matlon, ―Bridging the Gap between 
Communication Education and Legal Education,‖ Communication Education 31 (1982): 39-53; Glen E. 
Mills, ―Legal Argumentation: Research and Teaching,‖ Western Speech Communication 40 (1976): 83-90; 
and, Richard D. Rieke, ―The Role of Legal Communication Studies in Contemporary Departments of 
Communication,‖ Association for Communication Administration Bulletin 24 (1978): 31-33. 
200
 For articles from communication scholars applying a rhetorical approach to studying the law, see J. 
Louis Campbell, III, ―How Opinions Can Persuade: A Case Study of William O. Douglas,‖ Federal Bar 
80 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and News Journal 29 (1982): 231-234; Vivian I. Dicks, ―Courtroom Rhetorical Strategies: Forensic and 
Deliberative Perspectives,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 67 (1981): 178-192; James M. Golden and Josina 
M. Makau, ―Perspectives on Judicial Reasoning,‖ in Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in Honor of 
Douglas Ehninger, ed. R. E. McKerrow, 152-177 (Glenview, IL: Scott, Forsemann & Company, 1982); 
Michael R. Hagan, ―Roe v. Wade: The Rhetoric of Fetal Life,‖ Central States Speech Journal 27 (1976): 
192-199; Hasian, Jr., ―Myth and Ideology in Legal Discourse,‖ 347-365; Marouf Hasian, Jr., ―Legal 
Argumentation in the Godwin-Malthus Debates,‖ Argumentation and Advocacy 37 (2001): 184-197; 
Marouf Hasian, Jr., ―Vernacular Legal Discourse: Revisiting the Public Acceptance of the ‗Right to 
Privacy‘ in the 1960s,‖ Political Communication 18 (2001): 89-105; Marouf Hasian, Jr., Celeste Michelle 
Condit, and John Louis Lucaites, ―The Rhetorical Boundaries of ‗the Law‘: A Consideration of the 
Rhetorical Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the ‗Separate But Equal‘ Doctrine,‖ Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 82 (1996): 323-342; John Louis Lucaites, ―Between Rhetoric and ‗The Law‘: Power, 
Legitimacy, and Social Change [book review],‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 435-449; Josina 
M. Makau, ―The Supreme Court and Reasonableness,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 379-396; 
Makau and Lawrence, ―Administrative Judicial Rhetoric,‖ 191-205; Theodore O. Prosise and Craig R. 
Smith, ―The Supreme Court‘s Ruling in Bush v. Gore: A Rhetoric of Inconsistency,‖ Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 4 (2001): 605-632; Richard D. Rieke, ―Argumentation in the Legal Process,‖ in Advances in 
Argumentation Theory and Practice, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, 363-376 (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); Richard D. Rieke, ―The Judicial Dialogue,‖ Argumentation 5 
(1991): 39-55; J. Clarke Rountree, III, ―On the Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Discourse and More: A 
Response to Lewis,‖ Southern Communication Journal 61 (1995): 166-173; J. Clarke Rountree, III, 
―Instantiating ‗The Law‘ and Its Dissents in Korematsu v. United States: A Dramatistic Analysis of 
Judicial Discourse,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 1-24; Warren Sandmann, ―The 
Argumentative Creation of Individual Liberty,‖ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 23 (1996): 637-
657; Saunders, ―Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument,‖ 566-578; Edward Schiappa, ―Analyzing 
Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining ‗Person‘ and ‗Human Life‘ in 
Constitutional Disputes over Abortion,‖ Argumentation 14 (2000): 315-332; Stahl, ―Carving Up Free 
Exercise,‖ 439-481; and Paul Stob, ―Chisholm v. Georgia and the Question of the Judiciary in the Early 
Republic,‖ Argumentation and Advocacy 42 (2006): 127-142. For articles and books from argumentation 
scholars applying a rhetorical approach to studying the law, see Eveline T. Feteris, ―A Survey of 25 Years 
of Research on Legal Argumentation,‖ Argumentation 11 (1997): 359-362; Hanns Hohmann, ―Logic and 
Rhetoric in Legal Argumentation: Some Medieval Perspectives,‖ Argumentation 12 (1998): 39-55; Janice 
Schuetz, Communicating the Law: Lessons from Landmark Legal Cases (Long Grove, IL: Waveland 
Press, Inc., 2007); and, Frans H. Van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser, ―Rhetorical Analysis within a 
Pragma-Dialectical Framework: The Case of R. J. Reynolds,‖ Argumentation 14 (2000): 293-305. Other 
scholars (including lawyers and legal academics) writing from a diversity of academic fields and 
contributing to the rhetorical turn toward studying the law include David E. Anderson, ―Reflections on the 
Supreme Court, Constitutionalism, and the Rhetoric of Law,‖ Saint Louis University Public Law Review 8 
(1989): 75-86; Binder and Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law, Chapter 3, ―Rhetorical Criticism of 
Law,‖ 292-377;  Lawrence Douglas, ―Constitutional Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the 
Rhetoric of Judicial Review,‖ in The Rhetoric of Law, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, 225-260 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Fielding, ―Rhetorical Context and the Judicial 
Opinion,‖ 419-435; Jerry Frug, ―Argument as Character,‖ Stanford Law Review 40 (1988): 869-927; Peter 
Goodrich, ―Antirrhesis: Polemical Structures of Common Law Thought,‖ in The Rhetoric of Law, ed. 
Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, 57-102 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); L. H. 
81 
 
   
 
Lucaites and William Wiethoff stress, ―the potential for significant dialogue between 
rhetoricians and legal theorists and critics is considerable.‖201  
 Conducting an exhaustive analysis of a variety of legal texts, such as appellate 
court and Supreme Court opinions, holds promise for advancing this interdisciplinary 
dialogue. As Scallen notes, ―[r]hetorical criticism is the means to a more complete 
understanding of legal discourse,‖202 and White suggests that a ―[r]hetorical analysis . . . 
may also provide a set of questions and attitudes that will enable us to move from one 
academic and social field to another and in doing so to unite them.‖203 At the same time, 
as Gold explains, since rhetorical criticism ―is paradigmatically interdisciplinary in 
thrust,‖ such an approach ―can illuminate the way in which a court both decides a case 
and wants to be seen as deciding that case.‖204 In fact, Gold argues that ―rhetorical 
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analysis should serve as a primary paradigm through which we organize our research 
into the nature of the judicial opinion.‖205 
 Analyzing judicial opinions within a paradigm of rhetorical analysis, according 
to Scallen, serves three important functions. First, rhetorical criticism is instructive, in 
the sense that it ―identifies, analyzes, and evaluates legal discourse,‖ which thereby 
offers a method for teaching how to construct more effective argumentative or 
persuasive discourse. Second, rhetorical criticism serves a reconstructive function, in 
which the aim of the ―criticism is to alter the reader‘s experience of the legal text, to 
make us see things we have never seen before.‖ A rhetorical analysis allows the critic to 
move beyond merely commenting on the words of the text and instead offer an insight 
into why the writer made certain discursive choices and how those choices serve the 
writer‘s purpose. Third, rhetorical criticism provides an evaluative function, in which the 
critic offers an assessment as to whether the piece of legal discourse is a ―fitting‖ text by 
establishing standards for what makes the legal discourse ―good, bad, ugly‖ or 
effective/ineffective rather than simply saying a piece of legal discourse is ―useful‖ or 
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―good if it succeeds.‖206 Rhetorical criticism, therefore, allows the critic to move beyond 
the pejorative associations and to provide insight into how the author of a legal text 
advocates a position through deliberate argumentative choices. 
 A rhetorical analysis of judicial opinions also addresses the questions and 
concerns regarding a Justice‘s judicial temperament and judicial philosophy. As legal 
scholar Brian Porto suggests, ―We expect judges to resolve legal questions by means of 
legal reasoning.‖207 Often, scholars evaluate a Justice‘s legal reasoning through the lens 
of a particular judicial philosophy, which scholars then use to draw inferences about the 
Justice‘s adherence to that judicial philosophy or political ideology, as well as to surmise 
how a Justice would resolve a particular case (and the legal or constitutional issues 
therein) based on the Justice‘s adherence to that philosophy or ideology. A rhetorical 
analysis offers an effective avenue for evaluating such claims. As Rogers Smith argues, 
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―interpretive studies of judicial ideologies‖ can ―illuminate the modes of reasoning and 
logical tensions associated with certain sets of beliefs,‖ and ―nuanced discursive 
interpretations‖ can ―highlight contradictions in a judge‘s ideological beliefs,‖ thereby 
providing insight into how a Justice‘s legal reasoning and judicial philosophies 
interrelate.
208
  
 Providing a more succinct definition of legal rhetoric—the use of argumentative 
strategies within a text to advance a position and to ground the rationale and reasoning 
for that position—and recognizing the value of rhetorical analysis offers a substantial 
reconciliation to the aforementioned challenges. At the same time, for those interested in 
studying the Supreme Court, judicial opinions, and other legal texts, those alterations 
offer a more fruitful approach for entering an interdisciplinary dialogue. The remaining 
sections of the chapter, therefore, discuss the elements of the revised definition, which 
provides the requisite background for conducting a rhetorical analysis of Chief Justice 
John Roberts‘ legal writings.  
Argumentative Strategies in Judicial Discourse 
 As the judicial opinion explicates what is or is not ‗legal‘ or ‗constitutional,‘ an 
expectation exists that the opinion writer has provided a justification and a rationale for 
arriving at that determination.
209
 Typically, one or more legal arguments provide that 
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justification and rationale for how a Justice arrived at a decision,
210
 though in many 
opinions there remains ―a question of what are good arguments, and how we can 
distinguish good from bad arguments in these issues of interpretation and practical 
decision-making.‖211  
In their simplest form, legal arguments are ―formal and stylized;‖212 in many 
opinions, however, they ―are rhetorical acts.‖213 Reading and analyzing a judicial 
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opinion, therefore, requires an understanding of the various legal arguments from which 
the opinion writer can select, as well as requires an understanding of how those 
arguments comprise both an argumentative strategy and a rhetorical strategy for 
justifying and rationalizing the decision outlined in the opinion. At the same time, as 
Francis Mootz argues, ―the most pressing need in legal theory is to develop a 
sophisticated account of the dynamic conceptual structure of legal argumentation 
practiced by lawyers and judges and a corresponding account of the conceptual structure 
of argumentation practiced by legal theorists.‖214 Mootz‘s contention follows a long 
tradition of attempts at making argumentation more easily understandable.  
 In the modern era, one of the most influential models of an argument‘s structure 
was the ―data-warrant-claim model‖ developed by Stephen Toulmin, who based his 
model of an argument‘s structure on legal reasoning.215 According to Toulmin, an 
argument consists of three primary elements: the grounds (or data), which are the facts 
or other relevant information on which the argument is based; the warrant, or the 
justification that links the data to the claim; and, the claim, or the conclusion of the 
argument. Toulmin also includes three secondary elements as well: the backing, or the 
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authority that provides credibility to the warrant; the qualifier, or the degree of certainty 
regarding the claim; and, the rebuttal, or the conditions or exceptions under which the 
claim might fail, and which serves a pre-emption against those objections that might be 
offered against the claim. Toulmin‘s model provides an easily accessible tool for 
identifying arguments and evaluating their structure, and many argumentation and legal 
scholars utilize Toulmin‘s model when they discuss the nature of legal argumentation216 
since his ―model works for legal argument because it is accurate, flexible, and 
effective.‖217  
 For other argumentation theorists, however, Toulmin‘s model places the 
proverbial ―cart before the horse;‖ that is, his model offers a method for identifying the 
structure of argument, but it does not provide a satisfactory account for what qualifies as 
an argument. Professor Robert Rowland explains the challenges when attempting to 
study argument: ―The problem facing argumentation theorists today can be explained 
quite simply: there is no agreement on the defining characteristics of argument form, the 
theory  which should undergird the study of argument, the proper method of evaluating 
that study, or even the meaning of the term argument itself.‖218 For example, Rowland 
offers what he deems a ―relatively simple‖ definition for argument, which ―is discourse 
in which people attempt to solve problems rationally by supporting their claims with 
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reason and evidence,‖219 while another communication scholar defines argument as 
simply ―a conclusion and its rationale.‖220 A definition of argument, it seems, remains as 
broad as does the definition of rhetoric. The problem, however, is that legal arguments 
are not ―relatively simple.‖ To address the shortcomings of Toulmin‘s model, as well as 
to account for the complexity of legal arguments, legal scholars categorize arguments 
within argument schemes.
221
 
Argument Schemes  
 As one argumentation scholar notes, ―One of the most important descriptive aims 
of argumentation theory is the development of a typology of argument schemes.‖222 
Developing a basic argument scheme for legal arguments involves locating an argument 
within a text, identifying it as a ‗type‘ of argument, and then placing that argument 
‗type‘ within a critic-created ‗category.‘ One of the first post-Toulmin works on 
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argumentation schemes, and one that effectively situated law within the branch of 
rhetoric, was Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s The New Rhetoric, which 
aimed ―to characterize the different argumentative structures.‖223 Initially published in 
French and translated into English a decade later, The New Rhetoric provided a 
comprehensive account for how speakers and writers utilize argumentation, and the 
myriad types of argument, in their spoken and written discourse. Communication 
scholars welcomed Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s work into their discipline, and The 
New Rhetoric offered these scholars a new tool for conducting argument-based critical 
analyses, especially in their approaches to studying legal rhetoric. As critical scholarship 
of legal rhetoric using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s work grew, scholars within the 
discipline, such as William Benoit
224
 and Stephen Jones,
225
 expanded upon and extended 
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca‘s work and each developed new argument schemes. 
Additional communication scholars have developed similar schemes for categorizing the 
                                                          
223
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 9. 
224
 Benoit‘s argument scheme includes argument by descriptive example, argument by causal example, 
analogy, argument from descriptive generalization, and argument from causal generalization. See Benoit, 
―An Empirical Investigation of Argumentative Strategies Employed in Supreme Court Opinions,‖ 182-
185.  
225
 Jones developed ―justificatory categories‖ for the arguments used in the opinions from Betts v. Brady, 
316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Jones‘s categories include 
intention of the framers; history; requirements of later precedents or chain of precedents; adaptive (no 
precedents exist for the current case); current usage (no existing precedent, but other bodies use the ―trend 
of the decision‖); literal meaning; depreciation of the original decision (the primary focus ―is in refuting 
the original decision by subsequent decision‖); and, pragmatic proposals (those ―primarily concerned with 
practicality and gaining adherence to questions of policy‖). See Stephen B. Jones, ―Justification in Judicial 
Opinions: A Case Study,‖ Journal of the American Forensic Association 12 (1976): 122. 
90 
 
   
 
types of legal arguments that Justices utilize in their opinions,
226
 though most of the 
schemes focus on a few select Court cases rather than examining a corpus of works from 
a single Justice.  
 Within the legal field, scholars also endeavor to develop comprehensive accounts 
to explain the types of legal arguments utilized within the field and those most 
commonly found in judicial opinions. Two leading scholars, Neil MacCormick
227
 and 
Douglas Walton,
228
 developed exhaustive lists of various argument types and schemes, 
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though for those not trained in the intricacies of the law, their work remains limited 
primarily to law students, other legal scholars, and legal practitioners. Recognizing that 
few laypersons study and understand the complexities of the law, and therefore lack an 
interest in reading judicial opinions, one law professor aimed to bridge that divide, and 
his work on argument schemes offers a more accessible and focused approach for 
studying the types of legal arguments utilized within judicial opinions. 
Philip Bobbitt‟s “Argument Archetypes” 
University of Texas Law Professor Philip Bobbitt published two groundbreaking 
books on legal argumentation: Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, in 1982, 
and a follow-up book ten years later, Constitutional Interpretation.
229
 Bobbitt‘s books 
generated both widespread acclaim and controversy among legal academics,
230
 yet most 
                                                                                                                                                                           
modern age‖ whose argumentation schemes have impacted significantly the study of reasoning in 
argumentation and which ―may be considered the basis of the most important theories of contemporary 
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agreed that his innovative method for studying legal arguments significantly transformed 
the manner in which legal practitioners, scholars, and law schools could approach the 
practice, teaching, and study of the law.
231
  
In his books, Bobbitt addressed the debate over the questions surrounding the 
legitimacy of and justification for judicial review, and he staked out his position in the 
debate by creating six categories for which legal arguments within a judicial opinion 
could be placed. Rather than solely categorizing based on the traditional ‗type‘ of legal 
argument (such as analogical, definitional, etc.), Bobbitt attempted to clarify the ongoing 
debate by developing a scheme for evaluating the larger argumentative strategy for 
which a particular argument ‗type‘ served within the text of a judicial opinion. Bobbitt‘s 
scheme situated legal arguments within what he termed the six argument archetypes, or 
modalities:  
These six modalities of constitutional argument are: the historical (relying on the 
intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the 
meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by 
the average contemporary ‗man on the street‘); structural (inferring rules from 
the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); 
doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from 
those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
University of Toronto Law Journal 35 (1985): 154-182 and Markovits, Matters of Principle, 184-188. 
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Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a 
particular rule).
232
 
 
According to Bobbitt, ―arguments are conventions,‖ and ―the Court hears arguments, 
reads arguments, and ultimately must write arguments, all within certain 
conventions.‖233 For Bobbitt, a Justice both interprets and advances an argument within 
one or more of the modalities; consequently, understanding a judicial opinion requires an 
understanding of how a Justice utilizes a legal argument ‗type‘ within one or more 
modalities to justify and rationalize the resolution of the legal or constitutional issue 
before the Court. At the same time, as law professor Sanford Levinson notes, Bobbitt‘s 
modalities ―present a morphology of legal argument, a grammar of lawtalk [sic],‖ which 
subsequently offers a way for demystifying the challenges of understanding judicial 
opinions.
234
 
 Consistent with Bobbitt‘s approach to the study of the Court and its opinions, and 
with the recognition that Justices experience ―ideological drift‖ during their tenure on 
the Court, this project argues that initially attempting to discern the ideology or 
philosophy of a Justice requires that critics move beyond assigning convenient labels to 
a Justice and instead shift their focus to how a Justice utilizes the modalities for the 
overall argumentative or rhetorical strategy within an opinion, as the selection of one or 
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more modalities best reflects the ideology or philosophy to which the Justice adheres at 
that time and which guides the Justice in his or her resolution of the instant case (i.e. the 
present case that the Court is resolving). Approaching a study from this vantage, 
therefore, requires a thorough explanation of each modality.  
The Historical Modality  
 In his ―Preface to the Debates in the Convention,‖ James Madison wrote that the 
new ―United States, of North America‖ was ―a system without a[n] example ancient or 
modern, a system founded on popular rights, and so comb[in]ing a federal form with the 
forms of individual Republics, as may enable each to supply the defects of the other and 
obtain the advantages of both.‖235 Madison and his contemporaries thus embarked in 
1787 on a journey to establish a structure for a Federal government, and they ultimately 
drafted a ―document that sets up the rules, procedures, and principles of the democratic 
Republic of the United States‖—the Constitution, which became ―the supreme Law of 
the Land.‖236 Madison dutifully recorded the debates, discussions, and opinions 
regarding the founding of the Republic that took place in Philadelphia.
237
 The dialogue 
did not remain confined to the floor of the Convention; both supporters and opponents of 
a federal Republic also carried out their debates and discussions via a compilation of 
                                                          
235
 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1966), 3.  
236
 Adrienne Koch, ―Introduction,‖ in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, v-xxiii 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), v. 
237
 For more on Madison‘s efforts, see Edward J. Erler, ―James Madison and the Framing of the Bill of 
Rights: Reality and Rhetoric in the New Constitutionalism,‖ Political Communication 9 (1992): 213-229. 
95 
 
   
 
essays in a two-volume book and in the press through articles and opinion pieces that ran 
in state and local newspapers.
238
 This corpus of documents—The Federalist Papers—
left by the ―Founding Fathers‖ of the Republic and the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution provide a historical record of that journey.  
Bobbitt bases the first archetype in his typology, the historical argument, on this 
corpus of documents and the historical record provided by the ―Founding Fathers.‖ The 
historical argument holds as its central premise that Justices should decide cases based 
on the ―intent of the draftsmen of the Constitution and the people who adopted the 
Constitution.‖239 According to Bobbitt, the historical argument ―depend[s] on a 
determination of the original understanding of the constitutional provision to be 
construed,‖ which often involves drawing inferences from the ―the controversies, the 
attitudes, and decisions of the period during which the particular constitutional provision 
to be construed was proposed and ratified.‖240  
 When reasoning from the historical argument to determine the legality or 
constitutionality of the issue before the Court, then, a Justice interprets the relevant 
provision based on the historical evidence left by the framers and ratifiers (original 
intent), or based on the historical meaning of a word, phrase, clause, etc. at the time in 
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which that word, phrase, clause, etc. was written (original meaning).
241
 The central aim 
in the use of the historical modality is to ground the Justice‘s reasoning in the historical 
text(s) to demonstrate that the Justice arrived at a decision based on evidence rather than 
on the Justice‘s ideology, preferences, predispositions, or preconceived notions about the 
legality or constitutionality of the issue(s) at hand.  
 By citing The Federalist Papers as the primary historical record about the 
founding of the Republic and her new Constitution, Justices attempt to support their 
legal reasoning by demonstrating that the manner in which they reached a decision 
remains true to the original constitutional ideals set forth by the framers. To accomplish 
this end, the Justices can utilize The Federalist in one of three ways: first, ―as a source of 
wisdom that might enlighten the Court on how to interpret the Constitution in a 
particular case;‖ second, to demonstrate the existence of ―a reliance-based contract 
theory‖ in which a citation to The Federalist reflects the belief ―that the delegates to the 
various state ratifying conventions read the essays and relied on their explanations of the 
Constitution in voting to ratify;‖ and, third, to ―display how the text of the Constitution 
was originally understood.‖242 At the same time, by referencing The Federalist or one of 
its most important contributors—Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, or James Madison—the 
Court can ―establish its own ethos as an institution‖ by ―draw[ing] on the ethos of the 
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authors themselves.‖243 In so doing, the Justices attempt to demonstrate that they ―are 
seeking to rule on ‗the law‘ and not on their ‗preferences.‘‖244 The Justices, therefore, 
aim not to appear as ideologues promoting a particular political party‘s position but 
instead strive to appear as defenders of the Constitution, as entrusted to them by the 
framers and ratifiers of that document.  
 In fact, Justices on the modern-era Courts are utilizing more frequently the 
historical modality in their majority and plurality opinions, as The Federalist Papers 
―are by common convention now presumed to constitute authoritative (and convenient) 
evidence of the intent of the Framers,‖245 and ―many of the most controversial cases over 
the past several years‖ include references to The Federalist.246 One legal scholar, in his 
study of the Rehnquist Court, observed that ―the modern Court has presumed the papers‘ 
interpretive value. . . . in discussing the evolution of constitutional principles and 
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doctrines, the modern Court has frequently consulted The Federalist as its first 
source.‖247  
 The Justices‘ reliance on The Federalist, however, often calls into question the 
validity of the historical modality. For example, ―in a significant number of cases‖ in 
which the majority or plurality opinion references The Federalist, the concurring and/or 
dissenting opinions also will reference The Federalist to demonstrate that the majority or 
plurality opinion actually departs from the Founders‘ ideals.248 As a result, Professor 
Matthew Festa suggests, ―history can be—and, in fact is—used to support different sides 
of many legal arguments.‖249 Legal scholar James Wilson offers a more critical 
assessment of the Justices‘ use of The Federalist:  
 [T[he Court has never significantly altered its techniques for using The Federalist 
 in constitutional adjudication.  Passages have been cited (although frequently out 
 of context), ignored (although The Federalist had been shown to support an 
 opposing argument), or even rejected (when the changed times argument dictated 
 a different result), depending on the position a justice wanted to advance. Rarely 
 has the Court gone beyond the immediate passages of The Federalist to 
 determine its meaning or significance. Indeed, The Federalist has been relied on 
 mostly as a means of persuasion.
250
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Ronald Kahn echoes Wilson‘s criticism, and Kahn contends that ―[m]ost justices tend to 
be quite undisciplined in their use of Founding materials and arguments.‖251 Historian 
Pauline Maier offers an equally critical point. She notes that at the time in which the 
framers were meeting to discuss the Constitution, and at the height of the circulation of 
The Federalist to the conventioneers, ―most delegates to the [June 1788] Virginia 
convention had probably never seen The Federalist—or, for that matter, many other 
essays on the Constitution.‖252 Despite these flaws, however, the Justices continue to 
rely on The Federalist (and other historical records from the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution) to support their reasoning by utilizing the historical modality, even though 
so doing, according to David McGowan, ―is a mistake and places upon those essays a 
burden they cannot carry.‖253  
The Textual Modality  
 The second archetype in Bobbitt‘s scheme is the textual argument. As Bobbitt 
explains, textual arguments are ―drawn from a consideration of the present sense of the 
words of the provision,‖ and ―textual arguments rest on a sort of ongoing social contract, 
whose terms are given their contemporary meanings continually reaffirmed by the 
refusal of the People to amend the instrument.‖254 From a practical standpoint, the 
strength of the textual argument is that it ―argues from the words of the Constitution 
                                                          
251
 Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, 69. 
252
 Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 257. 
253
 McGowan, ―Ethos in Law and History,‖ 825. 
254
 Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 7, 26. 
100 
 
   
 
alone, as they would be understood by contemporary readers.‖255 Thus, one need not be 
trained in ―law-talk‖ to understand concepts such as ‗free speech,‘ or ‗due process,‘ or 
‗liberty;‘ those concepts mean what laypersons interpret them to mean. From a judicial 
standpoint, the textual argument encourages judicial restraint since judges ―take their 
charter from a text and [they] do not have to rely on themselves to make up a rule.‖256 
Similar to reasoning from the historical argument, reasoning from the textual modality 
forces Justices to base their decisions on a ‗text,‘ such as a statute or agency regulation, 
rather than on their own ideologies or preferences; Justices interpret the Law/law rather 
than make the Law/law. 
  As with the historical argument, however, the textual argument introduces 
problems of its own. As Bobbitt concedes, ―[o]ne corollary of the textual approach is a 
disregard for precedent.‖257 A Justice can decide that a previous Court incorrectly 
defined or interpreted a word (such as ‗privacy‘ in Roe v. Wade258) or a phrase (such as 
‗reasonable search and seizure‘) based on ‗contemporary meaning.‘ In so deciding, the 
Justice can offer a new definition or interpretation and then either ignore prior Court 
precedent or take a more unrestrained approach and overrule a prior precedent. As a 
result, reliance on ‗contemporary meaning‘ risks letting a Justice substitute his or her 
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definition or interpretation for how that word or phrase is ‗understood‘ by the public, 
agency, or Congress.  
An additional problem that arises from the use of the textual modality involves 
the confusion between a ‗textual argument‘ and ‗textualism‘ as a judicial philosophy. A 
Justice who reasons by utilizing a textual argument ―asks what the meaning of the text 
actually used in the Constitution is, a result that can vary from what the Constitution 
may have meant to a person in the Framers‘ day.‖259 A Justice, such as Antonin Scalia, 
who approaches deciding cases as a textualist, asks ―what the Framers intended the text 
to mean,‖ which clearly discounts the ―contemporary meaning‖ standard of the textual 
argument.
260
 Professor Fallon clarifies the argument versus philosophy confusion. 
According to Fallon, there exists ―an important distinction between arguments about the 
text and arguments from the text.‖ The former are simply ―arguments about the text and 
what it should mean,‖ whereas the latter are ―arguments that purport to resolve a 
question by direct appeal to the Constitution‘s plain language‖ which ―either requires or 
forbids a certain conclusion.‖261 As Fallon explains, ―arguments from the text can fulfill 
three functions.‖ First, they ―require a unique conclusion,‖ such as the stipulation in the 
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Constitution that the president holds a term of office for four years.
262
 Second, they 
exclude ―one or more positions that might be argued for on nontextual grounds.‖ The 
Constitution‘s text, for example, does not definitively specify a timeframe for ―a speedy 
and public trial,‖263 but the language of the amendment does prohibit an indefinite 
incarceration without the accused party receiving an appearance before an action which 
can be credibly described as a ―trial.‖ Third, in situations in which meanings ―are not 
excluded by arguments from text, a narrowly text-focused reading will sometimes yield 
the conclusion that some [meanings] are more plausible than others.‖ Such a reading, 
therefore, may elucidate whether possessing live hand grenades or positioning a 
functional battlefield tank on one‘s front lawn enjoys protection as a ―right of the people 
to keep and bear arms.‖264 While somewhat difficult between which to distinguish, 
understanding the marked difference of the textual argument and the textualist 
philosophy clarifies Bobbitt‘s modality. 
The Structural Modality  
 The third archetype in Bobbitt‘s scheme is the structural argument, which is 
―grounded in the actual text of the Constitution.‖265  Unlike the historical and textual 
arguments, which focus on narrower aspects or specific parts of the Constitution, the 
structural argument addresses ―the relationships the Constitution seems to mandate,‖ 
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such as the existence of institutional structures or the division of power between the 
three branches of government.
266
 As Bobbitt explains, Justices usually construct a rather 
simple line of reasoning when they utilize the structural argument: first, they introduce 
an ―uncontroversial statement‖ about a constitutional structure; next, they infer a 
relationship about the structure; third, they make ―a factual assertion about the world;‖ 
and, finally, they draw a conclusion about the relationship that provides the applicable 
rule(s) for the instant case.
267
  
 Use of the structural argument serves several important functions for the Justice 
writing the opinion, especially when the central issue in the instant case involves 
whether the plaintiff or respondent acted within or exceeded its authority. The modality 
limits judicial discretion since the Justice reasons from the constitutional text rather than 
creates a new rule about an institutional structure. The modality also ties the Justice to 
existing law or precedent, as the Justice can evaluate the instant case and its legal and/or 
constitutional questions against prior intergovernmental or Court decisions.  
The Doctrinal Modality  
 When the Supreme Court renders a decision on the constitutional or legal issues 
in a case, the Court issues its ‗holding,‘ or the rules and principles derived from the 
Court‘s decision in the case. The holding(s) in each Court opinion provides an ongoing 
body of case law, known as precedent, to which the Justices can turn to resolve 
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subsequent cases that raise similar issues. Future Courts and lower courts, therefore, are 
expected to adhere to the principle of stare decisis, which is the practice of following 
Court precedent, to decide subsequent cases. As S.J. Balter explains, the legal 
community expects judges to ―justify their opinion by relating it to other cases; i.e. use 
precedent.‖268 
 Bobbitt bases the fourth archetype, the doctrinal argument, in his scheme on 
these concerns with precedent and stare decisis. As Bobbitt explains, a doctrinal 
argument is one ―that asserts principles derived from precedent or from judicial or 
academic commentary on precedent,‖ and the ―doctrinal approach treats the United 
States Supreme Court as though it were the last, best appellate tribunal.‖269 
 Justices who advance doctrinal arguments in their reasoning can accomplish two 
goals. First, use of the doctrinal argument reflects judicial restraint since the Justices are, 
as Bobbitt explains, ―dispassionate, disinterested justices who arrive at decisions by a 
process of reason applied to doctrine . . . precedent, institutional doctrines, and doctrines 
of construction.‖270 Second, use of the doctrinal argument allows Justices to appear that 
they adhere to the ―rule of law;‖ that is, they follow the law rather than make the law. 
The Justices‘ reasoning reflects a respect for ―legislative policy making‖ and ―judicial 
rule applying,‖ which is, according to Bobbitt, ―a reasoned process of deriving the 
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appropriate rules and following them . . . without regard to any fact not relevant to the 
rules . . . ‖271 Bobbitt cites Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Henry J. Friendly 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as two of the premier 
doctrinal judges.
272
 
 Use of the doctrinal argument, however, poses problems as well. Justices do not 
interpret nor apply precedential decisions in the same manner. As Hunter notes, ―two 
eminent jurists can reason about the same issue, using the same precedents, but come to 
completely different conclusions.‖273 Justices also can deviate from adhering to the 
principle of stare decisis. As Professor of Law Erwin Chemerinsky observes, the Court 
can overturn precedent by finding previous holdings ―aberrations and its current 
interpretation as the long-standing approach, even when that is not at all the case,‖274 or 
as Levinson suggests, precedent ―can be overridden in the name of some other important 
value.‖275 Scholars continue to debate why the Justices overturn precedent, and answers 
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range from the Justices‘ ideological leanings and policy preferences, to the strength of 
the majority coalition, or to the age of the precedent being overturned.
276
  
The Ethical Modality  
 The fifth archetype in Bobbitt‘s scheme is the ethical argument, which ―arise[s] 
from the ethos of limited government and the seam where powers end and rights 
begin.‖277 The ethical argument, for Bobbitt, allows Justices to argue that constitutional 
barriers exist that prevent the government, especially legislators, from exceeding their 
authority to impose or restrict rights.
278
 Consequently, the ethical argument ―confines 
governments in few respects [and] it provides an absolute bar as to the rights it does 
protect. This can provide an easily replicated decision procedure.‖279 Use of the ethical 
argument, therefore, allows Justices to uphold the ―moral principles that seem immanent 
in the Constitution,‖280 and the argument restrains Justices from ―reading‖ new rights 
into the Constitution and it allows Justices to protect rights when the government 
exceeds its authority to unduly restrict rights or too broadly extend them.  
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The Prudential Modality  
 The final archetype in Bobbitt‘s scheme is the prudential argument, which is ―a 
calculation of the necessity of the act against its costs.‖ As Gold explains, the 
―[p]rudential argument is consequentialist in focus;‖ utilization of the argument asks 
―what is the impact of the decision likely to be?‖281 Justices who utilize the prudential 
argument evaluate ―the relative costs and benefits of reaching a particular constitutional 
conclusion.‖282 The prudential argument, therefore, allows Justices to evaluate and 
weigh either the restriction or extension of a right or a rule against the impact that 
restriction or extension would have on the parties affected by the Court‘s decision. 
Bobbitt‟s Modalities and Rhetorical Criticism 
 Understanding each modality and how a Justice reasons using that modality as 
part of a larger argumentative or rhetorical strategy provides insight into that Justice‘s 
ideology, philosophy, and/or temperament. As previously discussed, those three 
concerns about Justices generate two important questions over which scholars continue 
to debate: Do Justices follow the Law/law, or do they make the Law/law? Conducting an 
analysis utilizing Bobbitt‘s modalities allows the critic to examine those two questions. 
 Bobbitt‘s approach to examining judicial opinions, though, is not a critical-
inquiry panacea. Bobbitt admits that some legal arguments may fall within more than 
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one modality, which for some scholars undermines the value of his scheme.
283
 A more 
objective view, however, should explain the dilemma as one which necessitates 
examining a text as a whole to determine the overall argumentative and rhetorical 
strategy present within the text, as well as determine whether the dilemma involves 
‗constitutional argumentation‘ or ‗constitutional discourse,‘ which according to Bobbitt 
are two distinct activities.
284
  
 Bobbitt‘s argument scheme complements a rhetorical analysis of judicial texts in 
two significant ways. First, his scheme allows the critic to determine the purpose for 
which a particular ‗type‘ of legal argument serves within the opinion, and, based on the 
selection of that argument ‗type‘ and its subsequent placement within a modality, the 
critic can assess whether a Justice‘s reasoning reveals a particular judicial philosophy to 
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which the Justice adhered in his or her decision-making, as evidenced by the overall 
argumentative and/or rhetorical strategy that characterizes the legal reasoning within the 
opinion.
285
 Bobbitt‘s argumentation scheme, therefore, provides a more fruitful approach 
for examining whether Justices adhere to one or more judicial philosophies when they 
provide a justification and rationale for resolving the legal or constitutional issue(s) of a 
case.  
 Second, Bobbitt‘s argumentation scheme supports Scallen‘s rationale for 
examining legal texts from the rhetorical critic‘s perspective. Situating a ‗type‘ of legal 
argument within a modality provides a more holistic account of how a Justice engages in 
the legal reasoning process. By evaluating how ‗the parts make up the whole,‘ the critic 
offers an instructive method for demonstrating how to (or how not to) construct an 
effective piece of argumentative and/or persuasive legal discourse. Additionally, 
Bobbitt‘s scheme contributes to the reconstructive effort of rhetorical criticism, as 
viewing how a Justice utilized argument(s) and modalities in his or her opinion may 
reveal the unknown: adherence to one or more judicial philosophies, the advocacy of a 
particular policy agenda or preference, or some other surprising discovery that only a 
holistic reading and evaluation of the opinion can provide. Finally, Bobbitt‘s scheme 
allows the critic to assess whether a Justice‘s use of one or more modalities and the 
rationale for the decision provided a fitting response to the constitutional or legal issues 
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of the case. Against this assessment, then, the critic could suggest a more applicable 
argument type or modality that could have provided a more fitting response if the 
evaluation uncovered weaknesses in the Justice‘s resolution of the case. Bobbitt‘s 
modalities, therefore, complement Scallen‘s position, and both legal scholars‘ work 
provides a justification for (re)defining legal rhetoric as the use of argumentative 
strategies within a text to advance a position and to ground the rationale and reasoning 
for that position.  
Legal Argument „Types‟ 
 Interdisciplinary scholarship on traditional arguments
286
 and legal arguments
287
 
covers a wide body of research. Utilizing Bobbitt‘s modalities as an approach to the 
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rhetorical criticism of legal texts, especially judicial opinions, requires an understanding 
of the most prevalent legal argument ‗types‘ used within the legal discipline. The 
following section of the project, therefore, reviews the ‗types‘ of arguments found within 
legal texts and judicial opinions, such as the argument from analogy,
288
 the argument 
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from coherence,
289
 the argument about and from definition,
290
 the argument from 
dissociation,
291
 and the institutional argument.
292
  
Argument from Analogy 
 According to law professor Cass Sunstein, ―Reasoning by analogy is the most 
familiar form of legal reasoning.‖293 Reasoning from analogy involves ―finding the 
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solution to a problem by reference to another similar problem and its solution.‖294 
Justices usually advance two kinds of argument from analogy. The first, a statutory 
analogy, compares the regulation, rule, or law in the instant case to a similar regulation, 
rule, or law from a prior case, and the analogy either explains why the two are 
comparable or why one is distinguishable from the other. When offering a statutory 
analogy, a Justice ―reasons from a rule already established, applies the rule to the case at 
hand, and makes her decision regarding the case according to the mandates of the 
rule.‖295 The second kind of analogy, and the one more often advanced in a Court 
opinion, is the precedential analogy. When offering an analogy based upon Court 
precedent, the holding in a prior case serves as ―the guiding principle‖ for evaluating the 
pending issue, and the Justice explains why the issue(s) in the instant case is/are 
comparable to or distinguishable from the issue(s) in the prior case.
296
 
 In theory, then, arguments from analogy promote judicial restraint and thereby 
limit ―the power on judges to extend the law‖ beyond the Court‘s prior holdings.297 At 
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the same time, as Professor Emily Sherwin explains, ―[a]nalogical reasoning . . . is likely 
to improve the overall quality of judicial reasoning and rulemaking‖ as it ―incorporates 
the insights of many judges over time. It also works indirectly to protect against 
insufficient judicial attention to reliance on past decisions.‖298 Other scholars, however, 
view the argument from analogy as a disingenuous attempt to resolve the issue(s) in a 
case. By relating ―one example to another,‖ judges take the liberty to ―adjust words and 
rules‖ or ―invent new words and rules‖ to fit new cases since ―legal terms change as they 
are used in relation to specific cases.‖299 Consequently, use of argument from analogy 
reflects that ―the process of legal argument is rhetorical in nature.‖300  
 Justices are likely to utilize argument from analogy within three of Bobbitt‘s 
argument modalities: historical, textual, and doctrinal. The historical modality allows the 
writer of the opinion to compare or contrast the issue(s) in the instant case to how the 
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution viewed the issue(s), while the textual modality 
allows the opinion writer to compare and contrast the meaning or interpretation of the 
issue(s) in the instant case to a meaning or interpretation from a prior decision. The 
doctrinal modality, which focuses on precedent, affords the opinion writer the option to 
compare or contrast the issue(s) in the instant case to similar issues resolved by a similar 
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case. Use of any of the three modalities, therefore, encourages judicial restraint and 
limits judicial activism, which thereby promotes consistency within the Law/law.  
Argument from Authority 
 Another ‗type‘ of argument found within legal texts is the argument from 
authority. The Justice who authors the Court‘s opinion must write in a manner that 
provides legitimacy for the opinion and credibility for the Court, a process that entails 
writing an opinion which reflects the absence of that Justice‘s ideological or policy 
preferences. To accomplish this goal, a Justice can advance an argument from authority, 
or what Robert Hume calls ―rhetorical sources,‖301 which are ―references to prominent 
authors and texts that are nonbinding on case outcomes.‖ According to Hume, the 
Justices most often reference and quote from an author of, or an excerpt from, the 
Federalist Papers,
302
 though the Justices also reference interpretive authorities, founding 
documents, respected jurists, and respected non-jurists, such as philosophers and legal 
scholars.
303
 In addition to referencing authorities from rhetorical sources, Justices also 
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are citing traditional legal secondary sources,
304
 such as articles from law journals, as 
well as citing Internet resources, many of which are from non-legal sources and which 
are slowly finding their way into Court opinions.
305
  
 By referencing authorities other than themselves, the Justices achieve two goals. 
First, as White explains, ―[i]n rhetorical terms, the court gives itself an ethos, or 
character . . . ;‖306 that is, the Court appears objective in its resolution of the case and the 
Justices as neutral arbiters in their decision-making. Second, as Gold suggests, ―[i]n 
terms of rhetorical impact, arguments from authority enhance the image of the decision 
as, in some sense, independent of the values of the court invoking the authority.‖307 The 
historical, doctrinal, and ethical modalities complement the argument from authority, as 
each modality allows the opinion writer to demonstrate that the expertise of another 
authority contributed to the rationale for resolving the issue(s) of the instant case. 
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Argument from Coherence 
 Another type of argument Justices advance is the argument from coherence.
308
 
According to MacCormick, ―coherence‖ means ―that the multitudinous rules of a 
developed legal system should ‗make sense‘ when taken together.‖309 An argument from 
coherence aims to ―provide reasons for a standpoint by taking into account its placement 
within the system as well as its relationship with the fundamental goals of the 
system.‖310 There are two types of argument from coherence, the precedential and the 
prudential.
311
 The first type, the precedential argument, promotes judicial restraint and 
limits judicial discretion, as the argument ―establishes a relation of coherence between a 
solution, on the one hand, and the precedents and rules of a legal system, on the other, 
[and] it seeks to do justice to the decision-making authorities‘ duty to be faithful to pre-
existing law.‖  The second type, the pragmatic argument, allows Justices to adjust the 
law so that it fits the contemporary or future needs of society, as the argument ―appeals 
to the system‘s goals and principles [and] is forward-looking‖ and ―can be used to give 
voice to the need of innovating the system.  In this use, the argument from coherence 
keeps in view the future of the legal system, and the system itself is conceived of as a set 
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of goals to be pursued and fulfilled (in the future) rather than as a number of previously 
formatted rules and precedents prescribing this or that conduct.‖312 The doctrinal and 
structural modalities complement the precedential argument from coherence, and the 
pragmatic argument from coherence requires Justices to adjust elements of a modality to 
fit their Court-created Laws/laws, since the pragmatic argument from coherence reflects 
an activist, rather than a restrained, judicial solution. 
Argument about and from Definition 
 Disputes over the meaning or interpretation of a word or phrase comprise another 
type of common legal argument.
313
 As relevant for the critique of judicial opinions, 
many communication scholars base their studies about definitional interpretations on 
Edwin Schiappa‘s distinction between an argument about a definition and an argument 
from definition. The former involves ―finding the better definition in the context of 
resolving some larger disagreement,‖314 while the latter involves resolving issues based 
on ―well-established and uncontroversial definitions.‖315 An argument about definition, 
therefore, involves competing interpretations ―over [the] preferred meaning‖ of a term 
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―in a context of previously recognized uses of the term. The ‗meaning‘ that one seeks to 
alter is not a property of a term per se but a use to which the term is put,‖ which usually 
entails ―providing an accurate, perhaps empirical, account of how a term is actually used 
in practice.‖316 The argument from definition, on the other hand, ―reasons from an 
uncontroversial definition‖ of the word or phrase in question. To advance arguments 
about or from definition, the Court often turns to Black’s Law Dictionary or an edition of 
The American Heritage or The American Collegiate Dictionary ―to get just the ‗right‘ 
definition to affect the holding,‖ though ―use of dictionaries by the Court is hardly 
consistent‖ and often ―begins to border on the bizarre.‖317 
 Despite the source the Justices reference, argument about or from definition often 
functions as an integral step in the Justices‘ reasoning in the instant case. For example, 
definitional arguments can clarify ―when it is ‗proper‘ or ‗correct‘ to use words in a 
particular way,‖318 such as when statutory questions arise concerning the meaning or 
interpretation of a word or phrase. Additionally, Justices can use definitional arguments 
―to clarify ambiguous policy prescriptions,‖319 especially those involving an agency‘s or 
institution‘s rules and regulations. The end result of definitional argument is, as 
Schiappa explains, ―to induce denotative conformity, which is another way of saying 
that definitions are introduced or contested when a rhetor wants to alter an audience‘s 
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linguistic behavior in a particular fashion. A successful new definition changes not only 
recognizable patterns of behavior, but also our understanding of the world.‖320 Justices 
can utilize the historical, textual, doctrinal, or structural modalities to advance 
definitional arguments, and their modality selection(s) largely depends on how they want 
to frame and resolve the disputed word or phrase. 
Argument from Dissociation 
 Unlike the previous types of arguments, a more complex and therefore more 
difficult to recognize argument is the argument from dissociation. The law requires that 
Justices ―reconcile conflicting claims.‖ The argument from dissociation allows Justices 
to justify their rationale for finding in favor of one claim over the other by ―delimiting 
the sphere of application‖ of the claim in question by ―introduc[ing] distinctions‖ to 
reconcile the competing claims.
321
 For example, Justices cannot resolve a ‗rights‘ claim 
without considering individual rights versus societal rights, or without considering the 
spirit of the law versus the letter of the law that protects or excludes the ‗right‘ in 
question; Justices must resolve the competing claims by demonstrating that one claim 
deserves precedence over the other claim.  
 The argument from dissociation provides a strategy for reconciling the 
competing claims, and the argument proceeds by dividing a previously unified concept 
or idea (rights) into two ―philosophical pairs‖ (individual/societal, spirit/letter) in which 
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one of the two ―is usually considered metaphysically, epistemologically, or ethically 
superior to the other,‖ or ―one that will be positively valued by the target audience, and 
one that will be negatively valued.‖322 When used as an argumentative strategy within a 
text, such as an opinion, the argument from dissociation is a ―powerful linguistic device‖ 
that allows the advocate to reframe the issue(s) in question in an attempt to ―restructur[e] 
a community‘s linguistic understanding of reality.‖323 To advance an argument from 
dissociation, Justices can utilize the ethical or prudential modalities, since each modality 
addresses the at times ambiguous and often contested concepts of freedom, liberty, 
justice, and rights.  
Institutional Argument 
 A final type of legal argument is the institutional argument. In many Court cases, 
the constitutional or legal issue(s) centers on whether an institution possesses the 
authority to promulgate a regulation or rule. To determine whether the institution is 
within or has exceeded its authority, Justices can advance an institutional argument to 
―define the scope of institutional decision making and explain why particular actions are 
justified in light of the public‘s interest.‖324  
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 The institutional argument provides Justices with a potent tool for resolving 
questions concerning an institution‘s authority. As Professor Steve Schwarze explains, 
institutional arguments ―function to negotiate the legitimacy of governing 
institutions,‖325 and when the Court determines ―that a particular institution has the 
authority to define a term for policy purposes,‖ the Court thereby also determines ―that 
some part of the policy-making apparatus . . . should be accepted as the rightful definer 
of key terms.‖326  
 At the same time, institutional arguments promote judicial restraint. As Schwarze 
explains, institutional arguments allow the Court to ―avoid the appearance of . . .  
legislating from the bench‖ since the Court is deferring to institutional regulation- and 
rule-making rather than imposing Court-created regulations or rules. Deferral also 
demonstrates that ―the [C]ourt is not overstepping its bounds‖ by ―actively intervening 
in agency decisionmaking [sic] or creating their own definitions of statutory terms.‖ 
Perhaps the greatest value in advancing institutional arguments, however, is that Justices 
―can minimize the appearance of actively imposing their own policy preferences and 
bolster [the Court‘s] legitimacy.‖327 To advance an institutional argument, Justices can 
utilize the doctrinal and structural modalities, as both address the role of institutions and 
their authority within the Law/law.  
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Legal Argument „Types‟ and Rhetorical Criticism 
 By no means does the above discussion identify every ‗type‘ of legal argument 
judges, Justices, lawyers, or scholars use; instead, the discussion addresses and explains 
those argument ‗types‘ most commonly found in judicial texts, especially Court/court 
opinions. At the same time, the discussion synthesizes how Justices can advance legal 
argument ‗types‘ within a particular modality as part of an argumentative strategy to 
advance their position and to ground their rationale and reasoning for that position, 
which supports White‘s contention that ―[w]hat is most needed in law . . . is not abstract 
theoretical argument but a more fully informed and argumentative critical practice.‖328 
Understanding how argument ‗types‘ and argument modalities interrelate provides the 
requisite background for examining the ever-present concern regarding Supreme Court 
Justices: To what judicial philosophy does a Justice adhere? That question remains a 
central concern for those who study the Court, and the next part of the project explores 
this question. 
Judicial Philosophies and Theory Disputes 
 According to legal scholar Daniel Farber, ―Constitutional law needs no grand 
theoretical foundation.  None is a likely ever to be forthcoming, and none is 
desirable.‖329 Yet as Professor Barry Sullivan notes, there is a ―current preoccupation 
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with theories of interpretation and adjudication,‖330 and Professor John Valauri deems 
the endless search for a Justice‘s constitutional theory a ―method fetish.‖331 Nonetheless, 
those most interested in how the Court rationalizes its decisions continually engage in 
fervent academic debates regarding the Justices and the judicial philosophy to which 
they adhere and which they apply when writing their opinions, for as Judge Patricia 
Wald notes, ―[w]e write what we are, and perhaps, more than others, judges are what 
they write,‖332 and as law professor Daniel Breen notes, ―by examining carefully what 
judges do say, when they say anything, it is possible to determine if they possess a 
consistent point of view that may help us predict how they are likely to approach major 
controversies as the years go on.‖333 
Formalism 
 One of the ―dominant jurisprudential mode[s]‖ of the nineteenth century—legal 
formalism—―began just after the Civil War, rose to its zenith at the turn of the century, 
and ended with the advent of World War II.‖334 Most scholars attribute the doctrine to 
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Harvard Law School Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell, who is ―universally 
regarded as the father of legal formalism.‖335 Langdell believed that ―law consisted of 
scientifically identifying the relevant rules and applying them to the individual case‖336 
and he saw ―the task of legal theory‖ as the process of discovering the ―principles that 
underlie legal doctrine.‖337  
 One allure of the formalist approach to constitutional interpretation lies in the 
simplicity of the tools needed for resolving competing claims. Justices who adhere to 
formalism use logic in their reasoning,
338
 and they resolve cases ―as technicians whose 
task and expertise is mechanical: to find the law, declare what it is, and apply its pre-
existing prescriptions.‖339 While cases raise competing claims about that which is 
constitutional or legal, those claims are not ―new‖ or ―novel‖ claims that Justices must 
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struggle to resolve; instead, either the statutory text or prior Court precedent provides the 
necessary answers for resolving the questions in the instant case.
340
 Along those same 
lines, formalists are wary of turning to legislative history or legislative intent to resolve 
competing claims; caution deters formalists from exercising ―their discretion to make 
illegitimate policy choices‖ or ―to write their own preferences into the statute.‖341   
 Another appeal to the formalist theory of constitutional interpretation is that it 
promotes judicial restraint and curbs Justices from letting their ideological biases or 
policy agendas influence their decision-making. As Professor Sunstein explains, a 
formalist approach to deciding cases ―denies courts four relevant powers: to make 
exceptions to the text when those exceptions seem sensible or even necessary; to allow 
meaning to change over time; to invoke ‗canons‘ of construction to push statutes in 
favored directions; and to invoke the purposes of the legislature to press otherwise 
unambiguous words in certain directions.‖342 Formalists, therefore, can utilize the 
historical, structural, and doctrinal modalities to advance their claims, since each 
modality focuses the resolution of competing claims on the statutory text, the 
Constitution, and precedent and the principle of stare decisis. 
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Realism 
 As the formalist theory of constitutional interpretation grew, both jurists and non-
jurists sought a new approach ―for the observation, description, and criticism of law,‖ an 
approach that better described the judicial practice,
343
 and in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, a movement began that functioned ―as an attack on formalism.‖344 
Known as the realist movement, proponents of this approach ―abandoned‖ the formulaic 
method for resolving cases and rejected the view that defined ―the Constitution in static 
terms as a code of law.‖345  
 Most legal realists agree that the movement began with Massachusetts Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes‘s influential address, ―The Path of the Law,‖ in 
1897.
346
 Holmes ―insisted that the law was a great anthropological document,‖ an idea in 
which the law was not limited only to the rules that dictated citizens‘ behaviors, but 
instead took into consideration the ―compelling personal accounts of how citizens live 
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and work.‖347 Holmes‘ idea represented a significant departure from the existing views 
about the law, and he recognized that the law encompassed more than what ―the musty 
textbooks of the formalists‖ described.348 
 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, legal scholars began voicing their 
criticism against this new ―school‖ of legal theory, to which Columbia Law School 
Professor Karl Llewellyn offered a lengthy reply in 1931. Llewellyn wrote that ―[t]here 
is no school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be such a school. There is 
no group with an official or accepted, or even with an emerging creed. . . . There is, 
however, a movement in thought and work about law.‖349 After discounting the 
criticisms, Llewellyn explained that realists rejected the exclusively logic-centered 
approach to adjudication as well as the belief that judges functioned as technicians who 
resolved competing claims in a mechanical manner. According to Llewellyn, the realists 
harbored ―[d]istrust of traditional legal rules and concepts in so far as they purport to 
describe what either courts or people are actually doing‖ and ―a distrust of the theory 
that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in 
producing court decisions.‖350 More important, Llewellyn outlined realism‘s basic 
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tenets, which included, in part, conceiving of the ―law as a means to social ends and not 
as an end in itself,‖ which required constantly reevaluating the law ―for its purpose, and 
for its effect;‖ recognizing that society continually changes and therefore ―any portion of 
law needs reëxamination [sic] to determine how far it fits the society it purports to 
serve;‖ and, ―[a]n insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, and 
an insistence on the worthwhileness [sic] of trying to find these effects.‖351 As a result of 
his poignant essay and strident defense of realism, ―Llewellyn is entitled to be regarded 
as the man most representative of the movement as a whole.‖352 
 While scholars cannot say with certainty that Llewellyn‘s essay saved legal 
realism from its critics, the fact remains that ―legal realism gained a strong following 
within the nation‘s leading law schools during the 1930s.‖353 Future jurists embraced 
realism, such as Second Circuit Court Judge Jerome Frank
354
 and Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo, whom some scholars identify as ―the premier Realist judge.‖355 Legal realism, 
in fact, is ―still taught if not always endorsed in laws schools today.‖356 
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 The realist approach to constitutional interpretation largely remains true to the 
tenets of which Llewellyn wrote. While scholars do not agree on the exact precepts that 
comprise realism,
357
 most scholars do agree on the primary view of the law that realist 
thinkers and writers hold, two of which are noteworthy.  
 Unlike the formalists, who believe judges should follow precedent and adhere to 
the principle of stare decisis, realists deny that either controls a judge‘s decision-making. 
The simple explanation for this denial is that ―[n]o two cases . . . are ever exactly 
alike;‖358 the more difficult explanation is that realists recognize that judges make the 
law.
359
 Legal reasoning is not a deductive, logic-centered method; instead, for the realist 
judge the legal reasoning process is ―an intuitive process,‖360 and the law ―is not 
contained in codes, cases, or regulations; law is what officials of the law do when faced 
with a dispute, nothing more.‖361 Put simply, judges who adhere to the realist philosophy 
of constitutional interpretation resolve cases according to their predispositions,
362
 ―their 
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ideological impulses,‖ or their ―ideological policy ends‖363—and ―the judicial process 
would be improved if all understood that this is what really goes on.‖364 With the 
recognition that realist judges shape the law to fit their aims for the law, they can must 
adjust the components of the modalities to advance their claims, since the realist 
approach acknowledges that judges exercise judicial activism to resolve competing 
claims. 
 Some scholars discredit realism on the grounds that it ―undercut[s] the authority 
of the text‖ by suggesting that one cannot discern meaning from the written text.365 
Others criticize the cynicism of the model.
366
 Kronman suggests that if ―every 
adjudication at its heart is an exercise of unrestrained will‖ by judges, ―then it is difficult 
to know how one can either explain past judicial behavior or predict its future course.‖ 
Additionally, according to Kronman, judges who ―make decisions in an arbitrary way‖ 
undermine a critic‘s efforts ―for justifying their [the judges‘] decisions or criticizing 
them.‖367 
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Positivism 
 In 1953, former barrister and philosopher H.L.A. Hart accepted a professor of 
jurisprudence position at Oxford University, where he began developing his philosophy 
of legal positivism. Hart rejected the realists‘ claims that judges ‗make the law;‘ instead, 
Hart sought to prove that a legal system depended upon the stability and the 
predictability of the law, and that the meanings or interpretations of words, such as 
―right‖ or ―duty,‖ did not exist independent of the context in which they were used. 
Hart‘s primary concern with the law, therefore, entailed justifying the validity of the law 
and clarifying how the ambiguity and ever-changing definitions and meanings of words 
impacted the law. 
 In a break from the realists‘ beliefs, Hart‘s legal positivism theory argued that 
any case could ―be controlled by an existing legal rule,‖368 which he identified as ―the 
rule of recognition.‖369 According to Hart, primary and secondary rules comprised the 
legal system and thereby produced ―the rule of recognition.‖ Primary rules specify how 
people ―ought to act:‖ what they are allowed or forbidden to do, what recourse they have 
against one another or their government, or what ‗rights‘ they possess; secondary rules 
specify how the primary rules come into existence: how rules are created, how rules are 
nullified, or how rules are applied. For Hart, the validity (i.e. legality) of a (primary) rule 
depended upon the validity of the criteria (secondary rule) used for adopting that rule; 
only when a valid system exists for creating, nullifying, or applying rules does a valid 
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law—a ―rule of recognition‖—exist.370 Judges, then, promote the stability and 
predictability of the legal system when they recognize that a ―rule of recognition‖ exists 
for resolving the instant case before them.
371
 
 Hart also attempts to answer three claims about the law: first, the realists‘ claim 
that judges can manipulate the definitions and meanings of words to make the law fit 
their preconceived notions; second, the utilitarian claim that law must be moral; and, 
third, the formalist conception of the judge as a technician. To refute these three theories, 
Hart introduces what he terms the ―problems of the penumbra,‖ a condition that exists in 
which there are unclear rules about how a law should apply. In a lengthy excerpt 
centered on the term ‗vehicle,‘ Hart provides an example to illustrate the tensions: 
 A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids 
 an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What 
 about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of 
 the rule or not? If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the 
 most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain type 
 of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general words we use - like "vehicle" 
 in the case I consider - must have some standard instance in which no doubts are 
 felt about its application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will 
 be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously 
 applicable nor obviously ruled out. These cases will each have some features in 
 common with the standard case; they will lack others or be accompanied by 
 features not present in the standard case. . . . We may call the problems which 
 arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning "problems of 
 the penumbra"; they are always with us whether in relation to such trivial things  
 as the regulation of the use of the public park or in relation to the 
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 multidimensional generalities of a constitution. If a penumbra of uncertainty 
 must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the 
 penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive 
 reasoning, which for generations has been cherished as the very perfection of 
 human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed anyone, 
 should do in bringing particular cases under general rules. In this area men 
 cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if legal arguments and legal 
 decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, their rationality must lie in 
 something other than a logical relation to premises. So if it is rational or "sound" 
 to argue and to decide that for the purposes of this rule an airplane is not a 
 vehicle, this argument must be sound or rational without being logically 
 conclusive. What is it then that makes such decisions correct or at least better 
 than alternative decisions? Again, it seems true to say that the criterion which 
 makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to 
 be; it is easy to slide from that into saying that it must be a moral judgment about 
 what law ought to be case. . . . This restatement of the point would have the 
 following consequence: instead of saying that the recurrence of penumbral 
 questions shows us that legal rules are  essentially incomplete, and that, when 
 they fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exercise a creative 
 choice between alternatives, we shall say that the social policies which guide the 
 judges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the judges are only 
 "drawing out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is "latent" within it.
372
 
 
Hart‘s focus on the term ‗vehicle‘ allows him to evaluate the strengths of his positivist 
approach for promoting stability and predictability in the law. The list of myriad vehicles 
demonstrates that the realists‘ flexibility with words fails to resolve the instant case, and 
allowing judges to make the law fails to promote the stability or predictability of the law. 
Invoking a claim of morality or immorality fails to resolve the conflict over what vehicle 
the rule/law allows or prohibits; morality and immorality are independent of a law‘s 
validity.
373
 The facts of the case negate the logic-centered, formulaic approach for 
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resolving the law-created conflict. For Hart, the resolution of the instant case begins with 
―the rule of recognition,‖ proceeds by an assessment of how the term is used within the 
context of the relevant law, and in the absence of a clear solution, judges must discern 
from the statutory text and the secondary rules the intended application of the rule/law. 
 While positivism as a theory of constitutional interpretation does not provide a 
panacea for resolving competing claims, the positivist approach ―continues to dominate 
legal education in the United States,‖374 and ―positivism has been the dominant approach 
to legal studies for the past two centuries.‖375 While some critics fault the theory for 
allowing judges to avoid ―resorting to complex, deliberative, and evaluative forms of 
reasoning‖ and ignore the ―practices of argumentation‖ that take place in decision-
making,
376
 others welcome the approach since it acts ―as a buffer for judges against the 
criticism that they create legal rules to justify results that they want to reach in particular 
cases for undisclosed reasons.‖377 The structural and doctrinal modalities, which 
encourage judges to turn to the Constitution and prior case law (which provides the basis 
for ―the rule of recognition‖), encourage positivist judges to resolve competing claims in 
a manner that promotes the stability and predictability of the law. 
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Pragmatism 
 Another leading theory of constitutional interpretation, one that ―has been the 
dominant philosophy in the United States,‖ is pragmatism.378 Attributed to Charles 
Sanders Peirce, a nineteenth century American philosopher, pragmatism counts among 
its earliest followers Harvard Law School Professor Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, whom the realists claim in their camp, even though some scholars argue that 
Holmes practiced legal pragmatism,
379
 and to support their adoption they note that 
Holmes ―mocked the notion of natural rights and held that the very meaning of the 
Constitution, not just its application to particular cases, needs to be adapted to fit the 
most ‗advanced‘ thinking of the times.‖380 Pragmatists also cite Supreme Court Justices 
―Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and now 
Breyer‖ as jurists who adhere to the pragmatist philosophy of constitutional 
interpretation.
381
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 While many respected jurists and non-jurists follow the pragmatist philosophy, as 
Professor Scallen notes, ―[p]ragmatism is almost as difficult to define as rhetoric.‖382 
Judge Richard Posner, a leading advocate of pragmatism, defines the theory as ―an 
avowal of skepticism about various kinds of theorizing,‖383 and he argues that 
pragmatism is ―more fundamentally the rejection of a sharp line between truth and 
rhetoric, between the analytic and the persuasive, the discursive and the metaphoric.‖384 
Posner‘s definition, though, does little to clarify the major components of this 
―dominant‖ theory. A more accurate conception of pragmatism recognizes that the 
theory involves ―the rejection of foundationalist theories of truth and knowledge.‖385  
 As its major premise, pragmatism serves as a critique of formalism.
386
 Whereas 
formalists hold that precedent and the principle of stare decisis should guide judges‘ 
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decision-making, ―the pragmatist considers precedent relevant only to the extent it is 
useful‖ and believes ―analogy cannot usefully constrain, or even justify, judicial 
decisions;‖387 instead, pragmatism holds that judges can, and should, solve ―legal 
problems using every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, 
and social policy.‖388 As Judge Posner explains, ―the pragmatist judge . . . wants to come 
up with the best decision having in mind present and future needs,‖ and therefore 
pragmatists view precedent not as ―an end in itself but only as a means for bringing 
about the best results in the present case.‖389 
 At the same time, pragmatism incorporates components from other legal theories 
as well. Like the realists, the pragmatists recognize that judges ―have somewhat inchoate 
biases and respond to diverse factors that influence particular decisions.‖390 Pragmatists 
also attempt to balance the validity of law with the morality of law. As Professor Daniel 
Farber explains, the pragmatic approach to resolving the instant case begins, but does not 
end, ―with an examination of our constitutional text, history, and traditions.‖ During the 
process of resolving competing claims, the pragmatist also evaluates, for example, 
―whether the idea of fundamental rights works, whether it produces better results for 
society,‖ and therefore the pragmatist judge ―tries to analyze problems based on both 
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social policy and traditional legal doctrines, seeking a satisfactory adjustment of the 
two.‖391 Such an approach to constitutional law, Farber argues, encourages better 
decision-making: ―pragmatism responds to our sense that some constitutional problems 
are simply hard and unresponsive to any preset formula,‖ and pragmatism ―does prompt 
a healthy concern about the societal impact of law.‖392 A pragmatist judge, therefore, can 
utilize all of the argument modalities in an effort balance the Constitution and laws with 
the needs of society. 
 Criticisms of the pragmatist theory echo those leveled against many of the other 
theories. Professor David Schaefer, for example, describes pragmatism as ―a willingness 
to disregard the rule of law, the democratic process, and the Constitutional text in favor 
of judges‘ own idiosyncratic notions of fairness.‖393 Judge Posner concedes that ―[t]he 
greatest danger of judicial pragmatism is intellectual laziness,‖ where judges choose ―to 
react to a case rather than to analyze it,‖394 and Farber notes that for many critics, the 
pragmatist approach ―leads to unprincipled and inconsistent judicial decisions.‖395 
Nonetheless, like positivism, pragmatism remains one of the leading judicial 
philosophies among the nation‘s judges and Justices.  
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Originalism 
 Perhaps the most contentious of all the constitutional theories of interpretation is 
originalism, which is a formalist-type theory. As discussed earlier in the chapter, those 
who adhere to an originalist philosophy approach to constitutional interpretation are 
known as either ‗original intent‘ or ‗original meaning‘ theorists.396 Original intent 
theorists believe that ―constitutional meaning is determined by reference to the 
Constitution‘s text as illuminated by the intent or understanding of its drafters and 
ratifiers;‖397 original meaning theorists hold that ―constitutional provisions should not be 
interpreted in light of their modern consequence, but rather in light of their ratified 
meaning, with words being interpreted in reference to their understanding at the time of 
ratification rather than the specific intent of any particular drafter.‖398 Judges who follow 
the original meaning approach, which some call ―textualism or literalism‖399 or ―a ‗plain 
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meaning‘ or ‗textualist‘ theory of interpretation,‖400 involves that practice about which 
Justice Owen Roberts wrote in his 1936 United States v. Butler majority opinion:  
 When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not 
 conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the Government 
 has only one duty -- to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside 
 the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the 
 former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment 
 upon the question.
401
 
 
 Those who advocate that judges follow the doctrine of originalism argue that so 
doing promotes better decision-making, as judges interpret and defend the Constitution 
as it was entrusted to them. The Constitution lays out directives and principles which 
judges should use to resolve competing claims;
402
 relying on either the original intent or 
original meaning of the Constitution can resolve statutory questions;
403
 and, judges will 
not ―overgeneralize nor undergeneralize [sic]‖ questions about the meaning of a word if 
they rely on the Constitution to answer the question posed.
404
 Along those same lines, 
Professor Jack Balkin suggests that advocates for an originalist philosophy should avoid 
opposing those who are ―nonorginalists,‖ or those who believe in a ‗living Constitution;‘ 
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creating a demarcation undermines the value of the originalist approach. As Balkin 
explains, 
 Constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of the 
 Constitution and to the principles stated by the text or that underlie the text. 
 Constitutional  interpretation also requires construction—deciding how best to 
 implement and apply the constitutional text and principles in current 
 circumstances. This is the method of text and principle. It is faithful to the 
 original meaning of the constitutional text and its underlying purposes. It is also 
 consistent with a basic law whose reach and application evolve over time, a 
 basic law that leaves to each generation the task of how to make sense of the 
 Constitution‘s words and principles.405 
 
Balkin believes his originalist interpretation to constitutional interpretation provides a 
healthy balance, as it allows judges to ―draw on a rich tradition of sources that guide and 
constrain interpretation, including pre- and post-enactment history, original expected 
application, previous constitutional constructions, structural and intertextual arguments, 
and judicial and nonjudicial precedents.‖406 Whether judges follow original intent, 
original meaning, or Balkin‘s balancing approach, those judges will utilize the historical, 
textual, structural, and doctrinal modalities. 
 Those who oppose the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation offer 
what are, to many, compelling reasons to reject the doctrine. Many view the Constitution 
as ―a flexible document,‖407 one which Justices must adapt as society changes. Others 
believe that discerning original meaning is an illusory quest because ―the language of the 
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document cannot realistically or reasonably, in a categorical sense, be frozen in its 
eighteenth-century meaning.‖408 Advocating an original intent approach is equally 
fruitless, since ―[o]riginal intent is often difficult to ascertain because of blanks in the 
historical record (particularly concerning the views of the ratifiers of constitutional 
provisions), the divergent views of decision-makers, and the usual difficulties of 
interpreting any text (particularly texts of ancient vintage). . . . None of these arguments 
individually is devastating, but cumulatively they make the originalist project 
dubious.‖409 Most damning, for many, is that those Justices who adhere to any form of 
originalism commit the cardinal sin: ―When the text has not been helpful . . . [Justices] 
abandon the text and history and resort to the ‗spirit‘ of the Constitution.‖410 As 
Professor Randy Barnett notes, however, ―despite the onslaught of criticism . . . 
[originalism] may be the dominant method actually used by constitutional scholars—
even by those who disclaim originalism.‖411 
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Dworkinism 
 Professor Ronald Dworkin‘s legal theory, aptly termed ―Dworkinism,‖ best can 
be described as a response to most previously constructed and currently held 
philosophical traditions.
412
 Dworkin advocates a ―broader form of judicial activism‖ and 
he ―argues that the Court has a greater competence for discerning constitutional 
principles, and thus for protecting rights,‖413 a seemingly reformed-realist position. He 
departs from the pragmatists since he ―argues that the law is best seen as an interpretive 
activity rather than a set of social rules.‖414 He ―rejects‖ originalism ―because it makes 
the Framers‘ mental state decisive in reading the abstract language of the 
Constitution.‖415 
 Ironically, Dworkin‘s theory refutes the judicial philosophy of the man whom he 
replaced at Oxford University in 1969, H.L.A. Hart. In fact, one scholar describes 
―Dworkin‘s major jurisprudential concern‖ as an ―attack‖ against Hart‘s legal 
positivism,
416
 and another argues that Dworkin‘s theory is ―one of the most forceful 
                                                          
412
 For Dworkin‘s theory, see Dworkin, A Matter of Principle  and Dworkin, Law’s Empire. 
413
 Burgess, ―Beyond Instrumental Politics,‖ 456. 
414
 Klinger, ―Rhetoric‘s Wide-Angle Lenses,‖ 359. 
415
 Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law? 211. 
416
 Dennis Goldford, ―Interpretation and the Social Reality of Law,‖ Social Epistemology 5 (1991): 11.  
145 
 
   
 
challenges to legal positivism in the last thirty years.‖417 Therefore, most scholars view 
Dworkin‘s work as an anti-positivist response.418  
 Dworkin‘s ―attack‖ begins with one of the basic tenets of the positivist theory. 
As with positivism, Dworkin agrees that in some areas of the law there are ―hard cases,‖ 
or those cases ―at the (thin) margins‖ in which ―a consensus of informed opinion on the 
application of the law‖ does not exist;419 in such cases, the ―rules are unclear‖ and 
therefore the competing claims are not easily resolved.
420
 His agreement with the 
positivists, though, ends there. Whereas positivism holds that law should be free of 
moral concerns, for Dworkin ―law always has a moral component,‖421 and a moral 
component of the law must exist since ―high-level principles or moral values animate the 
law.‖422 To resolve the hard cases, Dworkinism ―defend[s] an expansive role‖ for judges, 
since they must base their decisions on certain moral principles, such as justice and 
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fairness, to resolve the conflicting claims.
423
 MacCormick explains this basic precept of 
Dworkin‘s theory: 
 The proper task of . . . courts of law, is to ascertain and vindicate rights . . . that 
 are grounded in the political principles best geared to justifying the community‘s 
 institutions, whether or not these principles happen to be at any given moment 
 concretized in explicitly formulated rules of statute or case law.
424
  
 
Dworkinism thus offers an explanation for how ―judges search for principles which will 
fill the gaps between legal rules and particular situations,‖425  thereby resolving the ―hard 
cases‖ within the law. 
 Resolving the hard cases by turning to moral principles promotes what Dworkin 
refers to as ―law as integrity,‖426 and his approach to constitutional and legal 
interpretation proceeds in three steps. The first step, the ‗preinterpretive stage,‘ involves 
a judge‘s determination of ―what counts as evidence to the audience in terms of the 
particular decision being rendered.‖ The second, or the ‗interpretive‘ stage, entails 
finding ―a value judgment that shows the practice of law at its best.‖ During this stage, 
―a judge frames the opinion and establishes the value hierarchy to which the legal 
materials gathered in the interpretive stage will be applied. Here judges may mold the 
facts to support the value hierarchy being advanced by their opinions.‖ The final stage is 
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the ‗postinterpretive‘ or the ‗reforming‘ stage. During this stage judges ―adjust their 
conception‖ of the necessary requirements of the law to support their justification they 
advanced in the interpretive stage.
427
   
 An additional way in which Dworkinism departs from the traditional legal 
theories, and promotes the ―law as integrity,‖ is the manner in which Dwokinism treats 
precedent. Known as the ―chain novel hypothesis,‖428 Dworkinism‘s approach to 
handling precedent is similar to a group of authors writing sequential chapters in a novel: 
an author writes the first chapter; the second author adds a chapter that builds upon the 
previously written chapter, but that author has the discretion to shape her part of the 
story to make it fit with the previous chapter; then another author, who also possesses 
the discretion to shape his part of the story, writes a chapter; and the process continues in 
which separate authors add individual chapters that comprise the complete novel. The 
development of precedent proceeds in the same way: the first chapter in the story is the 
constitutional or legal issue(s) in a case; the second chapter is the initial story of the 
resolution of that first case; and, each subsequent decision on a similar case should be 
seen as an individual chapter in the ongoing process of ―writing‖ the Law/law, as each 
decision brings with it the author‘s/Court‘s discretion to shape the chapter while building 
upon the previous chapter. Precedent and the principle of stare decisis can constrain 
judges, but judges possess the discretion to treat both as best serves their ―writing‖ of the 
Law/law. As two leading legal scholars who study the chain novel hypothesis note, 
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while it ―is obviously an imperfect metaphor for sequential judging‖ and even though the 
―metaphor for precedent has been amply criticized, no one has yet proposed a superior 
model.‖429 
 As one could expect with such a sharp departure from the prominent legal 
theories, many legal scholars find fault with Dworkin‘s work.430 One critic explains ―that 
Dworkin‘s most important theoretical claims . . . are by and large rejected by the legal 
community,‖431 while another argues that Dworkin‘s theory ―often requires judges to 
make highly controversial decisions that have no roots either in popular morality or in 
the understanding of the authors of the black-letter law which judges are pledged to 
interpret.‖432 Most disconcerting for those who support the idea of a restrained judiciary, 
as another scholar suggests, Dworkin‘s theory promotes judicial activism since ―the very 
reality of moral principles frees Dworkin from reliance on the constitutional text.‖433 
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Prudentialism 
 Judge Henry J. Friendly, according to Daniel Breen, holds a ―place in the select 
pantheon of judges,‖ and though never a Justice of the Court, Judge Friendly remains 
one of the most frequently cited judges in the Justices‘ opinions.434 Both an academic (a 
Ph.D. in History) and a legal scholar (a J.D.), Breen studied the primary texts written by 
Friendly as well as secondary literature about Friendly, and Breen advances what he 
terms a ―prudentialist conception‖ of constitutional interpretation which he bases on 
Friendly‘s jurisprudential practice and vision. Breen provides a clear description of the 
judge who follows a prudentialist philosophy: 
 [T]he prudentialist judge will consistently display the following characteristics: 
 respect for precedent and constitutional text as limits upon judicial authority; 
 deference to the decisions of other branches of government; a sensitivity to the 
 effects judicial decisions may have upon the ability of the other branches to 
 perform the tasks entrusted to them by law and tradition; and a determination to 
 take faithfully into account the historic beliefs of the community in defining the 
 extent of individual rights.
435
 
 
 Breen discusses each of the characteristics of a prudentialist judge in greater 
detail. A prudentialist judge ―will not lightly overturn established precedents, especially 
those that have enjoyed wide acceptance in the greater community.‖ Consequently, the 
prudentialist judge ―has a limited view of the breadth of judicial authority,‖ and the 
prudentialist judge avoids ―[b]old forays into policy-making‖ and instead exercises 
―modesty and humility,‖ especially with respect to the separation of powers and in being 
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―guided by history, precedent and constitutional text.‖ According to Breen, ―[t]he most 
vital hallmark of a prudentialist judge is the acute recognition‖ that other actors within 
the structure of America‘s governmental system, in carrying out the tasks and duties 
accorded to them by established law and tradition, cannot effectively perform their 
duties if hampered or hamstrung by regulations or laws that inhibit their abilities to 
perform their tasks and duties. Therefore, the prudential judge recognizes that, like the 
judicial branch, ―other institutions have equally legitimate roles to play‖ and therefore 
the prudentialist judge avoids ―grand pronouncements of principle‖ and instead renders 
―decisions that other institutional actors can follow without compromising their abilities 
to function properly and effectively.‖ In a related vein, therefore, the prudentialist judge 
―believes that there is no such thing as absolute personal rights;‖ instead, ―individual 
rights must sometimes be balanced against other legitimate social and institutional 
interests.‖436 
 For Breen, the prudentialist philosophy incorporates the best components from 
the existing theories of constitutional interpretation. Precedent and the principle of stare 
decisis, concern for the validity of law, judicial discretion and restraint, recognition of 
the importance that the separation of powers doctrine plays in both the governmental and 
legal system, and a concern for the proper balance of rights all factor into a prudentialist 
judge‘s decision-making. Prudentialist judges, therefore, can utilize any of the modalities 
in their decision-making and resolution of the instant case.  
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Judicial Philosophies and Rhetorical Criticism 
 As the competing theories of constitutional interpretation and their components 
reflect, discerning an individual Justice‘s judicial philosophy poses a formidable 
challenge. A close-reading of a variety of legal writings and opinions from that Justice, 
though, may offer insight into whether that Justice adheres to one or more philosophies. 
Discovering the ‗types‘ of legal arguments the Justice advances within a particular 
modality, and then assessing how that modality fits within a philosophy, allows the critic 
to evaluate how that argumentative or rhetorical strategy functions within the text. 
Hopefully, the endeavor to unite legal argument, argument modalities, and judicial 
philosophies will offer a compelling approach for studying judicial opinions, as well as 
demonstrate that scholars can embrace legal rhetoric and rhetorical criticism as integral 
parts of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the Law/law. 
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CHAPTER III 
IN TRAINING FOR THE ―BIG SHOW‖: 
 
ROBERTS‘ SERVICE IN THE REAGAN AND BUSH I  
 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
Roberts‟ Legal and Political Career  
John Roberts‘ immersion into the judicial world began shortly after his 
graduation from Harvard Law School in 1979. A magna cum laude graduate, Roberts‘ 
sterling law school standing earned him a clerkship with Judge Henry J. Friendly of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Roberts‘ work ethic and success 
with Judge Friendly caught the attention of Justice William H. Rehnquist, and in 1980 
Roberts accepted a clerkship with the Associate Justice.
437
 Clerking for two of the most 
respected jurists in the country earned Roberts a reputation as a sharp and legally savvy 
attorney, and that reputation thrust Roberts from the judicial world in the world of 
politics. 
Rather than entering a corporate or private legal practice after his clerkships, 
Roberts instead opted to work for the government, and he held a distinguished career 
with two Republican administrations, those of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. 
W. Bush (―Bush 41,‖ as he became known after his son assumed the presidency in 
2000). From 1981 to 1982, Roberts served in the Justice Department as Special Assistant 
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to the Attorney General, William French Smith, who was both an advocate for, and 
defender of, the Reagan administration‘s policies on federalism and the belief in the 
need for greater judicial restraint, especially with respect to the Supreme Court. In 1982, 
Roberts accepted a position in the White House Counsel‘s Office, where he worked for 
Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President. Roberts served as Associate Counsel to the 
President, a post he held until 1986.
438
 After President Reagan‘s term in office ended, 
Roberts joined the firm Hogan & Hartson. Roberts worked as a lawyer for the 
Bush/Quayle Executive Committee during the 1988 presidential election, and one of his 
roles included conducting ―opposition research,‖ as he wrote on a questionnaire when he 
applied for a position with the newly-elected Bush administration.
439
 Roberts resigned 
his partnership at Hogan & Hartson in 1989 when he received an appointment within the 
Bush administration as Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and from 1989 until 1993 
Roberts worked under Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr.
440
 In 1993 Roberts rejoined 
Hogan & Hartson, and from 1993 until his appointment to a seat on the appellate court, 
Roberts argued 39 cases before the Supreme Court. In other words, Roberts had 39 
opportunities to hone his oral and written communication skills, 39 opportunities to 
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revise his argumentative and rhetorical strategies, and 39 opportunities to think (and 
write) like a Justice. 
 Many people who opposed Roberts‘ nominations for an appellate court seat and 
for a seat on the Supreme Court, though, complained that Roberts lacked a lengthy paper 
trail which they could review to discern his judicial philosophy and temperament. As a 
result, many critics saw Roberts as a stealth candidate that another Republican 
administration wanted to place in influential posts in the judicial branch. For example, 
after President Bush submitted Roberts‘ name for the open seat on the Court, one 
editorial criticized Roberts‘ lack of judicial experience, and the writers suggested that the 
limited paper trail Roberts left from his service in the Republican administrations and 
while in private practice revealed a conservative ideologue who ―made arguments on 
abortion rights, free speech and church-state issues that are at odds with established 
law.‖441  
 It is true that the availability of Roberts‘ writings prior to his clerkships and 
service in the Reagan administration are limited. However, the 65,000 pages of 
documents released by the NARA provide ample opportunity to investigate the claims 
that Roberts was a stealth candidate and a potential jurist who harbored a judicial 
ideology or philosophy that posed a threat to mainstream American values, as critics of 
his nomination argued, or whether Roberts‘ writings reveal the temperament of a jurist 
who respected the rule of law. This chapter examines Roberts‘ writings—from his time 
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as a budding law student, to his time as an advocate for the Reagan administration‘s 
policies, and after his governmental service—to address those concerns.  
The Pre-Administration Paper Trail 
 Roberts wrote and published very little while in law school. One publication, a 
―note‖ on the contract clause that appeared in the Harvard Law Review,442 however, 
provided critics a writing that they could read, assess, and from which they could infer 
conclusions about Roberts‘ judicial philosophy. Roberts‘ note focused on one of the 
cases from the Court‘s 1977 Term, Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus.443  
 In 1974, the Minnesota state legislature passed the Private Pension Benefits 
Protection Act. The Act imposed a ―pension funding charge,‖ which was an assessment 
the state could levy ―against a company terminating its pension plan or closing its 
Minnesota office if existing pension funds were inadequate to secure full pensions for all 
employees who had worked for more than ten years with the company.‖444 Prior to the 
passage of the statute, Allied planned to close its office in Minnesota, which it did 
shortly after the legislature passed the Act. As a result of Allied‘s action, Minnesota 
demanded that Allied pay the pension funding charge to compensate those employees 
who had worked for Allied for more than ten years but who lacked vested pension rights. 
Allied countered that Minnesota‘s demands and the Act ―unconstitutionally impaired 
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[Allied‘s] contractual obligations‖ with its former employees, and Allied sought an 
injunction in district court against the state‘s actions.445 The district court determined 
that Minnesota‘s actions were reasonable and that the financial obligations Allied owed 
were not unreasonable, and the court held that ―the Act should [not] be declared 
unconstitutional.‖446 Allied promptly appealed the court‘s decision to the Supreme 
Court. 
 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Allied. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Harlan Stewart found that first, the Minnesota legislature significantly 
altered Allied‘s contractual obligations to the pension fund, and second, the Act only 
protected a narrow class of individuals rather than protecting a ―broad social interest;‖ 
consequently, Stewart‘s opinion held that the Act therefore violated the Constitution‘s 
―Contract Clause‖ (―No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts . . . ‖).447 Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which, as Roberts 
explained, Brennan argued that the contract clause ―was not even relevant to the 
case.‖448 Roberts dedicates the majority of his note to critiquing Brennan‘s rationale for 
his dissent. 
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 Roberts first evaluates Brennan‘s ―threshold question of whether the contract 
clause applies at all to this case.‖ Brennan determined that the clause prohibits 
companies from abrogating their contractual obligations; the clause, however, did not 
forbid legislatures from imposing additional contractual burdens on contracting parties, 
and therefore the case did not raise a commerce clause concern.
449
 Roberts, though, 
disputes Brennan‘s doctrinal arguments and Roberts offers an argument by analogy in 
which he notes that ―Brennan‘s distinction can technically be drawn in some cases, [but] 
it is not clear whether there is any justification for applying it to contract clause 
analysis.‖450 To justify his claim, Roberts reframes Brennan‘s argument. He briefly 
summarizes Brennan‘s interpretation of the clause, in which he says that Brennan ―relied 
on the history surrounding the clause‘s enactment, its wording, and precedent,‖ which 
for Brennan meant that the Framers intended for the clause to prevent ―rampant state 
legislative interference with the ability of creditors to obtain the payment or security 
provided for by contract,‖ as Brennan wrote in his dissent.451 Roberts agrees with 
                                                          
449
 Roberts, Jr., ―Contract Clause—Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements,‖ 89. 
450
 Roberts, Jr., ―Contract Clause—Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements,‖ 90. 
451
 Roberts, Jr., ―Contract Clause—Legislative Alteration of Private Pension Agreements,‖ 90. In full, 
Brennan wrote: ―Although the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent public 
discussion of the Constitution are not particularly enlightening in determining the scope of the Clause, 
they support the view that the sole evil at which the Contract Clause was directed was the theretofore 
rampant state legislative interference with the ability of creditors to obtain the payment or security 
provided for by contract. The Framers regarded the Contract Clause as simply an adjunct to the currency 
provisions of Art. I, § 10, which operated primarily to bar legislation depriving creditors of the payment of 
the full value of their loans. . . . The Clause was thus intended by the Framers to be applicable only to laws 
which altered the obligations of contracts by effectively relieving one party of the obligation to perform a 
contract duty.‖ See Brennan, Dissent, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
158 
 
   
 
Brennan‘s approach to interpreting the clause, which Brennan arrived at from his reading 
of the historical papers on the Constitutional Convention debates, but Roberts offers his 
own argument from authority within the historical modality to rebut Brennan‘s 
conclusion. As Roberts noted, ―it does not follow that the Framers intended the clause to 
be limited to this specific problem. The Framers‘ intent was probably a broader concern 
to ‗inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of 
society.‘ Such a concern would entail protecting parties not only from laws relieving 
contractual obligations, but also from laws imposing duties beyond those contracted 
for.‖452 Roberts advances his argument from authority by referencing a line from James 
Madison‘s Federalist #44, which Roberts uses to ground his discernment of the 
‗Framers‘ intent,‘ and Roberts bases his supposition on the argument Madison makes 
concerning the lack of predictability within the law if legislatures haphazardly change 
the rules. As Madison wrote: 
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has 
directed the public counsels. They have seen with regret and indignation that 
sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, 
become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares 
to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have 
seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of 
repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects 
of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is 
wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general 
prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.
453
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 Roberts‘ argument thus presents an interesting perspective on judicial 
philosophies. On the one hand, Roberts offers the original intent component of 
originalism to defend his interpretation of the commerce clause, yet he also advances a 
component of positivism to advance his argument. That is, Roberts‘ argumentative 
strategy involves inferring that the intent of one of the Constitution‘s framers was the 
expectation that legislatures would enact valid laws to promote stability and 
predictability within the law, both of which are positivist concerns. In Allied Steel, the 
statute was not a valid rule/law because the legislature drastically changed the ‗rule of 
recognition‘ upon which individuals and Court precedent relied. 
 Roberts, however, does not commit himself only to the originalist philosophy to 
defend his reading of the contract clause and its application to the instant case; in fact, he 
defends a non-originalist, ‗living Constitution‘ position in which utilizes an argument 
from analogy within the doctrinal and textual modalities to support his previous claims. 
As Roberts explains, 
 Furthermore, the Framers could hardly have been expected to identify the 
 problem of state imposition of additional duties with ―admirable precision‖ when 
 the problems of state interference through the imposition of such duties was far 
 in the future. ―The great clauses of the Constitution are to be considered in light 
 of our whole experience, and not merely as they would be interpreted by its 
 Framers in the conditions and with the outlook of their time.‖454 
 
Roberts argues that the commerce clause applies in Allied Steel, and he shifts his defense 
with the use of the prudential modality to support the ultimate conclusion he draws about
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the Court‘s decision, which is that ―Allied Steel represents an effort‖ to balance state 
power and individual rights ―in a manner sensitive to modern needs and conditions.‖455 
Roberts‘ shift from an originalist to a non-originalist position allows him to support a 
prudentialist philosophy: the Court weighed the benefits of a upholding a questionably 
valid statutory regulation that promoted the rights of a small group of individuals against 
the costs of a suspect statutory regulation that both harmed corporations and failed to 
benefit societal rights in general, and the latter prevailed over the former.  
 Roberts‘ law review note, therefore, provides an initial glimpse into the judicial 
philosophy he supports. He defends an originalist position, but one that falls within the 
positivist theory, and he supports a prudentialist theory that incorporates positivist 
components into it. Roberts‘ note also reveals that he does not oppose the protection of 
individual rights; instead, he supports coherence within the law and opposes legislative 
initiatives that dramatically change the ‗rule of recognition‘ in such a manner that the 
change significantly alters the stability and predictability of the law. 
 A single law review article, though, only reveals a small section of the picture 
regarding Roberts‘ judicial philosophy. Roberts‘ writings from his service during the 
Reagan administration reveal a more complete picture of the seemingly stealth candidate 
awaiting appointment to the bench. 
The Paper Trail from the Reagan Administration  
 While some critics of Roberts‘ nomination to the Supreme Court hoped for a 
lengthier record of Roberts‘ writings, those who reviewed the documents that the NARA 
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did release offered a preliminary assessment of Roberts. Two Court journalists noted that 
―[t]he Reagan-era memos portray a cocksure young lawyer whose writing was clear, 
highly attuned to political realities and occasionally sarcastic.‖456 Court scholar Jeffrey 
Toobin noted that Roberts‘ ―plainspoken memos . . . display wit, common sense, and 
conservative politics in equal measure.‖457 Roberts‘ use of wit, or humor ―characterized 
by a conscious, sophisticated cleverness,‖458 is not an example of the type of pejorative 
rhetoric that many critics disdain; instead, he uses wit in a deliberate and purposeful 
manner as part of a larger argumentative strategy for defending his positions on a variety 
of issues, such as his understanding of the separation of powers doctrine, his views on 
the law, the proper role for a judge deciding questions about the law, and the acceptable 
use of an office of the presidency. 
Wit and Wisdom  
During the early 1980‘s, the Reagan administration revitalized the doctrine of 
federalism, or the Tenth Amendment directive that the powers not expressly delegated to 
the federal government are reserved to the states. In 1983, as a move to reassert 
congressional authority, Georgia Democratic Congressman Elliott Levitas sent a letter to 
President Reagan in which he ―propose[d] a ‗Conference on Power Sharing‘ to 
determine ‗the manner of power sharing and accountability within the federal 
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government.‘‖ Roberts sent Fielding a memorandum about the letter, in which Roberts 
remarked, ―There already has, of course, been a ‗Conference on Power Sharing‘ to 
determine ‗the manner of power sharing and accountability within the federal 
government.‘ It took place in Philadelphia‘s Constitution Hall in 1787, and someone 
should tell Levitas about it and the ‗report‘ it issued.‖459 That report, of course, was the 
Constitution.  
Roberts‘ witty retort to Levitas‘ request allows Roberts to advance an argument 
through the structural modality. While Senator Levitas is upset that the administration 
does not support an unfettered legislative branch, the reality is that the Constitution 
addressed the appropriate balance of power within the government. At the same time, 
Roberts‘ memorandum, rather than defending a particular administration policy, instead 
reflects his view on the separation of powers doctrine, a view that remains consistent 
throughout his writings. 
 In addition to reviving federalism, the Reagan administration also sought to curb 
judicial excesses, such as the federal courts‘ and Supreme Court‘s forays into policy-
making. One ongoing effort of the Attorney General‘s office, for example, was 
articulating a ―judicial restraint‖ message whenever the opportunity presented itself. 
While Roberts‘ position within the Republican administration required him to defend the 
administration‘s positions and to follow the ‗party line,‘ Roberts did reveal his personal 
beliefs on the proper role for a judge deciding questions about the law. 
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 In October 1981, Roberts wrote Starr (who was at that time Counselor to the 
Attorney General) regarding U.S. District Judge Walter Nixon‘s opinions.460 ―I have 
read ten opinions written by Judge Nixon, chosen at random from among his earlier 
cases,‖ Roberts wrote. ―One characteristic of Judge Nixon‘s jurisprudence which causes 
some concern is his propensity to reach out and decide complicated questions of law 
which he admits need not be decided.‖461 Roberts found that Judge Nixon often used 
―alternative reasoning‖ and would ―reach for alternative bases of decision‖ and ―opine 
on unnecessary matters‖ in his opinions.462 Roberts admitted that Judge Nixon faced 
certain ‗problems of the penumbra‘ in his cases, but Roberts questioned Judge Nixon‘s 
realist tendencies, especially in those cases in which Judge Nixon deviated from the 
statutory text and instead made the law from the bench. 
 One such case, Kitchens v. State,
463
 involved a petitioner who filed a habeas 
corpus claim but appeared before Judge Nixon without counsel. Judge Nixon, therefore, 
―surveyed applicable cases and devised general rules concerning when counsel is 
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required in habeas corpus cases.‖ In the next sentence, as Roberts advises, ―Such general 
rules should not be determined in the context of a case in which the issue is raised sua 
sponte and there is no controversy concerning the matter.‖464  
 At first glance, it appears that Roberts opposes certain individual rights‘ claims 
and that he questions the Sixth Amendment‘s directive for the right to counsel. In 
actuality, Roberts opposes Judge Nixon‘s efforts to fix the petitioner‘s problem (sua 
sponte, which is Latin for ―of one‘s own will,‖ usually refers to an order a judge issues 
without either party in the case making the request for that order), a correction that 
exceeds Judge Nixon‘s authority: the Constitution charges the legislative branch with the 
powers to make rules or correct their deficiencies, and the role of the judicial branch is to 
adjudicate questions involving those laws. Roberts‘ structural argument within the 
structural modality, and his positivist belief that Judge Nixon‘s realist actions undermine 
the validity of the judicially-created law, reveals that Roberts both holds a respect for the 
separation of powers doctrine and that he supports judicial restraint. At the same time, 
Roberts‘ opposition to Judge Nixon‘s actions reflects the prudentialist beliefs that judges 
should refrain from ‗bold forays into policy-making‘ and instead let ‗modesty and 
humility‘ guide their decision-making. Two years later, Roberts still maintained those 
positions. 
In his 1983 ―Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,‖ Chief Justice Warren 
Burger expressed his concerns regarding the Supreme Court‘s excessive caseload. In an 
effort to reduce the Court‘s workload, Burger proposed that Congress create an 
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Intercircuit Tribunal, ―a special temporary panel of [Circuit Court] judges‖ who would 
hear ―cases involving conflicts between the Courts of Appeals.‖465 
Roberts, however, opposed the creation of the Tribunal. In a memorandum to 
Fielding, Roberts discusses his personal—not the administration‘s—objections to the 
Tribunal. Roberts writes: 
My own view is that the creation of a new tier of judicial review is a terrible idea. 
 The Supreme Court to a large extent . . . controls its own workload, in terms of 
 arguments and opinions. The fault lies with the Justices themselves, who 
 unnecessarily take too many cases and issue opinions so confusing that they 
 often do not even resolve the question presented. . . . So long as the Court views 
 itself as ultimately responsible for governing all aspects of society, it will, 
 understandably, be overworked. A new court will not solve this problem.
466
 
 
Roberts bases his objection to the Tribunal on an institutional argument within the 
structural modality. The caseload problem originates with the Court‘s excessive efforts 
to review the decisions of other agencies (or other parties), a practice in which the Court 
need not engage; instead, deferral to the decisions of others offers a better solution for 
the Court‘s dilemma. At the same time, Roberts‘ presents his objections from a 
prudentialist position: the Court‘s practices exceed its ‗breadth of authority,‘ and a more 
restrained judiciary is a step toward alleviating the Court‘s workload. 
Chief Justice Burger‘s proposal for an Intercircuit Tribunal gained traction 
throughout the year, which forced the administration to enter the battle. As support for 
the Tribunal initiative grew, Roberts wrote his mentor, Judge Friendly, a letter in which 
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he discussed his fears about the Tribunal. Roberts‘ wit, evident in the letter, allows him 
to frame his concerns with the proposal. Roberts writes: 
The pressure behind the Chief Justice‘s Intercircuit Tribunal proposal – a Trojan 
 horse that will inevitably give birth to a National Court of Appeals – is becoming 
 irresistible. In confidence, our office is fighting the good fight against it, and has 
 delayed Administration support for almost a year, but we cannot hold out much 
 longer against the combined assault of the Chief, Congressional leaders, and . . . 
 our own Justice Department. Our only hope is that Congress will do what it 
 does best - nothing.
467
 
 
Roberts describes his objections to the proposal with an extended metaphor, comparing 
the administration‘s fight to prevent an impending judicial tragedy to the tragedy of the 
Trojan War that resulted after the Greeks wheeled the Trojan horse inside their gates. 
Roberts‘ use of metaphor and wit as part of his argumentative strategy allows him to use 
the structural modality to frame his objections within the prudential philosophy. For 
Roberts, the judicial branch lacks the authority to push policy proposals on how the law 
should be administered, an authority constitutionally given to the legislative branch, and 
a National Court of Appeals is the antithesis of judicial restraint and represents a 
dangerous step toward upsetting the balance of power between the branches of 
government, a step that would significantly hinder the ability of the legislative branch to 
check the sweeping powers of the judicial branch, as well as a step that would strengthen 
the judicial branch‘s ability to alter the stability and predictability of the law.  
 A month later, Roberts again wrote Judge Friendly to update him on the 
administration‘s efforts to delay the Tribunal proposal. The administration appears to 
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have adopted Roberts‘ initial, personal objections to the proposal, as Roberts explains in 
his letter that the administration will not support Burger‘s proposal ―unless it is 
accompanied by reforms directed to the underlying causes of the caseload problem 
throughout the federal judiciary,‖ reforms that ―would include abolition of Supreme 
Court mandatory appellate jurisdiction, repeal of diversity jurisdiction, and restrictions 
on prisoner petitions (§ 1983 as well as habeas corpus).‖468 Roberts tells Judge Friendly 
that the administration‘s stand is ―admittedly an odd position logically, but at least on the 
right side of the question.‖469  
At first glance, it appears that Roberts opposes Court efforts to hear cases that 
involve basic constitutional rights‘ claims, a reading consistent with the misconception 
that Conservatives/conservatives oppose broad protections for individual rights, 
especially for criminals. In actuality, reminiscent of the position he took regarding Judge 
Nixon‘s efforts, Roberts opposes the Court‘s efforts to expand its power to, as Roberts 
earlier wrote, ‗govern all aspects of society‘ and he opposes reforms that do not limit 
judicial discretion but instead allow judges to exceed the breadth of their authority. 
Roberts advances his prudential philosophy with an institutional argument within the 
structural modality that reflects his respect for the proper balance of power, though he 
doubts that Congress, the appropriate body to initiate the necessary reforms, will act to 
resolve Chief Justice Burger‘s concerns. Roberts again uses wit as part of his 
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argumentative strategy to advance his position, and as he notes in his closing remarks to 
Judge Friendly, ―There will be peace in Lebanon before Congress repeals diversity 
jurisdiction or restricts prisoner petitions.‖470  
 Roberts‘ paper trail also includes memoranda on some rather strange events for 
which a person in his position need address. Nonetheless, Roberts uses wit to address the 
issues, and in so doing he further provides insight into the philosophy by which he 
resolves competing claims.  
 One issue involved the source of funding for an overseas trip. Jim Coyne, who 
served as Reagan‘s Director of the White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives from 
1983 to 1985, apparently took great liberties while in his position. In March 1984, Coyne 
and some of his ―staffers and advisory committee members‖ planned on visiting Japan 
―to establish the Ronald Reagan scholarship program.‖ Coyne wanted to use private 
sector funding to cover his and the group‘s travel expenses, and he questioned whether 
he could use direct funding or indirect funding, such as ―through a 501 (c) (3) [sic] 
organization such as the Asian Studies Foundation, on whose board he serves[.]‖ 
Roberts advised Coyne that he needed to use the ―appropriated funds‖ budgeted to his 
office, and Roberts commented in a memorandum to Fielding that ―[r]eviewing a Coyne 
proposal is very similar to taking a typical law school torts examination. The fact 
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situation in both instances is filled with countless legal issues and the key is to spot as 
many as possible.‖471 
 A month later, another issue that involved Coyne arose, this time on the 
production of a videotape on successful volunteerism programs initiated by the private 
sector. Coyne wanted to accept $20,000 from DuPont to fund the production of the 
videotape, which Coyne planned on distributing as ―a product of the President‘s 
Advisory Council on Private Sector Initiatives.‖472 Roberts wrote Fielding and noted that 
―[a]s is so often the case with Coyne, it is the unasked questions that raise the most 
serious concerns,‖ and Roberts explained that Coyne‘s production of the videotape and 
its use as a fundraising tool did not fall within the legal parameters of the Council‘s 
advisory functions. As Roberts wrote, ―The Federal Advisory Committee Act does not 
define ‗advisory functions,‘ nor have there been any court decisions interpreting the 
term. If the limitation is to have any meaning, however, it would seem that producing a 
video tape [sic] for mass distribution goes beyond giving ‗advice‘ to the President.‖473 
 Roberts‘ wit as a component of an argumentative strategy allows him to address 
the problems with both of Coyne‘s plans. On their face, Coyne‘s projects seem to fall 
legitimately within the law. Upon review, however, each presents a potential problem. 
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To reveal the problem, Roberts advances an argument from dissociation, one that 
privileges the integrity of the office over the image of the office. In other words, both a 
scholarship and a videotape would create a positive image for the president, but both 
would negatively impact the integrity of how the president made use of the Office of 
Private Sector Initiatives. Funding a trip with money from the private sector and calling 
the scholarships ―Reagan Scholarships‖ creates, according to Roberts, ―supplementation 
of appropriations and/or conflicts [of interest] problems,‖474 and producing the videotape 
from within an office under the president‘s oversight also raises ―supplementation‖ 
concerns. More important, though, as Roberts‘ demonstrates with a definitional 
argument within the doctrinal modality, Coyne‘s videotape project potentially violates 
the intent of a statutory act, and prudentialism dictates that Fielding advise Coyne 
against proceeding with his projects, since the costs associated with each outweigh the 
benefits that either project would bring for the president and his image. 
 Another issue that arose through Coyne‘s office (though not directly from him) 
involved pop singer Michael Jackson. In a memorandum to Fielding, Roberts explained 
that Billboard (a weekly music periodical) wanted to devote an entire issue to Jackson, 
and ―Jackson‘s public relations firm has asked Jim Coyne to obtain a letter from the 
President highlighting the recent White House event.‖ Roberts advises Fielding to deny 
the firm‘s request, once again inferring that acquiescing to the request would undermine 
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the president‘s integrity. As Roberts admonished, ―enough is enough. The Office of 
Presidential Correspondence is not yet an adjunct of Michael Jackson‘s PR firm.‖475 
 Three months later, another Jackson issue arose. Coyne‘s office requested that 
the president send a letter to Jackson‘s personal manager in which the president thanked 
Jackson for donating 400 tickets to children who could not afford to purchase them. In 
his memorandum to Fielding, Roberts again displays his sharp wit: 
I hate to sound like one of Mr. Jackson‘s records, constantly repeating the same 
 refrain, but I recommend that we not approve this letter. Sometimes people need 
 to be reminded of the obvious: whatever its status as a cultural phenomenon, the 
 Jackson concert tour is a massive commercial undertaking. The tour will do quite 
 well financially by coming to Washington, and there is no need for the President 
 to applaud such enlightened self-interest. 
 
It is also important to consider the precedent that would be set by the letter . . . a 
 newcomer who goes by the name ―Prince‖ . . . is apparently planning a 
 Washington concert. Will he receive a Presidential letter? How will we decide 
 which performers do and do not?
476
 
 
Roberts uses this brief narrative to advance an argument from dissociation, one that 
privileges the disinterested image of the president over the self-interested image of the 
pop singer. The real issue is not the president‘s thanklessness for the donation of the 
tickets; instead, the real issue is that the president is not in the business of promoting 
singers. Roberts‘ advice, which reflects a prudential resolution to the issue, also presents 
a political twist on the judicial doctrinal modality. A restrained jurist refrains from 
issuing questionable precedential decisions that other courts must follow; likewise, an 
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office of the president should not set a questionable precedent with respect to letter-
writing, especially a precedent that it might not follow when future musicians stage 
concerts in Washington. The costs of initiating such a practice outweigh the benefits to 
sending a letter. Roberts‘ advice on the issue also reflects his positivism, as writing a 
letter to Jackson would undermine the current stability and predictability of a 
presidential practice, which is to not write letters that promote music idols or endorse 
commercial products. Ultimately, Roberts offered sage advice, as Prince‘s song ―Darling 
Nikki‖ received top-billing in 1985 on the ―Filthy Fifteen‖ list from the Parent‘s Music 
Resource Center as the most sexually explicit song (and the top song the PMRC wanted 
banned).
477
  
Constitutional and Statutory Guidance 
 Roberts‘ paper trail includes memoranda on more substantive issues that provide 
further insight into the reasoning he uses to resolve competing claims. Some of the 
memoranda he wrote in response to a direct request from another office, and other 
memoranda he wrote to express his views on a particular topic. Examined closely, 
Roberts‘ writings do not reflect the tenor of a conservative ideologue; instead, they 
reveal the concerns of a cautious non-jurist who approaches questions of law with a 
respect for a balance of power among the three branches of government.  
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Civil Rights, Take I 
 In 1984, the Justice Department issued a report on a proposed anti-busing bill, 
the ―Public School Civil Rights Act of 1983.‖ Roberts wrote a memo to Fielding in 
response to the Office of Management and Budget‘s request for the Counsel office‘s 
view on the Senate bill. In his memo to Fielding, Roberts explained that Ted Olson, the 
Assistant Attorney General, ―reads the early busing decisions as holding that busing may 
in some circumstance be constitutionally required, and accordingly concludes that 
Congress may not flatly prohibit busing.‖478 Roberts offered a different perspective on 
the Court‘s holdings: 
I do not agree with his reading of the early cases. The holdings of those cases 
stand for the proposition that busing is permissible, and that state statutes limiting 
the authority of federal courts to order busing are unconstitutional. A far different 
question is presented when Congress attempts to limit the authority of the federal 
courts. Congress has authority under § 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and can conclude - - the evidence supports this - - that busing promotes 
segregation rather than remedying it, by precipitating white flight. Even if 
Olson‘s reading of the 13-year old early busing cases is correct, we have now had 
over a decade of experience with busing. If that experience demonstrates that 
busing is not an effective remedy, Congress can legislate on the basis of that 
experience.
479
 
 
Roberts‘ response to Olson‘s reading seems to support the position held by critics of 
Bobbitt‘s modalities, as Roberts simultaneously utilizes the historical, doctrinal, and 
structural modalities to advance his argument. However, rather than viewing the 
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simultaneous use of multiple modalities as a negative, the overlap in the modalities 
actually strengthens Roberts‘ argumentative strategy. Roberts advances an argument 
from authority and he bases his interpretation of the Court‘s holdings on Hamilton‘s 
Federalist #33 and Madison‘s Federalist #44 (historical), and the Supremacy Clause 
(structural),
480
 which stands for the idea that the states cannot nullify federal law, such as 
Supreme Court decisions (doctrinal). One only need remember the Court‘s Brown v. 
Board of Education
481
 decision and the state attempts to nullify the decision to 
understand Roberts‘ position on the bill. The correct solution, which Roberts also 
advances through the structural and prudential modalities and from a prudentialist 
perspective, is that if the costs to busing outweigh the benefits to it (which they may, if 
busing results in white flight), then the proper authority to implement the necessary 
change in the rules/laws is the federal legislative branch. A close reading of Roberts‘ 
statement, when examined through Bobbitt‘s modalities, reveals that Roberts does not 
oppose busing, as many critics claimed; instead, Roberts opposes the invalid approach 
for remedying the situation, a position consistent with the one he took regarding Judge 
Nixon‘s and Chief Justice Burger‘s judiciary reform efforts.  
 Many who opposed Roberts‘ nominations for seats on the appellate court and the 
Supreme Court argued that Roberts‘ paper trail demonstrated that he opposed women‘s 
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rights and efforts to reverse gender discrimination.
482
 A close reading of his memoranda 
devoted to women‘s issues and gender discrimination, however, reveal a far different 
picture than the one painted by his critics.  
 In 1982, Roberts wrote a memo to Attorney General Smith advising him to 
oppose the request for having the Civil Rights Division intervene in Canterino v. 
Wilson,
483
 which involved alleged gender discrimination in the Kentucky Correctional 
Institution for Women (KCIW). In their suit, the plaintiffs raised a Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim regarding the KCIW‘s lack of comparable 
educational and vocational training programs for the female inmates, programs to which 
male inmates within Kentucky‘s prison system had access.  
 Roberts based his objections to intervention on two grounds. First, intervention 
would signal inconsistency with the Attorney General‘s policy of judicial restraint, since 
―the equal protection claim will be based on semi-suspect treatment of gender 
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classification.‖484 Second, ―relief could well involve judicial interference with state 
prison programs.‖485 For both positions, Roberts makes an institutional argument within 
the structural modality to justify his advice to Smith. While gender discrimination exists, 
the Justice Department lacks the authority to define what does and does not qualify as an 
individual right; that determination lies with the legislatures, and Smith should not signal 
that judges now possess the power to legislate rights into existence. Moreover, Roberts‘ 
advice echoes his theme of judicial restraint: the proper authorities for correcting the 
flaws with state prison systems, and the correct constitutional directive for alleviating the 
problem, again rests with the legislative branches of the state governments.  
 Roberts‘ closing remarks to Smith, though, support the position that Roberts 
opposes intervention based on a prudential philosophy. ―Many reasonable justifications 
for the Kentucky practices can be readily advanced, such as economies of scale calling 
for certain programs for the male prisoners but not for the many fewer female prisoners,‖ 
he wrote. ―If equal treatment is required, the end result in this time of tight state prison 
budgets may be no programs for anyone.‖486 Roberts assesses the disparity through a 
cost/benefit analysis: educational and vocational programs are expensive, and in a tight 
fiscal environment, allocating more money for programs is not an option; the more likely 
result would be the elimination of all programs to achieve gender-access parity. The 
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prudent decision involves maintaining the status quo, since pressing the access issue 
poses a greater danger. Roberts‘ position, therefore, is not an opposition to reversing 
gender discrimination; instead, his position is one that protects access to limited 
resources for women. 
 Two additional memos provide further support to refute critics‘ charges against 
Roberts. In a memo to the Attorney General, Roberts noted that the Secretary of 
Education, Terrel Bell, believed that implementing a ―regulation prohibit[ing] sex 
discrimination‖ based on ―appearance codes‖ is ―an area more suitable for local than 
federal regulation,‖ which Roberts agrees is ―an eminently sound conclusion.‖487 In 
another memo, Roberts responded to objections from some Conservative publications 
regarding proposed revisions to the Criminal Code. The revisions would increase fines 
for many offenses, as well as compensate the victims of certain types of crimes. As 
Roberts explained to Smith, ―[s]ome of the more specific objections [to penalties for 
sex-related crimes] are absurd - - such as the assertion that a compensation scheme for 
victims of violent offenses (including rape) would create federal funding of 
abortions.‖488  
 Roberts‘ statements in both memoranda are consistent with the positions he 
advocated in the previously discussed memoranda. Roberts‘ use of an institutional 
argument within the structural modality to identify the proper authority for resolving sex 
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discrimination at the local/state level parallels the Tenth Amendment argument he 
advanced regarding Levitas‘ letter. Roberts uses an argument by dissociation to express 
that ethically, the heinous crime of rape and the legally permitted, conscious decision to 
have an abortion are not comparable; in this instance, the opponents‘ slippery slope 
argument is a fallacy. The argumentative strategy that Roberts advances in each 
memorandum again falls within the prudential philosophy, and both memos demonstrate 
that Roberts does not oppose women‘s rights or the efforts to reverse gender 
discrimination.  
Disrobing the Supreme Court 
 The Reagan administration‘s preoccupation with curbing the excesses of the 
Supreme Court and curbing both Justices and judges forays into policy-making and 
unprincipled decision-making cannot be understated. The administration perceived the 
danger from an activist and unrestrained judiciary as serious threat to the balance of 
power within the government, not to mention to its policy agenda. Two of Roberts‘ 
writings exemplify the magnitude of the crisis the administration believed it faced. 
While both writings are advocacy pieces for the administration and therefore are not 
clear examples of Roberts‘ personal beliefs, both hold importance for this project, as 
they reflect the legal reasoning and decision-making processes in which Roberts engages 
to resolve constitutional questions, and they provide insight into how Roberts constructs 
his argumentative strategies to resolve competing claims. Each advocacy piece, 
therefore, deserves critical attention. 
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 In 1982, the Attorney General requested ―two versions of introductory language‖ 
for a larger document on ―Supreme Court Jurisdiction‖ involving school prayer cases.489 
Evidently, the Attorney General had not taken a position on whether he (or the Justice 
Department) should support an effort by Congress to divest the Supreme Court of 
appellate jurisdiction in school prayer cases. Roberts drafted two versions of a document 
that addressed whether Congress could exercise its Article III ―exceptions‖ authority, 
one document which concluded that Congress could exercise its authority on the First 
Amendment issue, and the other document which concluded that it could not. That 
Roberts could advocate both positions is not surprising; the manner by which he did it is 
surprising.  
 Roberts used the textual modality to arrive at an original meaning conclusion, 
and he began both versions of the document with the same paragraph: ―After careful 
consideration we have concluded that Congress has the constitutional power to divest the 
lower federal courts of jurisdiction over school prayer cases. Under Article III, section 1 
Congress has discretion whether to create lower federal courts at all, and it follows that 
the jurisdiction of such courts, once established, is also discretionary.‖490  
 In the first version, Roberts wrote a lengthy paragraph in which he argued that 
despite that discretion, ―Congress does not have the power to divest the Supreme Court 
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of appellate jurisdiction over school prayer cases.‖ He offers three reasons for his 
conclusion. The first reason, which he advances through the structural modality, relates 
directly to the separation of powers doctrine. While Article III allows Congress to 
exercise its ―exceptions‖ power, ―a broad reading of this clause authorizing Congress to 
divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over constitutional cases would 
essentially eliminate the federal judicial branch as an independent check on Congress.‖ 
The second reason, which he advances through the structural and prudential modalities 
with an argument from coherence, involves the ultimate outcome for constitutional cases 
in the absence of the Court‘s appellate jurisdiction. ―If Congress were permitted to 
exercise the asserted authority over Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, the highest 
courts of the 50 states would become the final arbiters of the federal Constitution in 
school prayer cases. This could result in disparate readings of the same constitutional 
provision in different states, with no final federal judicial review to guarantee the 
supremacy and uniformity of federal law.‖ According to Roberts‘ reasoning, the First 
Amendment‘s Free Exercise of Religion protections would be subject to the whims of 
fifty different state supreme courts. Roberts makes a valid point: the impact of ―disparate 
readings‖ and, for that matter, disparate decisions, would radically alter the established 
case law concerning acceptable and unacceptable religious practices. Roberts frames his 
reason by incorporating a positivist component (the stability and predictability of the 
law) within the prudentialist philosophy (the disparity costs outweigh any divestiture 
benefits). Roberts‘ third reason, which he supports with an argument from authority 
within the historical modality, is an original intent conclusion: ―We find such a prospect 
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very troublesome, and are persuaded on balance that the Framers did not intend 
Congress to have the power to bring about such a result.‖ 
 In the second version, Roberts wrote a slightly smaller paragraph in which he 
concluded ―that Congress has the constitutional authority to divest the Supreme Court of 
appellate jurisdiction in school prayer cases.‖ Roberts uses the historical modality to 
justify his original meaning conclusion. He turns to the ultimate authority—the 
Constitution—on the appellate jurisdiction issue, and he references the text of Article III, 
section 2 (―such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make‖) to conclude that ―[t]his 
clear and unequivocal language supports the exercise of power over Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction in S. 1742.‖ Roberts then puts an interesting spin on ―the highest 
courts of the 50 states‖ danger from the first version of his text. ―State laws and rules 
concerning prayer in public schools or other public buildings would still remain subject 
to judicial review in the state courts,‖ he wrote. ―While we are concerned about the 
possibility that these courts could reach disparate results on the same question of federal 
law, this prospect does not justify a departure from the express decision of the Framers 
to leave the scope of the federal judicial institution to the discretion of the Legislature.‖ 
The state supreme courts are now simply all courts, and ―the same constitutional 
provision‖ is now ―the same question of federal law.‖ Roberts‘ ultimate conclusion in 
this version omits the positivist component from the first version and instead 
incorporates components of the originalist philosophy into the prudentialist philosophy, 
where the benefits of the Court possessing appellate jurisdiction do not outweigh the 
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costs of violating the Framer‘s intent or restricting a constitutional directive regarding 
Congress‘ legislative powers. 
 The two versions of Roberts‘ document illustrate the tensions associated with 
judicial philosophies. Similar argument ‗types‘ and modalities influence the philosophy 
by which one advances a position, as both comprise the argumentative strategy chosen to 
resolve the competing claims. The selection of a particular component of a philosophy, 
rather than the selection of the complete philosophy, however, appears to allow for a 
more persuasive conclusion for the competing claims. The legal reasoning process over 
constitutional or statutory questions involves carefully incorporating the three to 
legitimate the resolution of the questions. Thus, making a broad generalization about the 
philosophy to which a jurist adheres seems to omit an important part of the equation 
when that generalization fails to account for the argument ‗type‘ and modality the jurist 
used in the decision-making process. A much larger document Roberts wrote clarifies 
further the above contention. 
 As part of the ongoing effort to find solutions to the threat of an emboldened 
judiciary, Roberts attended an American Enterprise Institute conference, the theme of 
which was ―Judicial Power in the United States: What are the Appropriate Constraints?‖ 
At the request of Ken Starr, Roberts wrote a six-section, 27-page memorandum, 
―Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction: An Analysis in Light 
of Recent Developments.‖ Starr referred to Roberts‘ memo as ―an advocacy piece,‖491 
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and Roberts prefaces the text of his memo by conceding that ―this memo is prepared 
from a standpoint of advocacy of congressional power over the Supreme Court‘s 
appellate jurisdiction; it does not purport to be an objective review of the issue, and 
should therefore not be viewed as such.‖492 As with the school prayer document, 
however, this advocacy piece reflects the legal reasoning and decision-making process in 
which Roberts engages to resolve constitutional and statutory questions and it provides 
further insight into how Roberts constructs his argumentative strategies to resolve 
competing claims. 
 As in the school prayer document, Roberts began the first section with a 
discussion on the historical background of the Exceptions Clause. Roberts quotes the 
text of Article III, section 2, clause 2, which gives Congress the power to divest the 
Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction: ― . . . the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations 
as the Congress shall make. (Emphasis added).‖ Roberts then explains, ―The 
underscored language stands as a plenary grant of power to Congress to make exceptions 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . the power to make exceptions to 
the Court‘s appellate jurisdiction exists by virtue of the express language of the clause 
over questions of both fact and law. This clear and unequivocal language is the strongest 
argument in favor of congressional power and the inevitable stumbling block for those 
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who would read the clause in a more restricted fashion.‖493 Roberts‘ statement is a near 
word-for-word reiteration of the second version of the school prayer document, but he 
adds the ―stumbling block‖ qualifier, which suggests that the second of the two prayer 
versions is the stronger. Roberts concludes the first section of this advocacy piece with 
an argument from authority within the historical modality. He frames the issue from an 
original intent perspective to preempt counterarguments advanced from a ‗living 
Constitution‘ perspective. Roberts writes: 
 This focus on the plain language of the exceptions clause is not a simplistic 
 approach. The Framers were not inartful draftsmen and can be expected to have 
 known how to express the more restricted interpretations advanced by modern 
 commentators had such constructions in fact been intended. In this regard it is 
 important to recognize that we are not considering a constitutional clause that is 
 by its nature indeterminate and incapable of precise or fixed meaning, such as the 
 due process clause or the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
494
 
 
 In section two, Roberts explains in greater detail the Framers‘ intent for the 
exceptions clause, drawing upon the Seventh Amendment to bolster his position. 
According to Roberts, ―Proponents of ratification [of the Constitution] did point to the 
exceptions clause in response to criticisms that the Supreme Court possessed the power 
to violate the right to a jury trial by appellate review of questions of fact. It is a 
nonsequitur [sic], however, to argue that the clause was therefore intended for this 
purpose alone.‖495 As Roberts explains, ―Even if the Framers were concerned about the 
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vulnerability of jury determinations, the exceptions authority they provided went well 
beyond that particular problem . . . statements made by supporters of the Constitution 
concerning the exceptions clause . . . did not at all suggest a limited scope to Congress‘ 
power under the clause.‖496 Roberts presents several arguments from authority to support 
his position, and he quotes Alexander Hamilton‘s Federalist #81, Chief Justice John 
Marshall, and Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph to advance his claim that the 
Framers intended for Congress to have the power to make exceptions to the Supreme 
Court‘s appellate jurisdiction. Roberts then draws a more specific reference to the 
Seventh Amendment. ―It is difficult to see what happened in the short period between 
ratification of the Constitution and enactment of the Seventh Amendment that created a 
need for the Seventh Amendment if there was no such need at the time of ratification of 
the Constitution,‖ Roberts wrote. ―Further, if the purpose of the exceptions clause was to 
protect jury determination of fact, it is difficult to understand why the Framers did not 
take a direct approach as was soon done in the Seventh Amendment.‖497  Roberts again 
advances his position through the historical modality, and the originalist position he 
defends incorporates the history behind the ratification of the amendments from which 
he makes inferences to justify his reasoning. Roberts concludes the second section by 
noting that ―the language of the exceptions clause does not support an interpretation 
limiting the power to make exceptions to questions of fact.‖498 
                                                          
496
 Memo, John G. Roberts, ―Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction,‖ 6. 
497
 Memo, John G. Roberts, ―Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction,‖ 7. 
498
 Memo, John G. Roberts, ―Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction,‖ 8. 
186 
 
   
 
 In the third section, Roberts shifts to the doctrinal modality and he discusses the 
exceptions clause in relation to the Supreme Court‘s precedential decisions on the 
clause. Roberts begins the section by writing, ―Judicial pronouncements on the 
exceptions clause also support Congress‘ power to divest the Supreme Court of appellate 
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases.‖499 Roberts focuses on Ex parte McCardle,500 a 
case in which a military governor ordered United States marshals to hold a Mississippi 
newspaper editor. McCardle applied to a federal circuit court for habeas corpus relief, 
which the court subsequently denied. McCardle then appealed to the Supreme Court 
under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. While his case was pending before the Court, 
Congress passed an act that repealed the sections of the 1867 Act that allowed for 
habeas appeals to the Court. President Andrew Johnson vetoed Congress‘ new act, and 
Congress subsequently overrode the president‘s veto, thus nullifying the appellate 
provisions of the initial act and therefore divesting the Court of appellate jurisdiction. 
According to Roberts‘ reading of Congress‘ action, ―The legislative history of the 
repealer [sic] provision left no doubt that Congress‘ purpose was to prevent the Court 
from deciding the McCardle [sic] case and perhaps undermining the entire military 
reconstruction scheme.‖501 And, Roberts notes, in the McCardle decision, ―A unanimous 
Court upheld the power of Congress to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.‖502 
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Roberts cites other decisions that further bolster his claim, but he notes that ―McCardle 
is simply the most prominent in a long and consistent line of judicial opinions reading 
the exceptions clause as meaning exactly what it says.‖503 
 In the fourth section, Roberts presents the arguments commonly made by those 
who believe ―that the Constitution requires that the Supreme Court be capable of 
insuring the uniformity and supremacy of federal law.‖504 He begins with an argument 
from coherence that is similar to the disparity argument he advanced in the first version 
of his school prayer document. As Roberts explained, ―[w]ith no appellate review in the 
Supreme Court, state courts could refuse to uphold the supremacy of federal law, and 
reach different conclusions on identical questions of federal law.‖505 After quoting from 
Hamilton‘s Federalist #80 and opinions from Justice Joseph Story and Chief Justice 
Marshall
506
 on the importance of the stability and predictability of the law, Roberts 
concludes that the positivist concern ―confuses a permissive grant of constitutional 
authority with a constitutional requirement.‖507 Roberts says that Justice Story and Chief 
Justice Marshall‘s ―opinions . . . establish the principle that the Supreme Court‘s 
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exercise of appellate jurisdiction is entirely dependent upon an act of Congress.‖508 
Furthermore, Roberts argues that in those opinions, ―the Court did not consider such 
jurisdiction to be required by the Constitution, even in the pursuit of the identified goals 
of federal supremacy and uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. Rather the 
matter was one for Congress to decide on policy grounds . . . ‖509 Roberts‘ use of the 
structural, doctrinal, and prudential modalities frames the next step in his argumentative 
strategy, which addresses the concern ―that permitting Congress to make exceptions to 
the Supreme Court‘s appellate jurisdiction would put Congress above the judicial branch 
and undermine the entire structure of checks and balances established by the 
Constitution.‖510 Roberts notes that the ―short answer . . . is . . . Congress is not 
attempting to dictate any particular result. Other courts of competent jurisdiction, either 
lower federal courts or state courts, would still exist and have the capacity to declare acts 
of Congress unconstitutional.‖511 Roberts‘ reasoning, though, appears to contradict the 
nullification and Supremacy Clause concerns he discussed in his anti-busing memo, 
though Roberts does offer a simple, structural, positivist solution: ―[t]hose who truly 
believe that the exercise of this exceptions power threatens the system of checks and 
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balances should pursue the remedy suggested by Justice [Owen J.] Roberts, namely 
amendment of the Constitution to remove Congress‘ exceptions power.‖512 
 In the fifth section, Roberts discusses the pending proposals in Congress that 
would divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction and he refutes two 
constitutional objections to Congress‘ exercise of its exceptions power. Roberts begins 
by explaining that Congress‘ power ―under the exceptions clause is as subject to the due 
process clause, and the equal protection component of the due process clause, as the 
exercise of any other constitutional grant of power.‖513 He argues, however, that ―[t]he 
pending proposals . . . do not seem to present a serious due process problem, since they 
all provide for at least some judicial forum, either the lower federal courts or state courts, 
to hear any claims.‖ Moreover, he says, ―[d]ue process does not require judicial review 
in a federal court or final review by the Supreme Court,‖ a conclusion he explains in the 
closing paragraph of the section: 
 Any proper application of fundamental rights equal protection analysis would 
 have to be based on an asserted fundamental right of access to federal court, 
 rather than any fundamental right to an abortion or the exercise of First 
 Amendment freedoms. . . . Access to federal court, however, has never been 
 identified as a fundamental right. The fundamental right involved in this area is 
 the right to due process, and that right can be satisfied by access to state courts.
514
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Roberts thus reframes the due process and equal protection concerns by offering a quasi-
definitional argument within the structural modality, though in so doing he seems to 
violate the basic precepts of the positivist and prudentialist theories. Nonetheless, 
Roberts‘ argumentative strategy attempts first, to change the conventional understanding 
of the place where due process claims are resolved (the Supreme Court) to an 
understanding that all courts can resolve due process claims, and second, to alter the 
understanding of what is and is not a fundamental right, and access to the Supreme Court 
is not a fundamental right.  
 In the final section of his advocacy piece, Roberts further justifies Congress‘ 
power to divest the Court of appellate jurisdiction based on §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: ―The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this Article.‖ Roberts argues that ―the broad scope of §5‖ grants Congress 
the authority ―to determine that in certain cases, such as abortion and desegregation 
cases, the guarantees of due process and equal protection are more appropriately 
enforced by state courts‖ rather than by the Supreme Court.515 Roberts writes that ―[t]he 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly supports the authority of Congress to 
advance its view of the appropriate means of enforcing the guarantees of due process 
and equal protection under §5. The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and passed in an 
atmosphere of great hostility to the Supreme Court.‖516 Roberts identifies ―the Dred 
Scott and Fugitive Slave decisions‖ as ―defeats at the hands of the High Court‖ for the 
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Reconstruction Congress that ―drafted and passed the Civil War Amendments.‖ 
Consequently, Roberts writes, ―[a] court which would render such decisions was 
certainly not to be entrusted with securing the protections of the Thirteenth through 
Fifteenth Amendments. In the view of the Framers of the Civil War Amendments, 
therefore, Congress was to have primary responsibility for providing for the enforcement 
of the guarantees of due process and equal protection.‖517 Roberts concludes the final 
section, and thus his memo, by writing, ―it is important to remember that the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to be enforced primarily by Congress, and not the 
federal courts. Whatever validity ‗structural‘ arguments concerning the role of the 
federal judiciary may have in other contexts, these arguments are considerably weakened 
in the area of Fourteenth Amendment claims.‖518 Roberts thus ends where he began, 
with an argument from authority within the historical modality and from an original 
intent perspective.  
 As with the two versions of the school prayer document, Roberts‘ ―Proposals to 
Divest the Supreme Court‖ memorandum illustrates the tensions associated with judicial 
philosophies. In the lengthier text, Roberts‘ writing demonstrates that similar argument 
‗types‘ and modalities influence the philosophy by which one advances a position, as 
both comprise the argumentative strategy chosen to resolve the competing claims. The 
selection of a component from a philosophy allows for more persuasive conclusions for 
the competing claims, and a well-developed argumentative strategy that incorporates 
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‗type,‘ modality, and component strengthens the legal reasoning process over statutory 
or constitutional questions. Thus, a generalization about the philosophy to which a jurist 
adheres should include all three elements of the equation. 
The Ultimate Warm-up for the “Big Show” 
 Roberts‘ paper trail includes several memoranda on the nomination of judges and 
judicial philosophies. Each memo parallels the prudentialist idea that he advocated in his 
other letters and memos in which he suggested that a jurist should avoid policy-making, 
practice judicial restraint, and exercise ‗modesty and humility.‘ In one memo, for 
example, he wrote that while judges may hold a ―personal ideology‖ about the law, any 
judicial appointees should ―recognize that their ideology should have no role in the 
decisional process - - i.e., so long as they believe in judicial restraint.‖519 In another 
memo, he commented on the criticism that many of Reagan‘s judicial appointees, once 
on the bench, decided cases consistent with the administration‘s policy goals. Roberts 
disputed that claim and reframed it. ―Judges do not implement policy in the true 
conservative view of things,‖ Roberts wrote, ―and the hot issues of today will not be 
those of ten or fifteen years hence, when our judges will be confronted with new social 
issues.‖520 Roberts stressed that instead of appointing judges who would carry out the 
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conservative agenda from the bench, ―candidates‖ were selected for their ―proper 
appreciation of the judicial role.‖521 
 The most interesting documents, and arguably two of the most important 
documents, received scant media coverage (save a few legal blogs) from those 
investigating Roberts‘ paper trail, especially those vetting the records released from the 
Reagan library.  
 In 1981, President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O‘Connor for a seat on the 
Supreme Court. As her confirmation hearings neared, Roberts sent her a memorandum 
in which he advised her on ―the proper scope of questioning Supreme Court 
nominees.‖522 With regard to Senators on the Judiciary Committee asking questions 
about hypothetical cases to discern a nominee‘s judicial philosophy, a concern arose as 
to whether a nominee‘s response to a hypothetical should disqualify that person from 
hearing a similar case on which the nominee provided an answer during the confirmation 
hearings. Roberts rejected that position and offered O‘Connor his personal view on the 
situation: ―The proposition that the only way Senators can ascertain a nominee‘s views is 
through questions on specific cases should be rejected. If nominees will lie concerning 
their philosophy they will lie in response to specific questions as well. The suggestion 
that a simple understanding that no promise is intended when a nominee answers a 
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specific question will completely remove the disqualification problem is absurd. The 
appearance of impropriety remains.‖523 
 More important than Roberts‘ advice to O‘Connor, however, is the narrative he 
provided to Starr regarding his work with O‘Connor. ―My involvement in the Judge 
O‘Connor appointment process began my first day on the job, August 10,‖ Roberts 
wrote. ―I started in on the process of preparing draft answers to questions that were 
likely to be asked during the confirmation hearings.‖524 His ―approach was to avoid 
giving specific responses to any direct questions on legal issues likely to come before the 
Court,‖ and instead to provide O‘Connor with ―a firm command on the subject area and 
awareness of the relevant precedents and arguments,‖ a process that continued ―right up 
to the day before the hearings began.‖ Roberts informed Starr that he read the transcripts 
of ―past confirmation hearings,‖ including those ―of the Chief Justice and Justices 
Stevens, Harlan, Stewart, and, with your help, Blackmun,‖ and Roberts prepared ―[a] 
topic outline‖ of the questions from the hearings for the Chief Justice, Blackmun, and 
Stevens ―to identify the major areas of questioning and pet projects and concerns of 
Judiciary Committee members.‖ Roberts noted that he also ―drafted the reply to the 
questionnaire item on judicial activism, and researched past hearings . . . concerning the 
practice of past nominees in not commenting on recent decisions.‖ Roberts also 
                                                          
523
 Memo, John G. Roberts to Sandra Day O‘Connor, September 9, 1981. 
524
 Memo, John G. Roberts to Kenneth W. Starr, September 17, 1981, folder ―KWS/O‘Connor 
Miscellaneous,‖ Box 12 (Acc. #60-88-0498), Correspondence Files of Kenneth W. Starr, Counselor to the 
Attorney General, 1981-1983, Ronald Reagan Library. All quotations involving Roberts‘ work on the 
O‘Connor hearing are from this memo. 
195 
 
   
 
―participated in the two ‗moot court‘ sessions . . . primarily asking questions based on 
past hearings.‖ 
 Perhaps few nominees were as prepared for their confirmation hearings as was 
O‘Connor, and far fewer people who were not awaiting their confirmation hearings 
knew as much about them as did Roberts. As his preparation for O‘Connor‘s hearings 
reflects, short of actually sitting at the table as a nominee before members of the 
Judiciary Committee, Roberts was a nominee-in-waiting. Twenty years would pass 
before Roberts took a seat at that table, and during that time period, as novelists like to 
write, the paper ‗trail went cold.‘ In fact, only one substantive publication exists from 
Roberts‘ post-administration service, but that article generated widespread hostility and 
earned Roberts criticism as an opponent of environmental protection. 
The Post-Administration Paper Trail 
 In 1993, the Duke Law Journal published Roberts‘ article, ―Article III Limits on 
Statutory Standing.‖525 Roberts‘ article reviewed Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
526
 and in the article, Roberts agreed with Scalia‘s 
position that a plaintiff could not seek relief in a court for an alleged harm caused by the 
defendant; instead, the plaintiff must prove that an action of the defendant resulted in an 
actual injury. In the absence of such proof, a court does not have standing to hear the 
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plaintiff‘s case. Roberts‘ article thus provides a final opportunity to explore his legal 
reasoning process and to which judicial philosophy he subscribed twenty years after his 
service in the Reagan and Bush administrations.  
 Roberts begins his article by providing the necessary framework under which to 
view the central question in the case. He uses the historical and doctrinal modalities 
within the original intent perspective to establish that Court precedent has continually 
reaffirmed the Framer‘s belief that courts should exercise restraint, and standing is ―a 
constitutionally based doctrine‖ that preserves the Framer‘s ideal.527 According to 
Roberts‘ interpretation, the standing doctrine ensures ―judicial self restraint‖ because 
when a court first determines whether a plaintiff suffered a direct injury from a specific 
action of the defendant, and therefore has the authority to hear the case, that initial 
determination ―prevents the court from reaching and deciding the merits of the case.‖528 
Roberts thus incorporates a component of originalism into the prudentialist philosophy, 
an argumentative strategy that parallels the strategies he used in his previous writings. 
To bolster his position, Roberts uses wit to point out the consequences of not following 
prudentialism when deciding a question of standing. As Roberts explains, ―[i]t certainly 
would have been an extraordinary adventure in judicial activism for the Court suddenly 
to change directions, overrule numerous precedents, and announce, uninvited, that it no 
longer regarded the injury requirement as an Article III restriction.‖529 A close reading of 
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his article reveals that, contrary to his critics‘ claims, Roberts does not oppose 
environmental protections; instead, and consistent with his previous writings, Roberts 
advances the positivist position that invalid procedures that change the ‗rule of 
recognition‘ produce invalid rules/laws. 
 Roberts does concede that courts may face a ‗problem of the penumbra‘ when 
―defin[ing] injury in some cases . . . , [but] the occasional difficulty of the enterprise is 
hardly reason to abandon it altogether . . . ‖530 For Roberts, the stability and the 
predictability of the law must subsume the definitional problems with the meaning of 
‗injury,‘ and the prudential course is to preserve the validity of the rules/laws.  
 Roberts also reframes Justice Scalia‘s opinion as one that was not a Conservative 
renunciation of environmental laws. In fact, Roberts argues, the doctrine of standing is 
ideologically neutral. ―Standing is an apolitical limitation on judicial power,‖ he writes. 
―It restricts the right of conservative political interest groups to challenge agency action 
or inaction, just as it restricts the right of liberal public interest groups to challenge 
conservative agency action or inaction.‖531 With his definitional argument, Roberts 
attempts to adjust the lens through which people should view Scalia‘s opinion, and 
rather than labeling the opinion as an ideological one, people should make an objective 
assessment of the standing doctrine, for as Roberts suggests, ―[t]he consequences of 
accepting the proposition that injury in fact is not an Article III limitation on federal 
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court jurisdiction ought to give one pause.‖532 Again, Roberts demonstrates his 
prudentialist leanings in the conclusion to his argumentative strategy. 
 As Roberts did in several of his other writings, he ends where he began—he 
returns to originalism. Roberts concludes his article with an argument from authority 
within the historical modality: ―The Court‘s recognition that injury in fact is a 
requirement of Article III ensures that courts will more properly remain concerned with 
tasks that are, in Madison‘s words, ‗of a judiciary nature.‘‖533 Roberts closing remarks 
again demonstrate that Roberts incorporates a component of originalism within the 
prudential philosophy, an approach that remains true to his writings from twenty years 
earlier. 
Preparing for the Call from the Minor League 
 A review of Roberts‘ paper trail from his time as a budding law student, to his 
time as an advocate for the Reagan administration‘s policies, and after his governmental 
service provides an initial insight into the judicial philosophy to which Roberts may 
subscribe. Roberts advances his argumentative strategies through the originalist, 
positivist, and prudentialist philosophies, though his primary strategies involve 
incorporating components of originalism and positivism into the prudentialist 
philosophy. The legal argument ‗types‘ he selects and the modalities in which he uses 
those ‗types‘ support his prudentialist approach for resolving competing claims over 
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statutory and constitutional questions. A review of Roberts‘ paper trail appears to cast 
doubt on the claim that Roberts was a ‗stealth candidate‘ when President Bush (43) 
nominated him for a seat on the Supreme Court. However, to evaluate whether Roberts, 
as a judge, actually resolved statutory and constitutional questions consistent with the 
approach he advanced in his pre-court writings requires an examination of his appellate 
court opinions. The next chapter in the project, therefore, explores this question. 
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CHAPTER IV  
PLAYING IN THE BUSH LEAGUES: 
THE APPELLATE COURT TESTIMONY AND OPINIONS 
 
 On January 15, 1992, C. Boyden Gray, the Counsel to the President, sent a 
memorandum to President George H. W. Bush (Bush 41) in which he recommended 
John Roberts, who at that time worked for the firm Hogan & Hartson, for a position as 
―United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit.‖534 On January 24, the 
White House‘s Office of the Secretary issued a ―For Immediate Release‖ statement in 
which President Bush announced his intention of nominating Roberts to succeed Judge 
Clarence Thomas for the open appellate court seat, and three days later, Bush sent 
Roberts‘ nomination to the Senate.535 Partisanship ruled the political climate, however, 
and the Senate failed to act ―on the nomination, which lapsed when President Bill 
Clinton took office.‖ President George W. Bush (Bush 43) re-nominated Roberts for the 
open seat on the appellate court, but it took another two years until the Senate, on May 8, 
2003, confirmed Roberts as a circuit court judge.
536
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
 Whereas the Supreme Court ―cherry-picks only 1% of the 10,000 cases it is 
petitioned to hear‖ every year, appellate courts must accept appeals ―from almost any 
loser in federal district court.‖537 As a result, the appellate courts ―are the final authority 
on most questions of federal law‖ and thus are ―more powerful and more visible now 
than ever before.‖538 In fact, even though the Supreme Court is the highest and final 
appellate court in the judicial branch, due to the small number of cases the Court agrees 
to hear each term scholars argue that ―the courts of appeals have become the de facto 
courts of last resort in the American legal system.‖539 
 The District of Columbia Circuit Court (hereafter DCC), the twelfth of the 
regional circuit courts, plays a particularly important role. The DCC ―hears appeals from 
the district court in Washington, D.C., and from federal government agencies,‖540 and as 
a result, the DCC ―enjoys an unmatched reputation as leader in determining the 
substance and content of administrative law,‖ such as in the ―key areas of energy, 
telecommunications, and environmental and labor regulation.‖541 Consequently, 
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Professor William Fox describes the DCC as ―the most powerful circuit court in the 
nation with respect to the review of the actions of federal agencies,‖542 a result that 
―enhances its notoriety as a de facto administrative law court.‖543 Perhaps most 
significant, the DCC ―has also gained a visible reputation for fostering the development 
of prospective United States Supreme Court justices, particularly in recent times,‖544 as 
current Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg all served on the DCC prior to taking 
their seats on the Supreme Court.  
 Appellate courts seem an appropriate training ground for a seat on the Supreme 
Court. A panel of nine Justices sits on the Court and all Justices hear the instant case,
545
 
and at the appellate court level, a panel of three judges usually hears each case. Also 
similar to the Supreme Court, where the Justices do not preside over trials, appellate 
court judges do not preside over trials; instead, they hear cases in which ―they consider 
only questions of law, not questions of fact.‖546 Professor Britt-Louise Gunnarsson 
explains the three classes of rules (laws) on which the courts must resolve competing 
statutory or constitutional questions. The first class, action rules, includes laws involving 
a right, duty, prohibition, exemption, or recommendation. Action rules focus on a 
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framework situation and are symmetrical (apply to two parties) or asymmetrical (apply 
to one party only). The second class, definition rules, focuses on the content of a statute 
or its parts and involves a dispute over a definition and its terminological meaning. The 
final class, stipulation rules, also focuses on a framework situation but instead addresses 
the domain of the applicability of an entire statute or sections of it.
547
 As do the Justices 
on the Supreme Court, appellate court judges issue a published or unpublished opinion, 
and the appellate court‘s decision can affirm the decision of a lower court, reverse the 
decision in part or in whole, or remand the case for a retrial.
548
 
 Despite their limited sphere of adjudication, appellate court judges remain an 
influential body within the legal and political systems. As Law Professor Brian Leiter, 
for example, argues, ―The idea that appellate judges never make law, and only apply the 
law as written, is a fiction, as every American lawyer knows.‖549 In fact, research 
conducted on appellate court judges‘ opinions ―has found that judicial ideology has a 
weaker but still prominent impact on decisionmaking [sic],‖550 and that ―the judges not 
only enact legal ideological positions but also American political ideologies.‖551 
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 If appellate court judges wield such a heavy gavel, and since the DCC appears to 
be a training ground for future Justices, it seems a worthwhile endeavor to examine how 
one of the Court‘s newest Justices transitioned from an advocate for two Republican 
administrations to a seat on one of the most influential courts in America‘s judicial 
system.  
 This chapter, therefore, follows John Roberts‘ paper trail to two stops along his 
route to seat on the Supreme Court. To compose this chapter, I read the complete text of 
Roberts‘ appellate court confirmation hearings and I read his 49 published opinions from 
his two-year tenure as an appellate court judge. The proceeding discussion of both, 
though, focuses on those aspects of his oral and written testimony and a representative 
sampling of published opinions that correspond to the subjects and themes on which he 
wrote letters and memoranda from his time in the Reagan and Bush administrations. 
Such an approach serves two purposes: first, it allows the project to discern whether 
Roberts constructed argumentative strategies consistent with those he advanced in his 
prior writings, and second, it allows the project to evaluate whether Roberts resolved 
statutory and constitutional questions through one or more judicial philosophies 
consistent with those he utilized for resolving competing claims while working for the 
administrations. The project‘s strategy, therefore, provides the necessary depth for 
investigating those two questions. 
Batting Before the Judiciary Committee 
 To demonstrate that he was fit for a seat on the appellate court, Roberts had to 
prove two important facts to the Judiciary Committee: first, that the positions he 
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advocated for the Reagan and Bush administrations did not represent his personal, 
ideological views, and second, that he would not enter into a judgeship with 
preconceptions about how to decide cases. 
 Early in his hearings, Roberts strove to dispute the notion that he would judge as 
a Republican extremist who, as Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy warned the 
Committee in his opening statement, endorsed limiting reproductive rights, opposed 
affirmative action, favored states‘ immunity from the Environmental Protection 
Agency‘s laws, and rigorously defended the Tenth Amendment at the expense of 
Congress‘ legislative abilities.552 Roberts‘ first opportunity to assuage the Committee‘s 
fears occurred during the questioning from Texas Senator John Cornyn, who asked 
Roberts about the role a lawyer serves for the client. Roberts responded with a two-
pronged strategy. Roberts used an argument from authority and an argument from 
dissociation to reframe the impression of the attorney/client relationship. Roberts 
replied: 
 And there is a longstanding tradition in our country, dating back to . . . John 
 Adams‘ representation of the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre, 
 that the positions a lawyer presents on behalf of a client should not be ascribed to 
 that lawyer as his personal beliefs or his personal positions.
553
 
 
Roberts‘ reference to one of the leading figures in the Republic‘s early history uses the 
well-known ‗good versus evil‘ dissociative dichotomy and serves to cast new light on 
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the idea that an attorney can represent a reprehensible client. Therefore, just as 
Americans, especially politicians, do not hold disrepute for Adams, neither should they 
hold disrepute for Roberts even if they disapproved of his representation of a client 
whom they disliked. Roberts then moves from the historical to the doctrinal modality to 
explain his perception of a judge‘s role, and in so doing, he again displays his positivist 
and prudentialist leanings. As he explains to Senator Cornyn, 
 There‘s no role for advocacy with respect to personal beliefs or views on the part 
 of a judge. The judge is bound to follow the Supreme Court precedent, whether 
 he agrees with it or disagrees with it, and bound to apply the rule of law in cases 
 whether there‘s applicable Supreme Court precedent or not. Personal views, 
 personal ideology, those have no role to play whatever.
554
 
 
Roberts restates this same position later, saying, ―obviously as [a] judge, I‘d follow 
binding Supreme Court precedent and the precedent in my circuit.‖555 Roberts‘ 
statements should have provided some reassurance to the Committee, since his 
explanation on the importance of following precedent, in addition to demonstrating that 
he recognizes the need for the stability and predictability of the law, also demonstrates 
that which he opposes: realist judges who fail to exercise restraint. Roberts‘ answers, 
however, did not overtly reveal his judicial philosophy. 
 For many Court followers, nominees should commit, on the record, to which 
judicial philosophy they will adhere to resolve cases before the Court. If Professor 
Barnett‘s claim is correct—that the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court candidates 
fail to elicit a nominee‘s judicial philosophy—the same conclusion holds true during 
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hearings for appellate court nominees, especially when Committee members directly ask 
to which philosophy the nominee adheres.
556
 Committee Chairperson Patrick Leahy of 
Vermont, for example, attempted to get Roberts to admit that he followed the originalist 
philosophy. Leahy discussed an interview Roberts gave to National Public Radio, and 
Leahy remarked, ―you support and [sic] originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.‖ A seasoned veteran of fielding leading questions, Roberts replied, ―Well, 
I think I‘d have to say that I don‘t have an overarching, uniform philosophy.‖ As all 
lawyers learn very early in law school, never ask a question to which you do not already 
know the answer. Perhaps Senator Leahy forgot that sage advice, so Roberts capitalized 
on Leahy‘s opening. Roberts deftly explained that everyone in the room is a ―literal 
textualist when it comes to a provision of the Constitution that says it takes a two-thirds 
vote to do something. You don‘t look at what was the intent behind that, and, you know, 
given that intent, one-half ought to be enough.‖557 Roberts thus reframes Leahy‘s 
original intent accusation into the more acceptable literal reading of the Constitution‘s 
text regarding the specific directives it gives. To conclude his responses to Leahy, 
Roberts stated, ―I don‘t have an overarching, guiding way of reading the Constitution. I 
think different approaches are appropriate in different types of constitutional 
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provisions.‖558 Leahy did not ask what those ―appropriate‖ approaches were, so Roberts‘ 
positivist and prudentialist perspectives went unexplored, and he did not strike out in his 
first at-bat against a formidable pitcher. 
 In addition to testifying before the Judiciary Committee, nominees receive both a 
pre-hearing questionnaire and a post-hearing, follow-up questionnaire to which they 
respond to written questions the Senators submit to the nominees. Roberts‘ oral 
responses to Senator Leahy‘s questions paralleled the written responses he provided to 
New York Senator Charles Schumer‘s follow-up questionnaire. Initially, Roberts‘ 
outlined his theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation: 
 My own judicial philosophy begins with an appreciation of the limited role of a 
 judge in our system of divided powers. Judges are not to legislate and are not to 
 execute the laws. . . . My judicial philosophy accordingly insists upon some rigor 
 in ensuring that judges properly confine themselves to the adjudication of the 
 case before them, and seek neither to legislate broadly nor to administer the law 
 generally in deciding that case.
559
 
 
Roberts then provided an explanation of the process he would use to decide a case: 
 
 Deciding the case calls for . . . adherence to precedent and reliance on the 
 traditional tools of the judicial craft, and an openness to the wisdom offered by 
 colleagues on a panel. It also requires an essential humility . . . reflected in 
 doctrines of deference to legislative policy judgments and embodied in the often 
 misunderstood term ―judicial restraint.‖ That restraint . . . means that judges 
 should  not look to their own personal views or preferences in deciding the cases 
 before  them. Their commission is no license to impose those preferences from 
 the bench.
560
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 Roberts‘ written responses to Senator Schumer‘s questions, in essence, do outline 
his legal reasoning process and his judicial philosophy, and his statements are important 
both for what they include as well as what they exclude. Roberts‘ use of both an 
argument from coherence and an institutional argument reveal his positivist and 
prudentialist tendencies. Judges should respect precedent, recognize that their ‗breadth 
of judicial authority is limited,‘ avoid ‗bold forays into policy-making,‘ and exercise 
‗modesty and humility‘—all hallmarks, according to Professor Breen, of the 
prudentialist jurist. Judges should exercise judicial restraint, adhere to the ‗rule of 
recognition,‘ and defer to others‘ valid rules and valid rule-making and rule-changing—
all hallmarks of the positivist judge, according to Professor Hart. At the same time, 
Roberts excludes the realist and pragmatist judges from his definitions, since both 
philosophies involve an element of judicial activism and judge-made law. 
 Which philosophy would a Judge Roberts use, positivism or prudentialism? 
Roberts provides some insight into that question in his written response to Senator 
Kennedy‘s follow-up questions: 
 I do not have an all-encompassing approach to constitutional interpretation; the 
 appropriate approach depends to some degree on the specific provision at issue. 
 Some provisions of the Constitution provide considerable guidance on how they 
 should be construed; others are less precise. I would not hew to a particular 
 ―school‖ of interpretation but would follow the approach or approaches that 
 seemed most suited in the particular case to correctly discerning the meaning of 
 the provision at issue.
561
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Based on Roberts‘ answer, what ―school‖ or interpretive approaches he would use 
remains a mystery at this point, one that a further investigation into his paper trail may 
answer. 
 When batters are ahead in the pitch count with three balls and no strikes, they 
know the pitcher must throw a ball across the middle of home plate to get that first 
strike. Senator Schumer, one of the most outspoken and angry members of the Judiciary 
Committee who wanted more on Roberts‘ paper trail, knew he needed to throw a strike 
to Roberts. Schumer, therefore, asked Roberts a straightforward written question: ―If 
confirmed, what Supreme Court Justice, living or dead, would you most want to emulate 
in terms of judicial philosophy or approach to constitutional questions?‖ Roberts 
expected the pitch and his response probably further angered the senator:  
 There is no Supreme Court Justice I would seek to emulate in terms of judicial 
 philosophy or approach to constitutional questions. As a general matter, I admire 
 the judicial restraint of Holmes and Brandeis, the intellectual rigor of Frankfurter, 
 the common sense and pragmatism of Jackson, the vision of John Marshall. But I 
 would not say there is one Justice‘s judicial philosophy that I would strive to 
 copy. The reason is that I do not believe that beginning with an all-
 encompassing, categorical judicial philosophy or uniform approach to 
 constitutional questions is the best way of faithfully construing the 
 Constitution.
562
  
 
Consider the Justices that Roberts lists: Oliver Wendell Holmes, a realist/pragmatist; 
Louis Brandeis, a pragmatist; Felix Frankfurter, a staunch defender of judicial restraint 
who voted with the majority in Brown v. Board of Education; Robert H. Jackson, an 
ardent supporter of individual rights but who vehemently opposed the Court‘s realist 
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Justices, and he, too, voted with the majority in Brown; and, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
a Federalist whose decisions demarcated the powers of the executive and legislative 
branches. Roberts‘ list reads as a ―Who‘s Who‖ of famous and well-respected Supreme 
Court Justices, yet he would not agree with all of their judicial philosophies; instead, he 
selects the best jurisprudential tendencies (in his view) of the Justices, and as he 
demonstrated in his prior writings, Roberts selects the best components of the Justices‘ 
philosophies and incorporates them into his own interpretive approach, which is 
consistent with the prudentialist philosophy.  
 Senator Schumer also asked Roberts to ―define judicial activism.‖ Again, 
Roberts advocated a role of judicial restraint for judges and expressed his respect for the 
separation of powers doctrine: 
 I understand ―judicial activism‖ to refer to a judge who has transgressed the 
 limited role assigned to the judicial branch under the Constitution, and has either 
 undertaken to exercise the legislative function by imposing his own personal 
 policy preferences under the guise of legal interpretation, or has arrogated to 
 himself the executive function by imposing his policy views of how the law 
 should be administered.
563
  
  
Again, Roberts uses the structural modality within the prudential philosophy to clarify 
what he views as acceptable and unacceptable interpretive approaches: judges are not 
realists who possess the authority or power to exceed their constitutional directive to 
adjudicate rather than legislate, and he rejects the pragmatist and realist philosophies, 
which encourage judge-made rules/laws. Roberts‘ response to Senator Schumer also 
parallels a similar response he provided to Senator Leahy‘s pre-hearing written 
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questions. Roberts offered an institutional argument within the structural modality to 
explain his approach to ―statutory interpretation,‖ and at the same time he excluded a 
key precept of the originalist position, which is that judges should not consider 
legislative history or intent when resolving competing claims over the meaning or 
interpretation of a word. As Roberts explained, 
 The Supreme Court has provided ample guidance on how to engage in statutory 
 interpretation. The task begins, of course, with the language chosen by 
 Congress. . . . The process by which the statute evolved – its legislative history – 
 is an appropriate source for guidance in construing ambiguous statutory 
 language.
564
 
 
By recognizing that legislative history can play an integral role in a judge‘s resolution of 
the instant case, Roberts signals that he rejects a ‗pure‘ originalist doctrine and the 
technician/mechanical approach advocated by the formalist philosophy. Roberts‘ 
answers allowed him to safely round the bases after facing two more Democratic 
Senators who took the mound.  
 Roberts never hit the proverbial ―home run‖ with one of his answers. He 
successfully guarded the plate, and he hit safely often enough that the Committee 
members could not report that Roberts was a Conservative ideologue or an extremist 
who posed a threat to American‘s rights and values. While Roberts never conveyed 
specifically how he would decide a particular controversy before the court, he did 
provide insight into how he viewed certain statutory and constitutional issues that could 
be the focus of an instant case. 
 
                                                          
564
 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments, 449-450. 
213 
 
   
 
Civil Rights, Take II 
 With fears high that a Judge Roberts would curb efforts to protect individual 
rights, several senators queried Roberts on his views about the issue. One notable effort 
involved Illinois Senator Richard Durbin‘s criminology lesson, in which he discussed 
the problems with racial profiling, minimum mandatory sentencing, and the statistical 
disparities for drug use and convictions. Durbin identified the alarming arrest and 
incarceration percentages for African-Americans versus other races. Roberts conceded 
that ―that sort of statistical disparity ought to spark further inquiry,‖ but he refused to 
adopt the realist or pragmatist position and concede that the courts or judges should be 
the ones to act on and resolve the disparities. Roberts instead reframed the issue and he 
offered his interpretation on the role that due process and equal protection play in any 
‗individual-group‘ assessment. According to Roberts, ―treating people as individuals . . . 
is sort of at the core of our constitutional liberties, that we don‘t group people according 
to characteristics. . . . We treat people as individuals.‖ According to Roberts, ―no matter 
how compelling the statistical evidence . . . that‘s not what due process means, that‘s not 
what liberty means, that‘s not what the various protections of the Bill of Rights 
means.‖565 Roberts uses dissociation to reframe the issue from a 
disadvantaged/advantaged group concern to one in which all people are treated equally 
under the law, and legislatures—not judges—are responsible for correcting the 
deficiencies with laws, especially those laws that inadvertently promote discrimination. 
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 As Senator Durbin pressed the issue with further questions, Roberts drew the 
proverbial ‗line in the sand‘ regarding whether judges or Congress should address the 
unfair or unjust sentencing guidelines. Mandatory minimum sentencing, Roberts 
explained, is ―a quintessential legislative policy judgment, what the sentence for a crime 
is going to be and whether a judge is going to have discretion in sentencing or whether 
there‘s going to be a mandatory minimum. I know there are constitutional issues at the 
margin . . . but it‘s a policy judgment.‖566 For Roberts, despite the ‗problem of the 
penumbra,‘ any racial disparities in sentencing cannot be attributed to judges, who only 
interpret the laws (guidelines) made by Congress; if a problem exists, Congress, as the 
legislative branch, possesses the policy-making responsibility and it must either enact a 
statute that reforms the system or enact a statute that provides guidance for judges when 
they impose a sentence to an individual convicted of a drug crime. Roberts‘ argument 
from coherence within the structural modality reaffirms his views on the proper 
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial branches, and he again 
interprets the issue through a positivist and prudentialist lens.  
 A little discussed topic for Roberts‘ jurisprudence involved the Fourth 
Amendment and how to define a ‗reasonable search and seizure.‘ In 1983, Roberts wrote 
a ―Talking Points‖ memorandum on the Court‘s decision in United States v. Leon,567 a 
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decision which held that there is a ―good faith‖ exception to the exclusionary rule.568 In 
his memo, Roberts outlined one of the benefits of the decision for law enforcement 
officers: 
 The Court has held today that there can be no deterrence in situations where 
 reasonably well-trained police officers believe that they are acting according to 
 the law. You cannot deter police officers from making mistakes when reasonably 
 well-trained police officers in their positions would have believed that they were 
 acting in accordance with the law.
569
 
 
One of the only references to the Fourth Amendment came during Senator Leahy‘s 
questioning. When answering whether he adhered to an originalist philosophy, Roberts 
explained that ―there are certain areas where literalism along those lines obviously 
doesn‘t work. If you are dealing with the Fourth Amendment, is something an 
unreasonable search and seizure, the text is only going to get you so far.‖570  
Roberts‘ answer does not signal under which philosophy he would evaluate the 
reasonableness of a search; instead, he only expresses that a literal interpretation of the 
Constitution‘s text would not resolve the competing claims. Roberts does suggest, 
however, that a prudentialist approach may guide his resolution of a search and seizure 
case, as a prudentialist judge has the ‗acute recognition‘ that laws and regulations should 
not hamper nor hamstring the ability of actors (such as law enforcement officers) to 
perform effectively their duties and tasks. 
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 A third topic which concerned the Committee was Roberts‘ defense in a Title IX 
discrimination case. In the general pre-hearing questionnaire responses he submitted to 
the Committee, Roberts discussed a position he advocated for the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) before the Court.
571
 The NCAA, which retained Roberts to 
argue before the Court, sought review on whether Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 applied to the NCAA. Title IX guidelines apply to organizations 
which receive federal funding from the government, and the Third Circuit Court held 
that Title IX applied to the NCAA since it received dues payments from its member 
schools. In his written response, Roberts offered a definitional argument to alter the 
meaning associated with receiving financial assistance. As Roberts explained, Title IX 
―applies only to organizations that receive federal financial assistance,‖ and that 
―hinging coverage on such indirect receipt of financial assistance conflicted with 
Supreme Court precedent.‖572 In his response, Roberts explained the position he 
advocated for the NCAA before the Court; at the same time, though, he also explained 
his statutory interpretation of Title IX as well as his interpretation of the Supreme 
Court‘s line of precedents regarding contract theory and Congress‘ Spending Clause 
powers. According to Roberts, ―entities that knowingly and voluntarily accept federal 
funding are subject to the restrictions that come with it. The necessary implication of this 
theory is that coverage under the statute is limited to direct recipients of the funding – 
those who knowingly entered into a bargain by accepting the funding – and does not 
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‗follow [] the aid past the recipient to those who merely benefit from the aid.‘‖573 Similar 
to the approach he took in his memoranda, Roberts uses a quasi-dissociative argument 
and a definitional argument to reframe the issue: direct governmental aid and indirect 
institutional aid serve distinct and different purposes, and Title IX requirements only 
apply to the direct recipient of federal aid; institution-provided aid (such as dues) is not 
federal aid, and therefore Title IX requirements do not extend to indirect recipients. 
The Environment, Take II 
 Despite the Committee‘s concerns that they lacked a complete record of Roberts‘ 
paper trail, Roberts did indirectly encourage them to follow his trail to the article from 
the Duke Law Journal. On the general questionnaire responses he submitted to the 
Committee prior to the start of his hearings, Roberts identified as one of ―the ten most 
significant litigated matters which [he] personally handled‖ the Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Federation case.
574
 While serving as the Acting Solicitor General, Roberts 
wrote, he ―participated in the briefing on the merits and presented oral argument [before 
the Supreme Court] on behalf of the government.‖575 The Committee questioned Roberts 
on his perceived opposition to environmental protections, and Roberts rephrased his 
earlier ‗John Adams defense‘ to address the concern. Roberts explained during his oral 
testimony that the Committee should not infer from his written response that he 
personally held the position that he advocated before the Lujan Court, and he provided a 
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very brief summary of the standing doctrine he defended in the Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Federation case. As Roberts explained, 
 We contended that the general allegations of injury that the two individuals had 
 presented were not specific enough to entitle them to mount a broad-based 
 challenge to the thousands of agency decisions affecting millions of acres about 
 which they complained. The Court, in a 5 – 4 decision, agreed with our 
 analysis.
576
  
 
Roberts‘ interpretation of the standing doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 
parallels his interpretation of the standing doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
case on which he wrote about in the Duke Law Journal article. In both Lujan cases, 
Roberts defended the position that since the plaintiffs failed to prove that a direct action 
of the defendant caused an actual harm (rather than an alleged harm), the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to sue, and therefore the Court lacked the authority to rule on the merits 
of the case.  
 Roberts also received a follow-up question from Wisconsin Senator Russell 
Feingold on the environment topic. The Senator asked Roberts whether he thought ―the 
courts should be more or less accepting of environmental regulation under the takings 
clause?‖ Roberts offered a pat answer within the doctrinal modality, and he wrote that he 
―would be bound to follow that precedent whether I personally regarded it as overly 
accepting or insufficiently accepting of environmental regulation.‖ Roberts excludes the 
realist and pragmatist perspective as approaches for relaxing or strengthening 
environmental protections via judge-made law, and he instead provides a positivist 
response to the Senator‘s question.  
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 During the actual confirmation hearings, however, none of the Committee 
members questioned Roberts on his environmental views. While Roberts provided the 
Committee an opportunity to explore his defense of the standing doctrine, no substantive 
questions explored either his pre-hearing written response or his Duke Law Journal 
article. As a result, the Roberts-as-environmental-foe fears subsided without incident, 
and Roberts‘ stance on environmental protection became a moot point.  
Getting the Call to the Bush League 
 As his confirmation hearings demonstrate, Roberts survived the sliders, 
curveballs, and occasional fastballs that the Committee threw to him. Roberts proved to 
be a formidable foe at the plate, and he followed the advice he gave to Justice O‘Connor 
and Roberts thus avoided a Bork-like disaster or a Thomas-like inquiry that could have 
permanently derailed his bid for a seat on the appellate court. While some critics still 
opposed Roberts‘ confirmation, other supporters, such as Neal Kumar Katyal, then a 
visiting professor of law at Yale Law School but who now holds the Deputy Solicitor 
General position in the Obama administration, submitted letters of recommendation for 
Roberts‘ appointment to the court.577 Ultimately, after waiting 11 long years for a 
judgeship, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 16 to 3 to confirm Roberts,
578
 and the 
full Senate, in a voice vote and without opposition, confirmed Roberts on May 8, 2003, 
for the open seat on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
579
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The Appellate Court Opinions 
 Professor Michael Comiskey argues that neither the ―published opinions of 
former federal judges‖ nor ―the record of even a highly experienced federal appeals 
court judge‖ provide much insight into that judge‘s judicial philosophy.580 Many Court 
followers appear to agree with Comiskey‘s claim. One person, for example, wrote that as 
an appellate court judge, Roberts remained ―something of an ideological mystery‖ since 
―[t]he 49 opinions he‘s written . . . reveal little of his leanings on issues important to 
conservatives, such as abortion and school choice.‖581 This project contends, however, 
that a close reading of Judge Roberts‘ published appellate court opinions reveals insight 
into the judicial philosophy to which he adheres to resolve competing claims over 
constitutional and statutory questions. The remainder of the chapter, therefore, examines 
a representative sampling of Judge Roberts‘ opinions to discern whether he constructed 
argumentative strategies consistent with those he advanced in his prior writings and 
confirmation hearing testimony, and whether his decision-making and resolution of the 
cases for which he wrote opinions provide additional insight into a judicial philosophy to 
which he subscribes. 
Wit and Wisdom, Take II 
 As he did in his memoranda while serving in the Reagan administration, Roberts 
displayed his sharp wit in several of his appellate court opinions. In some opinions, 
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Roberts used wit to frame the facts of the case, and in other opinions he used wit to 
advance an argument or to make a point regarding statutory questions.  
 Roberts introduced several cases with humorous historical or literary references. 
For example, Consumers Energy Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
582
 
concerned the legality of a tariff scheme for energy transmission services across the 
Canada-United States border. Roberts explained the origins for the statutory issue: 
 It was a close thing, but Benedict Arnold‘s bold plan to capture Canada for the 
 Revolution fell short at the Battle of Quebec in early 1776. As a result, the 
 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must now decide when affiliates of 
 Canadian utilities – utilities not subject to FERC jurisdiction – may sell power at 
 market-based rates in the United States.
583
 
 
In Jung v. Mundy, Holt, & Mance, PC,
584
 a case which involved estate planning and 
alleged legal malpractice, Roberts turned to Charles Dickens‘ 1853 novel to highlight the 
ongoing conflict between the parties. 
 The roots of this real-life Bleak House saga doubtless stretch further back in 
 time, but the precipitating event was the death of Lew Gin Gee Jung (Mother 
 Jung) in January 1985. 
 
Roberts‘ use of wit in both cases might draw disdain from those who oppose the use of 
‗rhetorical excesses,‘ such as humor, in judicial opinions,585 even when that humor is 
                                                          
582
 367 F.3d 915 (D.C. Circ., 2004). I used the Library of Congress website 
(http://www.loc.gov/law/find/roberts.php) to access the complete texts of Judge Roberts‘ D.C. Circuit 
Court published opinions, as that website provided a complete record of the 49 opinions Judge Roberts 
authored, and the Library of Congress website posted the opinions for review prior to Judge Roberts‘ 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers for an appellate court 
opinion from Judge Roberts are from the opinions on that website. 
583
 367 F.3d 915 (D.C. Circ., 2004): 2. 
584
 372 F.3d 429 (D.C. Circ., 2004). 
222 
 
   
 
―genuinely relevant to the case at hand,‖586 as Roberts‘ humor was. Benedict Arnold 
attempted to blockade Quebec, and the tariffs in Consumers Energy served as a blockade 
against the Canadian transmission of energy into the northern United States. Dickens‘ 
novel concerned the long-running litigation over a will, the central issue in Jung. 
Roberts‘ wit and humor, rather than detracting from the importance of the opinion, 
actually serve a purpose in his writing, similar to how his humor and wit in his Reagan-
era memoranda served a purpose. 
 Roberts, though, also used wit to frame statutory issues. In Duchek v. National 
Transportation Safety Board and Federal Aviation Administration,
587
 in which the court 
held that the NTSB and the FAA violated their precedent for random, unannounced drug 
testing and violated ―the text and purpose of the [drug testing] regulations,‖588 Roberts 
used a sports analogy to explain the importance of the consistent application of the ‗rule 
of recognition‘ for testing aviation employees. As Roberts wrote, 
 A sport such as golf can have a system of rules grounded on the assumption that 
 participants will in good faith call penalties on themselves, but such an approach 
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 seems ill-advised when it comes to designing regulations to protect the public 
 from drug use by those in safety-sensitive positions – and in fact that is not the 
 approach reflected in these regulations.
589
 
 
Roberts‘ prudentialist reasoning argues that the risk to allowing an individual, who 
knows he was selected for a ‗random‘ drug test and knows he must schedule that test for 
himself, potentially threatens the safety of airline passengers if the randomness and the 
element of surprise are no longer criteria for drug testing. In such a situation, deferral to 
agency decision-making is neither a wise nor a prudent decision, as the potential costs 
(less safety) outweigh the benefits to deferral. 
 In several other opinions Roberts used his wit via metaphors to advance or 
conclude arguments about the appropriate interpretation of a statute.
590
 For example, in 
Independent Equipment Dealers Association v. Environmental Protection Agency,
591
 
Roberts explained with a context-specific metaphor (hence the grammatical error in his 
quip below) that the EPA did not change the ‗rule of recognition‘ for heavy construction 
equipment dealers as ―the EPA Letter tread no new ground. It left the world just as it 
found it . . . ‖592 In an opinion issued a month after the Independent Equipment decision, 
Roberts again utilized a transportation metaphor, though he extended this metaphor 
throughout his opinion. Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. Federal Energy 
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Regulatory Commission
593
 involved a cost-trapping claim for realizing fees incurred for 
the use of energy transmission lines (i.e. energy ―transportation‖ lines). Critics of the 
opinion would characterize it as one filled with complex jargon and a lot of law-talk 
terminology; Roberts might agree, but he would counter that the opinion demonstrates 
his attempt at making the opinion more readable, as he intersperses more recognizable 
―transportation‖ metaphors throughout the opinion. Roberts opens the opinion with the 
statement ―In the bad old days,‖ and then he ―drives‖ the reader through the case. As the 
reader travels through the opinion, the reader arrives ―at some point down the road,‖ 
traverses ―jurisdictional speed bumps,‖ encounters ―transmission loads wheeled across‖ 
energy facilities, but in the end the reader finds that Midwest ―gain[ed] no traction in 
their argument.‖594 Rather than reading Roberts‘ Independent Equipment and Midwest 
ISO opinions as exemplars of all that is wrong with legal rhetoric, a more objective 
approach is to view the opinions as examples of Roberts‘ deliberate use of a rhetorical 
device to strengthen his argumentative strategy for resolving competing claims about a 
statute. 
The Statute is the Key for Unlocking the Rule of Law 
 After law school, Roberts secured a clerkship at the U.S. Court of Appeals in 
New York. Roberts clerked for the man who became his ―role model,‖ Judge Henry 
Friendly, whom legal scholars regard ―as perhaps the greatest appeals-court judge of the 
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20
th
 century.‖595 Roberts, it seems, deeply respected the humility and the wisdom Judge 
Friendly used to resolve constitutional and statutory questions, and Roberts ―cited 
[Judge] Friendly by name in six cases.‖596 Roberts‘ reference to Judge Friendly in the 
case In re England
597
 reflects how Judge Friendly‘s approach to deciding cases guides 
Roberts in his own decision-making. As Roberts explained in his opinion, 
 . . . the statute, by its terms, applied only to certain types of selection board 
 proceedings. This calls to mind what Judge Friendly described as Felix 
 Frankfurter‘s ―threefold imperative to law students‖ in his landmark statutory 
 interpretation course: ―(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the 
 statute!‖598 
 
Judge Friendly‘s temperament and Justice Frankfurter‘s admonition best describe the 
approach that Roberts takes to resolve competing claims over action, definition, or 
stipulation rules, as evidenced by his appellate court opinions: Roberts reads the text of 
the statute, he identifies the ‗rule of recognition,‘ and he lets that guide his resolution of 
the case. 
 Consistent with Judge Friendly and Justice Frankfurter‘s advice, Roberts 
proceeds to resolve many of his cases by turning to the text of the statute, and he 
employs a two-step process for resolving statutory questions. First, he begins his 
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reasoning by focusing on the actual meaning of the words or phrases as they are used 
within the statute. Second, and consistent with the explanation he gave during his 
confirmation hearing testimony, he cites Supreme Court precedent and uses the doctrinal 
modality to signal the process by which his reasoning will follow. Roberts‘ two-step 
approach is consistent with the Chevron doctrine, a two-part framework the Supreme 
Court outlined in its decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.
599
 Under the Chevron framework, courts must decide first whether Congress 
has ‗spoken directly to the question at issue,‘ and if they have, then courts must defer to 
Congress‘ statutory intent; second, if the statute is ‗silent‘ on the issue of intent, then 
courts must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of the statute, as long as that 
interpretation is reasonable and not ―an action‖ that is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law,‖ the standard codified in the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1988.
600
 A review of some of Roberts‘ opinions 
outlines his legal reasoning procedure, his application of the Chevron doctrine, and the 
prudentialist approach he uses to resolve competing claims. 
 Roberts often opens the section of the opinion in which he explains the rationale 
behind the court‘s holding with a simple statement about where the court should begin 
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its resolution of the case. For example, Consumer Electronics Association v. Federal 
Communications Commission
601
 answered whether the FCC had the authority to require 
manufacturers of televisions with a thirteen inch or greater display screen to include 
tuners on the televisions that would enable the televisions to receive and decode digital 
television signals. Roberts quotes a previous D.C. Circuit Court decision, Citizens Coal 
Council v. Norton, to begin his rationale for the Consumer Electronics court‘s decision: 
―We begin, as always, with the plain language of the statute in question.‖602 In another 
case, Roberts omits any reference to a prior decision, but he uses similar language to 
introduce the court‘s rationale. In re England addressed whether a congressional statute 
specifically barred, to any non-board member, the disclosure of information about the 
proceedings of a naval selection board. To introduce the rationale for the court‘s 
decision, Roberts wrote, ―[w]e begin with the plain language of the statute in 
question.‖603 Roberts‘ approach serves two purposes: first, by starting with the statutory 
text, Roberts demonstrates that the court followed the ‗rule of recognition‘ rather than 
engaged in judicial policy-making, and second, he demonstrates that the court exercised 
judicial restraint and focused on the statutory question rather than decided the merits of 
the case based on his (or the panel‘s) preconceptions. Roberts also advances this 
positivist and prudentialist perspective in his PDK Laboratories Inc. v. United States 
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Drug Enforcement Administration opinion.
604
 Roberts concurred in part and concurred in 
the judgment, and his opinion serves as one of the clearest examples of his belief that 
judges should exercise judicial restraint. As Roberts explains in introducing the rationale 
for his decision, 
 [T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint – if it is not necessary to decide 
 more, it is necessary not to decide more – counsels us to go no further.  
 
 My brethren, however, are not content with this narrow and effectively conceded 
 basis for disposition, and instead adopt an alternative ground of far broader 
 significance . . . I cannot go along for that gratuitous ride.
605
    
  
 The substance of Roberts‘ opinions also reflects his prudentialist commitment to 
judicial restraint as well as his belief that the separation of powers doctrine precludes 
judges from making the law. As he explains in In re England, ―we are reluctant to imply 
an additional exception,‖606 a restraint he justifies by citing the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in United States v. Johnson: ―When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, 
it does not follow that courts have authority to create others.‖607 Roberts advances his 
position on judicial restraint with an institutional argument within the structural and 
doctrinal modalities. Even with the absence of congressional or Court guidance, though, 
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Roberts still argues for judicial restraint. In United States v. Stanfield,
608
 the defendant 
questioned the district court‘s imposition of unclear sentencing guidelines regarding his 
ability to access the internet. Rather than take the opportunity to correct the district 
court‘s sentencing stipulations, Roberts emphasizes that the issue demands judicial 
restraint. As Roberts explained, 
 We are reluctant to address the validity of the internet restriction in the absence 
 of a clearer understanding of its scope; we need more footing before deciding 
 where we stand . . . the confusion over the scope of the internet restriction 
 counsels restraint on our part before attempting to consider the validity of the 
 restriction under 18 U.S.C § 3583 and the First Amendment.
609
 
 
Roberts‘ use of the prudential modality within the prudentialist perspective also reflects 
his incorporation of a component of positivism into his decision-making calculus: he 
recognizes that the district court has not clarified the ‗rule of recognition‘ under which it 
imposed restrictions, though he assumes that a valid rule exists. Both positivism and 
prudentialism, however, preclude an appellate court judge from correcting the problem 
with the law. 
 Roberts‘ prudentialist approach also allows him to cite Supreme Court precedent 
in cases in which the court need not consider legislative history or intent. In Consumer 
Electronics, for example, Roberts uses the doctrinal modality and explains that ―the 
Supreme Court has consistently instructed that statutes written in broad, sweeping 
language should be given broad, sweeping application,‖610 and he quotes the Court‘s 
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decision in Ratzlaf v. United States
611
 to further impress his point: ―We should ‗not 
resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.‘‖612 At the same time, 
however, Roberts‘ prudentialist approach to resolving statutory questions reveals that, 
consistent with his confirmation hearings‘ testimony, he breaks from the formalist and 
originalist contention that judges should not consider legislative history or intent when 
deciding the instant case. Roberts noted in his In re England opinion, for example, that 
the court found that the limited legislative history ―fully comports with our plain 
language reading, and that nothing in that history remotely suggests that Congress 
intended an unexpressed exception to the ban on disclosure for civil discovery.‖613  
 Roberts often, in fact, staunchly defends his prudentialist belief that judges must 
defer to Congress‘ statutory intent. Acree v. Republic of Iraq614 involved the 1961 
Foreign Assistance Act‘s prohibition on providing aid to countries that sponsor terrorism 
and whether a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq could receive economic assistance. Roberts 
filed an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, and his opinion 
addressed the majority‘s failure to appropriately ‗read‘ Congress‘ intent for the 
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA), which authorized 
providing assistance to post-terrorist states. In his opinion, Roberts included the Ratzlaf 
quote and he cited his Consumer Electronics opinion to establish that courts must defer 
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to Congress‘ broad statutory intent. As Roberts explained in Acree, ―Congress knows 
how to use more limited language . . . when it wants to. Congress did just that in another 
appropriations [sic] statute enacted just two months prior to the EWSAA.‖615 Roberts 
made a similar argument in United States of America ex rel. Totten v. Bombadier,
616
 a 
case that involved Amtrak‘s payment for allegedly defective rail cars. As Roberts 
explained in his opinion, ―if the overriding intent of Congress were in fact to delete the 
requirement that claims be presented to a Government officer or employee, Congress 
could readily have done just that. . . . But Congress did not . . . ‖617 Roberts‘ arguments 
by analogy within the structural modality reflect his prudentialist belief that judges 
possess limited authority and that they should defer to the decision-making of others. 
 Roberts‘ appellate opinions also demonstrate that he defers to the agencies tasked 
with carrying out the rules/laws on which the case centers. By so doing, Roberts 
recognizes that a ‗rule of recognition‘ guides his decision-making, and that he should 
defer both to valid rules/laws and to valid rule-making and rule-changing procedures.  
Roberts‘ positivist approach thus corresponds with his prudentialist belief that judges 
should exercise judicial restraint rather than make or change the law, as a realist or 
pragmatist judge might do. 
 As with his deference to Congress‘ intent, Roberts bases his deference to agency 
decision-making on the ‗rule of recognition‘ contained within the text of a statute. In 
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Bloch v. Powell,
618
 for example, the plaintiff raised a due process claim and argued that 
it was beyond the Secretary of State‘s discretion to withhold Bloch‘s immediate 
retirement annuity. In his opinion, Roberts offers an institutional argument and an 
argument from coherence to explain that ―Bloch concedes that Section 811 of the 
[Foreign Service] Act [of 1980] vests the Secretary with significant discretion – as 
indeed he must. The statute is perhaps a paradigmatic vesting of unfettered discretion, 
placing no constraints on the Secretary‘s authority to withhold consent.‖619 Roberts later 
notes in his opinion that ―discretion [is] the touchstone of the due process analysis in the 
property context,‖ and as such ―[t]he Secretary‘s broad discretion to withhold consent to 
retirement and an immediate annuity negates the existence of any constitutionally 
cognizable property interest in Bloch, and so his due process claim must be rejected.‖620 
To justify his deferral to an agency‘s decision, Roberts utilizes the structural and 
doctrinal modalities to resolve both a statutory and a constitutional question, and again 
his use of the two modalities restricts him from imposing his own preconceptions and 
from advancing a realist or pragmatist position to resolve the case. 
 In fact, Roberts defers to Congress‘ intent and a statute‘s ‗rule of recognition‘ 
when he determines that a lower court erred in its decision. In one case that reflects this 
approach, Roberts had the opportunity to address Senator Durbin‘s concerns about 
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sentencing guidelines. In United States v. Tucker
621
 the appellate court reviewed a 
district court judge‘s decision to ―depart downward‖ and reduce the sentence for a 
defendant because the judge did not agree with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; as the 
judge said on record, he was ―not going to be the instrument of injustice in this case.‖622 
Upon review, Roberts found that the judge‘s contravention of the Guideline‘s ‗rule of 
recognition‘ prevented the judge from deviating from the legislatively-created, and thus 
valid, sentencing guideline. As Roberts explained, ―[t]o the extent the district court 
based its departure on its belief that the sentence was unjust, it relied on a factor that is 
clearly impermissible under the Guidelines.‖623 Roberts noted that some exceptions for 
downward departure in sentencing were ―legally permissible – in rare circumstances,‖ 
and a judge could consider ―post-conviction rehabilitation‖ or ―employment history or 
family responsibilities‖ as factors for a departure from the Guidelines. In the instant 
case, however, the district court judge failed to provide a written statement that 
explained his rationale for the departure, as required by the Guidelines, and as a result, 
Roberts wrote, ―we are unable to discern whether and how the district court applied this 
body of law to the case at hand.‖624 Roberts therefore concluded that ―the district court 
was not attempting to apply the Guidelines in this case: it instead seemed intent on 
defying them – and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), to boot. . . . So long as these Guidelines are the 
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law of the land, we – and the district courts – are obligated to apply them.‖625 Roberts‘ 
holding in the case, which he advances with an institutional argument within the 
structural modality, demonstrates that he resolved the case from a positivist perspective: 
a ‗rule of recognition‘ exists; it is a valid rule; exceptions to following the rule are valid 
rules; but, a judge-made change to the rule is not valid, and an activist decision by a 
judge violates the principle of judicial restraint. At the same time, the position Roberts 
advocates in his opinion is consistent with the position he advocates in his other 
writings: a respect for the separation of powers doctrine and a belief that legislatures, 
and not the judiciary, are charged with making and correcting the rules/laws. 
 Roberts‘ deference to agency decision-making also reveals his prudential 
approach for resolving statutory questions. For example, Roberts uses an institutional 
argument within the prudential modality to conclude his opinion in Sioux Valley Rural 
Television, Inc. v. Federal Communication Commission.
626
 The Sioux Valley court held 
that the FCC appropriately handled licensing fees, and to reiterate that judges should 
exercise restraint, Roberts‘ cites an opinion from then-Judge Scalia of the D.C. Circuit 
Court: ―The maxim that we must not substitute our judgment for that of the agency is 
‗especially true when the agency is called upon to weigh the costs and benefits of 
alternative policies.‘‖627 While cost/benefit analysis influences Roberts‘ prudentialist 
decision-making, a hypothetical scenario about a need for a potential cost/benefit 
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analysis does not; instead, Roberts‘ prudentialism encourages him to ‗limit the breadth 
of judicial authority.‘ As he explained in his opinion for the In re Tennant court, 
 It is one thing to say that we have [writ if mandamus] authority. . . . It is quite 
 another to claim such power solely on the basis that events might lead to a filing 
 before an agency or lower court, which might lead to an appeal to this court . . .  
 To dispense with even that preliminary requirement would effectively grant us 
 jurisdiction to consider extraordinary writs in any case, because it is easy enough 
 to spin out ―for want of a nail‖ scenarios from any set of facts that could 
 eventually lead to this court.
628
  
  
Roberts, in essence, reverses the cost/benefit hypothetical to a scenario in which the 
costs of judicial activism outweigh the benefits of unrestrained appellate jurisdiction, a 
position  reminiscent of the one he discussed in his Reagan-era memoranda on the 
efforts to curb an activist Supreme Court. Also reminiscent of his prior memoranda, 
Roberts refuses to open the floodgates into the judiciary and set a circuit court precedent 
that would increase the caseload of courts, a caseload that might include baseless claims. 
Roberts instead errs on the side of caution, and his exercise of judicial restraint in an area 
where he could make the law or shape the law reflects that he does not approach 
questions about the rules/laws from a realist or a pragmatist perspective. 
Assessing Judge Roberts 
 A close reading of Roberts‘ appellate court opinions provides additional insight 
into the judicial philosophies to which he adheres to resolve competing claims on 
constitutional and statutory issues. Consistent with his letters and memoranda, Roberts 
uses of a variety of argument ‗types‘ within several different modalities to advance his 
argumentative strategies, a practice that demonstrates that he adopts components of the 
                                                          
628
 In re: James M. Tennant, 359 F.3d 523 (D.C. Circ., 2004): 10. Italics in original. 
236 
 
   
 
positivist philosophy and incorporates them into the prudentialist philosophy. Roberts 
recognizes that the statutory text, and appellate court and Supreme Court precedent, limit 
his judicial authority; he defers to Congress‘ statutory intent and to other institutions‘ 
decision-making and statutory interpretation; he evaluates the costs and benefits 
associated with a decision; and, he attempts to balance individual rights against the 
rights of other institutions and society. Roberts, in other words, displays the hallmarks of 
the prudentialist judge who exercises ‗modesty and humility‘ in decision-making.  
 Would Judge Roberts approach constitutional and statutory questions from a 
prudentialist perspective once he assumed a seat on the highest appellate court in the 
nation? The next chapter attempts to answer that question. 
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CHAPTER V  
UMPIRING IN THE ―BIG SHOW‖: 
THE SUPREME COURT TESTIMONY AND OPINIONS 
 
 With the prospect of the potential seating of another conservative Justice on the 
bench, many Court watchers envisioned ―a large-scale confirmation battle.‖629 Even the 
media prepared for the impending showdown between the president and the Democrats 
on the Judiciary Committee. As one Conservative pundit remarked, ―The media were 
expecting a contentious nomination, and they were going to cover one whether it 
materialized or not.‖630 Unfortunately for the media, Roberts‘ hearings lacked the 
spectacle of the Thomas‘ hearings, and America avoided a take-no-prisoners war. 
 The judicial philosophy question, though, took center stage once again in the 
political drama surrounding Roberts‘ Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Roberts 
tried to defuse the issue, and he explained to Illinois Senator Richard Durbin that one 
could determine what type of Justice Roberts would be based on his ―demonstrated 
commitment to the rule of law,‖ and by examining his appellate court opinions and 
―what types of arguments I make and how I make those arguments and how faithful they 
are to the [Supreme Court‘s] precedents[.]‖631 The previous chapter examined Roberts‘ 
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claim; this chapter leaves Roberts‘ paper trail and joins him at his final destination: the 
Supreme Court. For this chapter I read the complete text of his Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, and I read the complete texts of his 56 published opinions from 
his first four Terms on the Supreme Court (the October 2005 Term through the October 
2008 Term). Consistent with the previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter focuses 
on those aspects of his testimony and writing that correspond to the subjects and themes 
on which he wrote letters and memoranda from his time in the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, and it discusses cases similar to those for which he wrote an opinion as 
an appellate court judge. Such an approach serves two purposes: first, it allows the 
project to discern whether Roberts constructed argumentative strategies consistent with 
those he advanced in his prior writings and appellate court opinions, and second, it 
allows the project to evaluate whether Roberts resolved statutory and constitutional 
questions through one or more judicial philosophies consistent with those he utilized for 
resolving competing claims in his prior writings and appellate court opinions. The 
project‘s strategy, therefore, provides the necessary depth for investigating those two 
questions. 
Greeting the Two Teams 
 Similar to the challenge he faced during his appellate court confirmation 
hearings, Roberts had to prove three important facts to the Judiciary Committee: first, 
that the positions he advocated for the Reagan and Bush administrations did not 
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represent his personal, ideological views; second, that his appellate court decisions were 
not ideologically-motivated; and, third, that he would not enter the Court with 
preconceptions about how to decide cases nor promote a Republican or 
Conservative/conservative agenda. 
 After the opening presentations from Indiana Senators Evan Bayh and Richard 
Lugar and Virginia Senator John Warren, Roberts delivered his opening statement. 
Roberts told the Committee that ―a certain humility should characterize the judicial role. 
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. . . . Judges have to 
have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent shaped by 
other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath, and judges have to have the 
modesty to be open in the decisional process to the considered views of their colleagues 
on the bench.‖632 Roberts stuck largely to the confirmation game plan, as his opening 
remarks paralleled those he provided to the Committee in his pre-hearing ‗Biography‘ 
questionnaire, in which he wrote that ―a judge needs humility to appreciate that he is not 
necessarily the first person to confront an issue‖ and that ―a judge must have humility to 
be fully open to the views of his fellow judges on the court.‖633 Roberts‘ prudentialist 
description of a Justice provides the starting point for examining his testimony and his 
Court opinions to evaluate whether he approached constitutional and statutory questions 
from a prudentialist perspective or whether he used other philosophies to resolve those 
questions. 
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The Famous/Infamous “Umpire Analogy” 
 In October 1984, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist spent several days at 
the University of Minnesota Law School as a ―Jurist in Residence.‖ On October 19, he 
delivered a lecture, part of which included an analogy comparing the appointment 
process to a baseball game:  
Vacancies in the federal judiciary are filled by the President with the advice and 
consent of the United States Senate. Just as the courts may have their innings 
with the President, the President comes to have his innings with the courts.
634
 
 
Rehnquist‘s statement went largely unheralded at the time, though legal scholars should 
have known from where Rehnquist drew his analogy: H.L.A. Hart, who compared 
judicial decision-making to a game with an official scorer.
635
 In his book, Hart offered 
an analogy in which he likened the ―scorer‘s discretion‖ to a judge‘s discretion. Hart 
discussed how the inconsistency of a scorer‘s rule-making affected predictability during 
the game, which he then compared to the problems with a judge who applies inconsistent 
rules and how that affects the predictability of the law. 
 Perhaps taking a cue from his mentor and predecessor, or perhaps stealing a base 
(page) from Hart‘s book, Roberts also offered a baseball analogy for the senators to 
consider. As most interested persons who followed Roberts‘ confirmation hearings 
know, Roberts offered the Judiciary Committee the now-famous (or -infamous) ―umpire 
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analogy.‖636 In his opening statement to the Committee, Roberts framed his description 
of a judge as a person who adheres to the ‗rule of recognition.‘ As Roberts explained, 
―Judges are like umpires. Umpires don‘t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an 
umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a 
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. . . . I will remember 
that it‘s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch and bat.‖637 
 Roberts‘ positivist response and his ―umpire analogy,‖ however, have their origin 
in a previous hearing: Roberts‘ appellate court hearing. During that hearing, Texas 
Senator John Cornyn asked, ―Are you willing to commit to assuming a new role and a 
different role, and that is as an impartial umpire on the law, [and] legal arguments[?]‖638 
Senator Cornyn revisited his analogy during Roberts‘ Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings, and Cornyn asked which type of umpire Roberts would be: The one who says, 
―Some are balls, and some are strikes, and I call them the way they are;‖ or, the one who 
says, ―I call them the way I see them;‖ or, the one who says, ―they ain‘t nothing till I call 
them.‖ Roberts selected umpire two, and he explained that he was not umpire three since 
―they are balls and strikes regardless, and if I call them one and they are the other, that 
doesn‘t change what they are. It just means that I got it wrong.‖639  
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 Roberts‘ response, though, actually provides more insight into his view on the 
appropriate judicial philosophy a judge should use and which philosophies a judge 
should avoid. Roberts‘ choice of umpire two demonstrates that he believes the ‗rule of 
recognition‘ creates the judicial strike zone, and his role as a Justice is to decide whether 
a constitutional or statutory claim falls within or outside that zone. By not selecting 
umpire one, Roberts rejects the rigidity of formalism and the judge who resolves cases in 
a mechanical way, and by not selecting umpire three, Roberts rejects the realist, 
pragmatist, and Dworkinist judge who practices activism to change, shape, or make the 
law as that judge sees fit. Roberts might get the pitch wrong, but a clear rulebook exists 
for determining whether that pitch crossed or missed the constitutional or statutory plate. 
Roberts‘ response to a post-hearing follow-up question from Senator Schumer best 
reflects these philosophical rejections:  
 I believe that any interpretation, and especially that of broadly-worded 
 provisions, requires judges to guard against the incorporation of their personal 
 preferences into the law. . . . A judge who did not regard his role as that of an 
 umpire, but instead as that of a player, would feel free to decide such questions 
 on the basis of his own social policy preferences. I do not.
640
 
 
 As one could expect, critics questioned Roberts‘ use of the ―umpire analogy.‖ 
Martin Grabus, for example, argued that ―[t]he Supreme Court, contrary to what Chief 
Justice Roberts says, is not a neutral umpire at all and never has been.‖641 Jeffrey Toobin 
remarked that ―Supreme Court justices are nothing at all like baseball umpires. It is folly 
to pretend that the awesome work of interpreting the Constitution . . . is akin to 
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performing the rote, almost mindless task of calling balls and strikes. When it comes to 
the core of the Court‘s work, determining the contemporary meaning of the Constitution, 
it is ideology, not craft or skill, that controls the outcome of cases.‖642 Judge Posner 
offered a similar assessment, and he claimed that both Supreme Court Justices and 
judges on the federal appellate courts are ―calling the balls and strikes‖ as well as 
―changing the rules,‖ and the new rules are ―political in character, especially in 
constitutional cases, because the changes are not dictated by the unambiguous language 
of authoritative documents, such as constitutional text.‖643 Despite those concerns, 
columnist David Savage applied the analogy to the entirety of Roberts‘ testimony: ―I 
would say one thing sort of in the baseball context: When this guy first takes the field, 
you would say: This guy was born to play the game. He is a real natural talent.‖644 
Let the Pre-Game Warm-Up Begin 
 Roberts, of course, would have to defend his paper trail during his confirmation 
hearings. As he explained to Senator Schumer, ―I think some 80,000 pages have been 
released of memoranda that I wrote[.]‖645 On the final day of testimony, Roberts offered 
Senator Schumer a similar remark: ―The numbers [have] been ranging from 80,000 to 
100,000, and there is a lot of paper out there.‖ Roberts also added that after serving for 
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two years on the appellate bench, he has ―50 opinions. You can look at those. . . . I think 
if you look at what I‘ve done since I took the judicial oath, that should convince you that 
I‘m not an ideologue[.]‖646 Perhaps his most direct answer to the memoranda issue, and 
one tinged with his sharp wit, was his response to a question from Wisconsin Senator 
Herbert Kohl. In discussing the memoranda he drafted as a staff lawyer for the Reagan 
administration, Roberts explained, ―I was promoting the views of the people for whom I 
worked. In some instances, those were consistent with personal views; in other instances, 
they may not be. In most instances, no one cared terribly much what my personal views 
were.‖647 But the Committee cared now, and its members were determined to get 
Roberts to reveal his ideological leanings. 
 Questioning about the memoranda continued, and as he did during his appellate 
court confirmation hearings two years earlier, Roberts used the ‗John Adams defense‘ to 
deflect responsibility for the memoranda he wrote for the Reagan administration. As 
Roberts explained to South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham, 
 You know, it‘s a tradition of the American Bar that goes back before the 
 founding of the country that lawyers are not identified with the positions of their 
 clients. The most famous example probably was John Adams, who represented 
 the British soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre. He did that for a reason, 
 because he wanted to show that the Revolution in which he was involved was not 
 about overturning the rule of law, it was about vindicating the rule of law.
648
 
 
Roberts offers a near word-for-word defense of the statement he made during his 
appellate hearing, but in this hearing he adds to the well-known ‗good versus evil‘ 
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dissociative dichotomy which he uses to cast new light on the idea that an attorney can 
represent a reprehensible client. Roberts uses the historical modality to argue that all 
people, no matter how reprehensible they may be, enjoy constitutional protections, 
which the founders of the Republic fought a war to establish; while some people may 
disagree with the defense of a person or a position, all people must recognize that the 
Constitution demands that those persons or positions be protected.  
 In addition to defending his memoranda, Roberts spent a major part of the three-
day confirmation hearings defending his approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Roberts responded safely by repeatedly emphasizing his commitment to the principle of 
stare decisis. Roberts framed his approach early in the hearings in response to 
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter‘s questions. As Roberts explained with an argument 
from authority, ―Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, said that, ‗To avoid an arbitrary 
discretion in the judges, they need to be bound by rules and precedents.‘ So even that far 
back, the Founders appreciated the role of precedent in promoting evenhandedness, 
predictability, stability, [and] the appearance of integrity in the judicial process.‖649 As 
he did before, Roberts used the historical and doctrinal modalities to incorporate a 
component of originalism that complements his positivist perspective. Throughout his 
testimony, Roberts continually repeated those four purposes for following precedent, and 
he stressed that overruling precedent ―is a jolt to the legal system.‖650 Displaying his 
penchant for humor and reflecting his prudentialism, Roberts told Iowa Senator Charles 
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Grassley, ―You begin with a basic recognition of the value of precedent. No judge gets 
up every morning with a clean slate and says, well, what should the Constitution look 
like today? The approach is a more modest one. You begin with the precedents.‖651 
Roberts‘ answer is similar to one he gave during an interview with Scholastic News 
Online, in which he explained his approach to deciding cases:  
I have a copy of the Constitution on my desk and the first thing I do when I have 
a case involving the Constitution is read what it says. I also have a copy of the 
Federalist Papers—a series of essays by the Founding Fathers that helps explain 
what the Constitution means. . . . I will go and find previous opinions of the 
Court that have interpreted the part of the Constitution at issue in a particular 
case, and I will read those opinions.
652
 
 
Roberts‘ response reveals that he considers both original intent and original meaning 
prior to hearing oral arguments on the instant case, and that he turns to Supreme Court 
precedent to understand how prior Courts resolved similar cases. Roberts thus explains 
his preparation for hearing a case within the historical and doctrinal modalities, but he 
never indicates that he uses originalism as his interpretive approach; instead, he explains 
how precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis provide a background for his 
understanding of the constitutional and/or statutory questions in the instant case. 
 During his testimony, Roberts qualified the appropriate situations under which 
Justices may revisit precedent: first, if ―precedents have proven to be unworkable,‖ and 
second, ―whether the doctrinal bases of a decision have been eroded by subsequent 
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developments.‖653 Roberts argued that Brown v. Board of Education,654 which overruled 
Plessy v. Ferguson,
655
 and that West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
656
 which overruled the 
Lochner v. New York-era decisions,
657
 justified revisiting precedent since the 
―intervening precedents had eroded the authority of those cases, [because] those 
precedents that were overruled had proved unworkable.‖658 Roberts advances his 
argument within the doctrinal modality, and in so doing, he infers that the Court 
overruled precedent only after the appropriate authority—Congress—validly changed 
the ‗rule of recognition;‘ the Court merely responded rather than changed the rules/laws. 
 Roberts also established parameters from within which Justices should decide 
cases. Similar to the position he defended during his appellate court testimony, Roberts 
rejects realism, pragmatism, and Dworkinism as acceptable interpretive approaches, and 
he instead defends the positivist and prudentialist approaches. As he explained to Utah 
Senator Orrin Hatch, the Court must recognize that ―they‘re interpreting the law, they‘re 
not making policy, and to the extent they go beyond their confined limits and make 
policy or execute the law, they lose their legitimacy, and I think that calls into question 
the authority they will need when it‘s necessary to act in the face of unconstitutional 
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action.‖659 Roberts advocates for judicial restraint, and he argues that judge-made law 
does not produce valid law, and an activist judiciary actually undermines the credibility 
of a decision on a controversial case. Roberts takes a similar position on a related 
question in which he concedes that Hart‘s ‗problems of the penumbra‘ exist, but that 
fails to give judges license to make the law, as the Justices did with the Lochner 
decision: 
 [I]n most cases . . . most judges, [sic] know what it means to interpret the law, 
 and can recognize when they‘re going too far into an area of making law, but 
 certainly there are harder cases . . . go to a case like the Lochner case. You can 
 read that opinion today and it‘s quite clear that they‘re not interpreting the law, 
 they‘re making the law. . . . It‘s right there in the opinion . . . they are substituting 
 their judgment on a policy matter for what the legislature had said.
660
 
 
Iowa Senator Charles Grassley reintroduced the topic during his questioning, and 
Roberts exhibited a more forceful tone and he once again drew the proverbial ‗line in the 
sand.‘ As Roberts responded, ―I have said that it is not the job of the Court to solve 
society‘s problems. . . . [Judges] don‘t have a license to go out and decide I think this is 
an injustice and so I‘m going to do something to fix it. That type of judicial role I think 
is inconsistent with the role the Framer‘s intended.‖661 Roberts‘ response parallels the 
rationale he provided in his United States v. Tucker appellate court opinion, the decision 
in which he held that a district court judge could not ignore the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines simply because he thought they were unjust, and he uses an argument from 
authority within the historical modality to advance his positivist position. At the same 
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time, Roberts chides judges who fail to exercise restraint and who resolve cases from a 
realist or a pragmatist perspective. In a later response, Roberts again incorporates the 
original intent component of originalism into his positivist perspective. As Roberts 
explained to South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham, ―[t]he Framers were not the sort 
of people, having fought a revolution to get the right of self-government, to sit down and 
say, let‘s take all the difficult issues before us and let‘s have the judges decide them. 
That would have been the farthest thing from their mind. The judges had the obligation 
to decide cases . . . according to the law, not according to their personal preferences.‖662 
 The most interesting aspect of Roberts‘ testimony regarding precedent did not 
take place during the oral questioning; instead, that aspect is found in his responses to 
the post-hearing questions the Committee members submitted to him. In response to one 
of Senator Biden‘s questions, Roberts wrote that ―stare decisis . . . embodies essential 
rule of law values: reliance, fairness, predictability, and judicial integrity.‖663 Roberts 
offered a similar response to a question from Senator Feinstein; for the first time, 
however, one discovers that Roberts based his explanation of precedent on dicta from 
the Court‘s plurality opinion in Payne v. Tennessee,664 which he quoted in his response: 
―Stare decisis ‗is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, 
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
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contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.‘‖665 The author 
of the Payne opinion? Roberts‘ mentor and his predecessor, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist. It appears that just as Judge Friendly‘s jurisprudence influenced Roberts‘ 
approach to the law and the judicial philosophy to which he adheres, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist‘s jurisprudence influenced Roberts‘ approach and philosophy as well.  
Now Batting: Judicial Philosophy 
 Similar to one of the aspects of this project, other scholars have examined the 
texts of nominees‘ Court confirmation hearings and concluded that the Judiciary 
Committee often asks nominee about their prior court decisions.
666
 Since Edwin Meese‘s 
calls for originalism and Judge Bork‘s testimony about his originalist approach to 
deciding cases, the quest to discern the judicial philosophy of nominees has taken on a 
greater importance for the Committee. As Roberts‘ hearings neared, one editorial 
encouraged the Committee ―to examine Roberts‘ constitutional philosophy. He should 
be asked in detail his views of how the Constitution should be interpreted.‖667 The 
members of the Committee heeded the call. 
 Roberts‘ responded to the Senators‘ questions about his philosophy in much the 
same manner that he responded to them during his appellate court hearings. When 
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pressed by Senator Hatch, Roberts simply replied, ―I do not have an overarching judicial 
philosophy that I bring to every case.‖668 With Senator Grassley, Roberts used an 
argument from dissociation to recast the issue: he framed the quest for the discovery of a 
philosophy into an ‗academic theorizing‘ versus a ‗judicial practicing‘ pairing in which 
the former should be considered less reliable than the latter. As Roberts explained to 
Senator Grassley,  
 There are some areas where a very strict textualist approach makes the most 
 sense. . . . In other areas, the Court‘s precedents dictate the approach. This is not 
 something that is purely a matter of academic exercise. . . . So the approaches do 
 vary, and I don‘t have an overarching view. As a matter of fact, I don‘t think very 
 many judges do. I think a lot of academics do . . . the nuances of academic theory 
 are dispensed with fairly quickly, and judges take a more practical and pragmatic 
 approach to trying to reach the best decision consistent with the rule of law.
669
 
 
Roberts did, however, differentiate his interpretive approach from that of a judge who 
follows a ‗pure‘ originalist philosophy. As he explained to Senator Specter, 
 I think the Framers, when they used broad language . . . they were crafting a 
 document that they intended to apply in a meaningful way down the ages . . . 
 they intended it to apply to changing conditions . . . when they adopt broad terms 
 and broad principles, we should hold them to their word, and apply them 
 consistent with those terms and those principles. . . . I depart from some views of 
 original intent in the sense that those folks, some people view it as meaning just 
 the conditions at that time, just the particular problem. I think you need to look at 
 the words they used, and if the words adopt a broader principle, it applies more 
 broadly.
670
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Roberts offered a similar response to Senator Feinstein‘s post-hearing written question, 
in which she asked, ―since different Framers and different legislators have different 
intent, whose intent is controlling?‖ Roberts responded: 
 I do not mean to say that we should attempt to read the minds of drafters of the 
 text, or that we should try to divine how they would have decided the case. 
 Rather, I believe we should gauge their intent by the words that they have 
 written, with the aid of accepted tools of interpretation. If the framers of some 
 legal text decided to use broad language, we should hold them to their word and 
 apply the provision as it is written.
671
 
 
Roberts concluded his written response to Senator Feinstein by explaining that ―the 
Court‘s precedents provide guidance on materials considered probative in ascertaining 
the intent of the Framers as a group.‖672 Roberts‘ responses to the Senators‘ questions 
reflect that he recognizes that originalism encompasses both an original intent and an 
original meaning component, as he frames his responses within the historical and the 
textual modalities. Roberts trusts the authority of the Constitution‘s framers and ratifiers, 
but other interpretive materials also influence his decision-making. 
 The one area in which Roberts did outline his approach to resolving competing 
claims occurred during the questions that involved statutory interpretation. Senator 
Grassley, for example, wanted to know what importance Roberts gave legislative history 
when he interpreted statutes. Roberts explained that ―when you are dealing with 
interpreting a statute, the most important part is the text. You begin with the text, and as 
the Supreme Court has said . . . that‘s also where you end.‖ Roberts explained that as an 
appellate judge, he ―relied on legislative history to help clarify ambiguity in the text,‖ 
                                                          
671
 Roberts Hearings, 570. 
672
 Roberts Hearings, 570. 
253 
 
   
 
and that he ―quoted and looked to legislative history in the past to help determine the 
meaning of ambiguous terms, and I would expect to follow that same approach on the 
Supreme Court.‖673 Roberts‘ responses to the Senators‘ questions should sound familiar: 
here, Roberts‘ quotes Justice Frankfurter from his Whitehouse Court opinion, and 
Roberts also included that same statement from Justice Frankfurter in the PDK 
Laboratories opinion Roberts wrote for the D.C. Circuit Court. Roberts extended his 
argument from authority to his post-hearing written responses as well, and he again 
quoted Justice Frankfurter to answer a question from Senator Biden: ―As a general 
matter, statutory interpretation, [sic] ‗begins with the statutory text, and ends there as 
well if the text is ambiguous.‘‖674 
 Arizona Senator Jon Kyl threw a statutory interpretation curveball to see how 
Roberts would call the pitch. He queried Roberts on how one Court could find a statute 
constitutional, yet another Court could find that same statute unconstitutional. Roberts 
took the opportunity to discuss the distinction between a facial challenge to a law and an 
as-applied challenge to a law. With a facial challenge, Roberts explained, ―you‘re 
basically saying the law is unconstitutional without regard to the facts of the case . . . the 
law [is] so fundamentally flawed that it‘s unconstitutional however it‘s going to be 
applied.‖ With an as-applied challenge, ―a law . . . is not facially unconstitutional, but it 
may be applied in an unconstitutional manner.‖ Roberts thus concluded that ―a statute 
that is constitutional on its face can always be applied in an unconstitutional way,‖ 
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which means that one cannot conclude that a ―statute could [not] ever be 
unconstitutionally applied.‖675 Roberts‘ deceptively simple explanation deterred a more 
in-depth inquiry into the challenge distinctions, and Senator Kyl returned to asking 
Roberts about precedent.  
Now Batting: The Standing Doctrine 
 The Committee‘s questions on statutory interpretation included inquiries on 
Roberts‘ Duke Law Journal article and his position on standing. Senator Leahy 
disapproved of Roberts‘ defense of Justice Scalia‘s opinion, and Leahy, without directly 
referencing the article, proceeded to ask a series of questions about whether individuals 
can sue if they feel a party is in violation of a law. Similar to the rationale he provided in 
his article and in his written response about Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 
Roberts explained how the legislative branch possessed the authority to resolve 
questions about standing. As Roberts told the senator, ―Well, if Congress wants them to 
sue, all Congress has to do is write one sentence saying, ‗Individuals harmed by a 
violation of this statute may bring a right of action in Federal court.‘ There are laws 
where Congress says that, and that question never comes up.‖676 Roberts offered an 
argument from coherence within the structural modality to justify why the legislature, 
rather than the judiciary, has the responsibility for writing or clarifying the ‗rule of 
recognition,‘ and in so doing, he again reaffirmed his positivist and prudentialist belief in 
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the need for judicial restraint, and he offered a resolution for those interested in knowing 
how the legislative branch, and not the judicial branch, can resolve standing problems. 
 Senator Leahy also specifically asked Roberts about the Duke Law Journal 
article. Leahy wondered whether ―individuals under Chief Justice Roberts‖ who sought 
relief from the Court would ―find the courthouse door slammed shut in their face[.]‖ 
Roberts advised that those individuals should ―read the rest‖ of his article, which 
addressed the issue of ―whether anyone could bring a lawsuit just because they are 
interested in the issue, or whether the plaintiffs had to show that they had been injured.‖ 
The central issue, Roberts explained, was ―whether somebody halfway across the 
country who‘s not injured by that act should be able to bring suit.‖677 Ohio Senator Mike 
DeWine also asked Roberts about the article, which Roberts humorously referred to as 
―that small little Law Review [sic] comment,‖ the point of which was ―that judges 
should be very careful to make sure they‘ve got a real case or controversy before them, 
because that is the sole basis for the legitimacy of them acting in the manner they do in a 
democratic republic.‖678 Roberts stressed that ―[w]hat the standing doctrine requires is 
that you actually be injured by what the Government is doing, injured by Congress‘s 
action.‖ Roberts explained that ―the injury doesn‘t have to be economic;‖ the injury ―can 
be aesthetic, it can be environmental, it can cover a wide range of injuries, but you have 
to show some injury that separates you from the general public.‖679 Roberts thus 
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provided a definitional argument to change the perception of what it means to have 
grounds for a lawsuit: the Court is not an open forum where the Justices should hear 
cases simply because individuals have a concern about a constitutional or statutory 
question; instead, the Court is the place where those individuals harmed by a direct 
action of the defendant deserve their day in Court. Roberts, in fact, opened the 
Courthouse door and welcomed plaintiffs who suffered almost any injury—as long as 
they experienced a direct harm that resulted from the defendant‘s actions.  
Now Batting: International Law 
 An interesting aspect of the hearings involved the Committee‘s concern with how 
Roberts‘ would incorporate foreign laws and precedents into his decision-making. 
Senator Kyl, for instance, asked Roberts about ―the proper role of foreign law in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions‖ in cases that ―involve interpretations of the U.S. 
Constitution[.]‖ Roberts replied that there were ―a couple of things that cause concern on 
my part about the use of foreign law as precedent,‖ and he provided two explanations for 
his concerns. ―The first has to do with democratic theory,‖ he said. In the United States, 
the president nominates judges, the Senate confirms the judges, and both the president 
and the senators are elected representatives of the people; thus, the president and 
senators are accountable to the people, and judges, therefore, are indirectly accountable. 
Another country‘s judge‘s interpretation about America‘s Constitution should not shape 
domestic law since that judge is not accountable to the American people.
680
 Roberts 
provided a similar response to a written question from Senator Kennedy: ―If a court 
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relies on a decision of a foreign judge, however, no President accountable to the people 
appointed that judge, no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet 
that judge is playing a role in shaping the law that binds people in this country.‖681 
Roberts‘ second concern ―is that relying on foreign precedent doesn‘t confine judges. It 
doesn‘t limit their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent does.‖ Judges could 
pick and choose any precedent from any country and apply it to the American case at 
hand, which ―expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his 
or her own personal preferences,‖ Roberts explained.682 Roberts uses the historical, 
structural, and doctrinal modalities to justify his position, and his hesitation to rely on 
foreign law and precedent reflects his positivist beliefs: legislatures establish valid ‗rules 
of recognition‘ that both constrain a judge‘s decision-making and provide a guide for 
judges to follow, and judges who introduce new rules/laws into the game to fit the 
instant case exceed their authority and circumvent the will of the people as well as the 
Congress.   
 Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn approached the issue with a different tack, and 
he wanted Roberts to commit ―to not use foreign precedent‖ if seated on the Court. 
Roberts would not commit to such a position, but he did explain that prior Supreme 
Court decisions may have considered, but did not rest, ―entirely on foreign law, so it‘s 
not a question of whether or not you‘d be departing from these cases if you decided not 
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to use foreign law.‖683 Roberts successfully called the pitches as he saw them, and the 
topic received little attention from the other Committee members. 
Now Batting: Civil Rights, Take III 
 The confirmation hearings would not be complete without some questions about 
Roberts‘ position on defending civil rights and supporting efforts to curb discrimination. 
Roberts again defended the position that only the legislature possessed the authority to 
alter the ‗rules of recognition,‘ and judges are obligated to follow Congress‘ intent. As 
he explained to Senator Feingold: ―If you folks here in Congress had a particular—in 
any statute, a narrow focus, then to give that focus a broader impact I think would be 
wrong. If you had a broad focus, as, of course, you often do when you‘re dealing with 
statutes designed to address discrimination, giving that interpretation a narrow focus 
would be wrong.‖684 Roberts‘ institutional argument within the structural modality 
further clarified his positivist and prudentialist approach, an approach he defended 
consistently throughout the hearings. 
 Senator Kennedy, the most ardent skeptic of seating Roberts on the bench, 
questioned Roberts about the landmark holding in Brown v. Board of Education. 
Kennedy pressed Roberts on whether he ―accept[ed] both the holding and the reasoning 
in the case[.]‖ Displaying his sharp intellect, Roberts offered a striking response, and he 
praised the reasoning of the Justices: ―[T]he genius of the decision was the recognition 
that the act of separating the students was where the violation was and it rejected the 
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defense, certainly just a theoretical one given the record, that you could have equal 
facilities and equal treatment.‖685 Roberts‘ prudentialist interpretation of the decision 
clearly surprised the Senator; rather than saying anything in response to Roberts‘ answer, 
Senator Kennedy simply said, ―If we could move on now. . . .‖686  
 On the final day of his testimony, Senator Schumer returned to the Brown 
decision. Roberts again used the prudentialist modality to characterize the decision as 
both a positivist and a prudentialist decision, and he explained to Senator Schumer that 
the Brown decision should be ―more appropriately understood as a restrained decision 
compared to the decision that came before in Plessy v. Ferguson. And you can see this if 
you look at the arguments of the lawyers.‖ Roberts explained that rather than the Court 
issuing an activist decision, the Court actually decided the case based on precedent. John 
W. Davis, the advocate for the Board, warned of ―the social consequences of upsetting 
this decision,‖ by which Roberts meant the impact of changing the settled expectations 
of prior precedent. On the other side, Thurgood Marshall, Brown‘s advocate, ―was 
making a legal argument addressed to the obligation of the Court to apply the rule of law 
. . . focused on the discrimination involved in the segregation . . . it was a very clever 
approach to the case because he based his decision on precedent as well.‖687 At the 
conclusion of the Brown discussion, Roberts sounded neither like a 
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Conservative/conservative ideologue nor as a potential Justice hell-bent on opposing 
individual rights and the efforts to reverse discrimination. 
 Roberts also addressed the busing topic that still lingered from his Reagan-era 
service. Roberts explained to Senator Schumer that ―[b]eing against busing and being 
against quotas is not the same thing as being against civil rights,‖688 and he told Senator 
Kennedy that ―[o]pposition to quotas is not the same thing as opposition to affirmative 
action.‖689 While he did not elaborate on either claim, Roberts offered answers 
consistent with those he provided elsewhere in his testimony: judges lack the authority to 
change or make the law on those issues; that responsibility lies with the Congress. 
Roberts demonstrated his positivist perspective later in the hearings when he told 
Senator Durbin, ―I don‘t think you want judges who will decide cases before them under 
the law on what they think is good, simply good policy for America. There are legal 
questions there.‖690 Roberts took a stand against realism and pragmatism, and none of 
the Senators charged the plate to kick sand on Roberts‘ shoes; instead, Roberts again 
appeared to be the umpire who would call a fair game. 
Now Batting: The Eighth Amendment 
 Surprisingly, the Committee devoted very little time to questioning Roberts about 
his views on what constitutes ―cruel and unusual punishment.‖ Kansas Senator Sam 
Brownback did, however, submit post-hearing questions for Roberts to answer on that 
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issue. Referencing Supreme Court precedent, Roberts outlined a three-tiered test for 
evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim. First, he cited the Court‘s 1958 decision Trop v. 
Dulles,
691
 which he referenced to explain ―that what is cruel and unusual must be 
evaluated in light of ‗the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.‘‖ For the second tier of the test, the Court must consider ―the 
contemporary understanding of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,‖ a 
standard which is discussed in the Court‘s 1977 Coker v. Georgia692 decision. As the 
third prong of the test, Roberts explained that since some states oppose, while other 
states impose, the death penalty, ―[t]he actions of state legislatures represent the ‗clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,‘‖ a position discussed in 
the Court‘s 1989 Penry v. Lynaugh693 decision.  
 Roberts‘ three-tiered test, which he grounds in the doctrinal modality, removes 
the issue from the subjective, personal-preference to a (theoretically) more objective, 
legally-based belief. In other words, Roberts would base his decision on the existing 
‗rule of recognition‘ rather than imposing his own beliefs or crafting the law based on 
his own views of what type of punishment best serves society and the changing political 
and social climate regarding ―cruel and unusual‖ punishments. Even on a difficult 
constitutional issue, Roberts interprets the competing claims through the positivist and 
prudentialist perspectives. 
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Now Batting: The Right to Privacy 
 Roberts‘ views on the right to privacy also received little attention during his 
hearings. During Senator Specter‘s questioning, Roberts used the historical modality to 
outline his interpretation of the right to privacy. As Roberts explained,  
 The right to privacy is protected under the Constitution . . . by the Fourth 
 Amendment, which provides that the right of people to be secure in their persons, 
 houses, effects, and papers is protected . . . under the First Amendment, dealing 
 with prohibition on establishment of a religion and guarantee of free exercise, 
 protects privacy in matters of conscience . . . the Court has . . . recognized that 
 personal privacy is a component of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
 Clause.
694
 
 
Determining what qualifies as a violation, however, is a completely different issue. For 
Roberts, the Constitution protects the right to privacy and prohibits ‗unreasonable 
searches and seizures;‘ however, the Constitution does not resolve the instant case. 
Roberts used the historical and textual modalities to explain the role that original intent 
and original meaning play in resolving privacy claims that arise under the Fourth 
Amendment. ―If the phrase in the Constitution says two-thirds of the Senate, 
everybody‘s a literalist,‖ Roberts told Senator Hatch. With broad, imprecise phrases 
such as ―unreasonable searches and seizures,‖ original meaning cannot resolve the issue. 
―You can look at that wording all day and it‘s not going to give you much progress in 
deciding whether a particular search is reasonable or not.‖ The progress, Roberts said, 
comes from ―looking at the cases and the precedents, what the Framers had in mind 
when they drafted that provision.‖695 Roberts further develops his interpretation in a 
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response to a written question from Senator Feinstein: ―In concrete cases, however, a 
judge cannot answer in the abstract whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in any given situation. Instead, [sic] whether a person‘s expectation of privacy is 
‗reasonable‘ turns on the facts of the particular case.‖696 Roberts‘ answers on the privacy 
question reveal that, for him, an originalist philosophy will not resolve the competing 
claims, but more important, he alludes that evaluating the claim might require a 
prudentialist approach.  
End of the Warm-Up 
 At the conclusion of Roberts‘ confirmation hearings, most Court followers 
concluded that the hearings were ―tamer than many expected or hoped.‖697 Perhaps the 
hearings, which one reporter described as ―a model of dignity and erudition,‖698 reflected 
a more meaningful ‗advice and consent‘ process, an investigation that eschewed the 
rancorousness that characterized the Bork and Thomas hearings. 
 Court followers did agree that Roberts deserved high marks for his 
accomplishments before the Committee. In assessing Roberts‘ performance, one legal 
scholar commented that Roberts‘ ―razor-edged legal intellect, fair-minded civility, past 
Democratic endorsements, and a complete absence of culturally polarizing law-journal 
[sic] articles carrying his byline‖ resulted in the Judiciary Committee‘s ―liberals lobbing 
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softballs at a nominee they‘d been hoping to nuke.‖699 Henry Abraham, a leading Court 
scholar, remarked, ―Roberts proved to be a master respondent, emphasizing his 
dedication to judicial restraint, to a deference to precedent, to a limited role—he called it 
a ‗role of modesty and stability‘—for the judiciary.‖700 Several reporters noted that 
Roberts showed ―flair‖ during ―his confirmation hearings,‖701 while others reported that 
Roberts ―impressed members of both parties with his intellect and his legal acumen.‖702 
Former Associate Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor remarked that Roberts ―did a masterful 
job navigating the always perilous waters of the confirmation process.‖703 Perhaps the 
highest praise came from one of the men charged with helping the president secure 
Roberts‘ nomination for the Court: ―Roberts validated the president‘s faith in him, 
shining in the hearings and proving without a doubt that he was fully suited to fill the 
robes of the mentor he had clerked for decades earlier. . . . His performance was a tour 
de force, beginning with his opening statement. . . . As he deftly answered and deflected 
questions over the course of the next three days, his confirmation became a forgone 
conclusion.‖704 
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Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee voted 13 to 5 in favor of Roberts‘ 
nomination
705
 and it sent his name to the floor, where the full Senate voted along 
partisan lines and confirmed Roberts by a 78 to 22 vote. On September 29, 2005, 
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens swore in John G. Roberts, Jr., as the 17th Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
706
 Judge John Roberts would now be calling 
balls and strikes as the umpire no one came to the game to see. 
Calling the Games in the Major League 
 A review of Roberts‘ testimony from his confirmation hearings demonstrates that 
Roberts consistently advocated the positivist and the prudentialist perspectives for 
resolving competing claims on statutory and constitutional questions. Similar to his prior 
writings, Roberts used a variety of argument ‗types‘ and modalities to construct his 
argumentative strategies. To discern whether Roberts maintained those consistencies 
once seated on the Court, this project involved a close-reading of the complete texts of 
the 56 published opinions he authored from the 2005 Term through the 2008 Term. The 
chapter, therefore, examines a representative sampling of opinions to discern whether 
Chief Justice Roberts constructed argumentative strategies consistent with those he 
advanced in his prior writings and his confirmation hearing testimony, and whether his 
legal reasoning and rationale for his resolution of the cases provides the answer to the 
question that Court followers wanted to know: to what judicial philosophy will Chief 
                                                          
705
 Neubauer and Meinhold, Battle Supreme, 53. 
706
 The Senate voted largely along party lines: all 55 Republicans voted ―aye,‖ as did 22 Democrats and 
the lone Independent, Vermont‘s Jim Jeffords. See ―The Democratic Divide,‖ A10. Also see Cummings 
and Bravin, ―With Roberts In, Bush Looks Ahead,‖ A3. 
266 
 
   
 
Justice John Roberts subscribe to resolve the statutory and constitutional questions in the 
cases he hears?  
Umpiring His First Game 
 With his first opportunity to author an opinion as a member of the Supreme 
Court, Roberts wrote the opinion in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corporation.
707
 Those 
expecting a Cardozo- or Holmes-like opinion from the Chief Justice instead read a rather 
bland opinion; in fact, those opposed to the Justices‘ penchant for crafting opinions 
characterized by rhetorical flourishes should laud Roberts for his restraint. Calling his 
first game for the Court, Roberts used the opportunity to pay homage to his mentors and 
to signal just how narrow his strike zone would be. 
 The question the Martin Court had to resolve was whether the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rightfully concluded that the district court had not abused its judicial 
discretion in denying the Martins their attorney fees. Franklin Capital Corporation and 
Century-National Insurance Company (collectively, Franklin) removed the case from 
New Mexico state court to federal district court, but the federal district court remanded 
the case back to the state court. As a result of the remand, the Martins argued that they 
were entitled attorney‘s fees under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). 
 Roberts turned to the statutory text to address the Martins‘ claim ―that attorney‘s 
fees should be awarded automatically on remand, or that there should at least be a strong 
presumption in favor of awarding fees.‖ Roberts provided a definitional and an 
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institutional argument to answer the claims: ―Section 1447(c), however, provides that a 
remand order ‗may‘ require payment of attorney‘s fees—not ‗shall‘ or ‗should.‘‖708 To 
support his rationale for his interpretation of the statutory text, Roberts cites Fogerty v. 
Fantasy, Inc., an opinion written by his mentor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who argued 
that ―[t]he word ‗may‘ clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney‘s 
fees to the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion.‖709 Roberts 
also used a structural argument to support his and Rehnquist‘s conclusion: ―Congress 
used the word ‗shall‘ often enough in §1447(c) . . . to dissuade us from the conclusion 
that it meant ‗shall‘ when it used ‗may‘ in authorizing an award of fees.‖710 Reiterating 
this balance later in his opinion, Roberts defers to Congress‘ intent rather than exercising 
his own or the Court‘s discretion: ―Congress could have determined that the most 
efficient way to cure this jurisdictional defect was to create a substantive basis for 
ordering costs. The text supports this view. . . . We therefore give the statute its natural 
reading: Section 1447(c) authorizes courts to award costs and fees, but only when such 
an award is just.‖711 Roberts‘ use of the structural modality to justify his deference to 
Congress‘ intent parallels the argumentative strategy he used in his appellate court 
opinions to resolve statutory claims. 
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 Roberts also signals through dicta just how narrow his strike zone will be. 
Roberts, in a demonstration of his belief in judicial restraint, explains that ―incorrectly 
invoking a federal right is not comparable to violating substantive federal law,‖712 and 
the Justices‘ will not alter the ‗rule of recognition‘ simply because the plaintiffs failed to 
raise the correct claim. To support this belief, and reminiscent of the explanations he 
offered throughout his appellate court opinions, Roberts references his other mentor, 
Judge Friendly, and Roberts states that ―[d]iscretion is not a whim, and limiting 
discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that 
like cases should be decided alike.‖713 Roberts also advises that ―[t]he process of 
removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back to state court delays 
resolution of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties, and wastes judicial 
resources.‖714 Roberts‘ statements of dicta are not binding law that other Courts/courts 
must follow; instead, the dicta reveal those components of positivism and prudentialism 
that Roberts believes judges and Justices should follow when resolving competing 
claims on constitutional and statutory questions: adhere to the ‗rule of recognition;‘ 
promote the stability and predictability of the law; defer to other institutions‘ 
interpretation of valid rules/laws; and, exercise judicial restraint and avoid ‗bold forays 
into policy-making.‘ 
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 Roberts‘ first opinion, therefore, provides a preview of how the new Chief 
Justice might approach the cases that come before the Court. As all academics know, 
however, conclusions cannot be drawn from a single case. Fortunately, Roberts authored 
other opinions that provide insight into whether the strike zone he established in his first 
opinion would be the strike zone he maintained for other batters who sought their day in 
Court. 
An Umpire‟s Wit and Wisdom 
 As in his letters, memoranda, and appellate court opinions, Roberts displays a 
sharp wit in his Court opinions. At times, he includes a short remark to emphasize a key 
point in a case. In his dissenting opinion in House v. Warden,
715
 for example, Roberts 
notes that the petitioner‘s alibi collapsed under the facts: ―Sometimes, when identity is in 
question, alibi is key. Here, House came up with one—and it fell apart, later admitted to 
be fabricated when his girlfriend would not lie to protect him. Scratches from a cat 
indeed.‖716 At other times, Roberts uses his wit to summarize the key facts of the instant 
case. He begins his opinion in Dean v. United States
717
 with a straightforward fact: 
―Accidents happen. Sometimes they happen to individuals committing crimes with 
loaded guns.‖718 Roberts uses this opening as the grounds for his warning to would-be 
criminals: 
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 An individual who brings a loaded weapon to commit a crime runs the risk that 
 the gun will discharge accidentally. A gunshot in such circumstances—whether 
 accidental or intentional—increases the risks that others will be injured, that 
 people will panic, or that violence (with its own danger to those nearby) will be 
 used in response. Those criminals wishing to avoid the penalty for an inadvertent 
 discharge can lock or unload the firearm, handle it with care during the 
 underlying violent or drug trafficking crime, leave the gun at home, or—best 
 yet—avoid committing the felony in the first place.719  
 
While an example of humorous dictum, Roberts actually reframes the facts from the 
case, he fits them into his narrative, and he reveals another aspect of the prudentialist 
perspective he brings to instant case: the costs, whether accidental or intentional, of a 
crime do not outweigh the benefits to committing the crime. Prudentialism dictates that 
the tie goes to societal rights rather than to the rights of the individual who broke the 
statutory law. 
Now Batting: Statutory Intent 
 Many of Roberts‘ Court opinions reflect his consistent use of the positivist and 
prudentialist philosophies to resolve cases that involve questions about statutory intent. 
As he did in his appellate court opinions to resolve competing claims about the meaning 
of a statute, Roberts often defers to the actual text of the statute to determine Congress‘ 
intent. In some cases, he offers a simple statement that signals how the resolution of the 
case will proceed, as he did in Vaden v. Discover Bank: ―The statute provides a clear and 
sensible answer.‖720 In other cases, such as Knight v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue,
721
 he begins his rationale for his resolution by citing Court precedent, a 
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practice he used in his appellate court opinions. Quoting Williams v. Taylor,
 722
  Roberts 
writes, ―We start, as always, with the language of the statute.‖723 In cases similar to those 
noted above, Roberts approaches the cases by comparing the facts of the case to the text 
of the statute, and he uses the established ‗rule of recognition‘ to guide his decision-
making. 
 There are cases, though, in which Roberts provides a more thorough assessment 
for why the statutory text and/or Congress‘ intent offer a simple resolution to the case. 
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company,
724
 for example, addressed whether 
a taxpayer could claim a refund when that request was made after the filing deadline 
established by the Internal Revenue Code. In his opinion, Roberts offered an institutional 
argument within the structural modality to address the issue. As Roberts wrote, ―The 
outcome here is clear given the language of the pertinent statutory provisions. . . . Five 
‗any‘s‘ in one sentence and it begins to seem that Congress meant the statute to have 
expansive reach. . . . We cannot imagine what language could more clearly state that 
taxpayers seeking refunds . . .  [must] file a timely administrative claim.‖725 In CSX 
Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization,
726
 a case that involved a 
                                                          
722
 552 U.S. 181 (2008): 5. 
723
 529 U.S. 240 (2000): 431. 
724
 553 U.S. 1 (2008). 
725
 553 U.S. 1 (2008): 4-5. 
726
 552 U.S. 9 (2007). 
272 
 
   
 
state‘s valuation and taxation scheme for railroad property, Roberts offered an equally 
succinct interpretation of the statutory question. As Roberts explained, 
 If Congress had wanted to impose such a limit by reserving to States the 
 prerogative of selecting which valuation methods may be used, it surely would 
 have done so. . . . Congress could easily have included similar language 
 insulating the State‘s chosen methodology from judicial scrutiny. It did not. . . .  
 We decline to find distinctions in the statute where they do not exist, especially 
 where, as here, those distinctions would thwart the law‘s operation.727 
 
Roberts‘ institutional argument within the structural modality once again reaffirms his 
commitment to judicial restraint, and to discern Congress‘ intent he relies on the ‗rule of 
recognition‘ established by the text of the statute, which he argues promotes the stability 
and predictability of the law. 
 In addition to deferring to Congress‘ intent with respect to a statute, Roberts also 
uses his positivist and prudentialist philosophies to justify his deference to the judgment 
of a district court, as long as the court‘s interpretation of the statute falls within the 
parameters of the Chevron doctrine. In House v. Warden,
728
 the petitioner claimed that 
the district court erred when it refused to admit newly presented evidence that might 
have persuaded a future jury to acquit the petitioner. In his dissenting opinion, Roberts 
offers an institutional argument within the doctrinal and structural modalities to remind 
the majority that their role as Justices is to exercise restraint rather than ignore the ‗rule 
of recognition‘ and read the law to fit the aims they believe the law should serve. As 
Roberts writes, 
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 The majority essentially disregards the District Court‘s role in assessing the 
 reliability of House‘s new evidence. . . . By casting aside the District Court‘s 
 factual determinations . . . the majority has done little more than reiterate the 
 factual disputes presented below. . . .  Schlup
729
 made abundantly clear that 
 reliability determinations were essential, but were for the district court to make. . 
 . . We are to defer to the better situated District Court on reliability, unless we 
 determine that its findings are clearly erroneous.
730
 
 
Roberts reminds the House Court that ―[t]he District Court attentively presided over a 
complex evidentiary hearing,‖ and consequently, the Supreme Court is ―poorly equipped 
to second-guess the District Court‘s reliability findings and [we] should defer to them, 
consistent with the guidance we provided in Schlup.‖731 At the same time, Roberts‘ 
rejects the pragmatist/realist approach the Court used to deny deference to the district 
court‘s findings. 
 Roberts does recognize, however, that ‗problems of the penumbra‘ exist and that 
the statutory text may not provide easy answers to the claims before the Court. 
Consistent with the position he advocated in his memoranda and appellate court 
opinions, though, he argues that the Court lacks the authority to alter the ‗rule of 
recognition‘ to correct the deficiencies with the rule/law; in fact, those deficiencies 
demand greater restraint from the Justices. United States v. Hayes,
732
 for example, 
concerned the phrase ―misdemeanor crime of domestic violence‖ and its correct 
grammatical interpretation. Roberts wrote his dissenting opinion as if he was teaching a 
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―Composition 101‖ course, and he provided a five-page definitional argument in which 
he discussed the correct way the majority should have read the phrase. The point of 
Roberts‘ lesson was that the statute‘s definitional confusion exemplifies why the Court 
should exercise restraint. As Roberts wrote to conclude his opinion, 
 Taking a fair view, the text of §921(a)(33)(A) is ambiguous, the structure leans in 
 the defendant‘s favor, the purpose leans in the Government‘s favor, and the 
 legislative history does not amount to much. This is a textbook case for the 
 application of the rule of lenity. . . .  
 
 If the rule of lenity means anything, it is that an individual should not go to jail 
 for failing to conduct a 50-state survey or comb through obscure legislative 
 history. Ten years in jail is too much to hinge on the will-o‘-the-wisp of statutory 
 meaning pursued by the majority.
733
 
 
Unlike in his opinion for the Dean Court, in which Roberts concluded that ―the rule of 
lenity‖ did not apply because there was not ―grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute,‖734 the ambiguity and uncertainty of the statutory text in the instant case justifies 
lenity. Roberts‘ Hayes opinion thus reflects his positivist commitment to the consistent 
application of an accepted ‗rule of recognition,‘ as well as demonstrates that Roberts 
believes that questionable statutory interpretations do not create opportunities for the 
Justices to adopt a realist or pragmatist approach and correct the statute. At the same 
time, Roberts incorporates those positivist components into his prudentialist philosophy, 
as he determines that the costs of the Court‘s new rule outweigh the benefits for those to 
whom the (invalid) judicially-created rule applies. 
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 When ‗problems of the penumbra‘ arise, Roberts applies his positivist and 
prudentialist expectations for judicial restraint to the Supreme Court as well as to the 
lower courts. In his concurring opinion in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, 
Inc.,
735
 Roberts notes that plaintiffs encounter difficulty when determining whether they 
have ―a claim for benefits‖ or ―a claim of breach of fiduciary duty‖ as those are not 
―settled questions,‖ but the Court is not ―in a position to answer them.‖736 Writing for the 
Knight Court, Roberts acknowledges in that economic case that the statute in question 
fails to provide the Court with any ―regulatory guidance . . . but that is no excuse for 
judicial amendment of the statute.‖737 Roberts offers a similar statement in a case 
involving the efforts of lower courts to reduce the number of prisoner complaints by 
enacting stronger pleading requirement rules. In his opinion for the Court in Jones v. 
Bock,
738
 Roberts explained that the Court is ―not insensitive to the challenges faced by 
the lower federal courts in managing their dockets . . . We once again reiterate, however, 
. . . that adopting different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular 
categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking procedures, not on a 
case-by-case basis by the courts.‖739 Roberts‘ opinions in all three cases reflect that he 
interprets the statutory questions from both a positivist and a prudentialist perspective, 
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and that Justices or judges who adopt a realist or a pragmatist perspective exceed their 
authority when they legislate from the bench. 
 Roberts‘ appellate court experience in resolving claims under the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1988
740
 and the Chevron doctrine also guides his resolution of cases 
that raise statutory claims in which an agency exceeded its authority. In his concurring 
opinion in Rapanos v. United States,
741
 Roberts uses the positivist approach to address 
the issue in the instant case. As Roberts explains, 
 Agencies delegated rulemaking authority under a statute such as the Clean Water 
 Act are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are 
 entrusted to administer. . . . Given the broad, somewhat ambiguous, but 
 nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean Water Act, 
 the [Army] Corps [of Engineers] and the EPA [Environmental Protection 
 Agency] would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in developing some 
 notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority. 
 
 The proposed rulemaking went nowhere. . . . [T]he Corps chose to adhere to its 
 essentially boundless view of the scope of its power. The upshot today is another 
 defeat for the agency.
742
 
 
Roberts relies on both the statutory text and Congress‘ intent to explain his rationale for 
how the agencies‘ exceeded their authority and violated the ‗rule of recognition,‘ and his 
use of an argument from coherence within the structural modality reflects not that he 
opposes environmental protections, but that he instead opposes actions that undermine 
the stability and predictability of the law upon which others rely for guidance.  
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Now Batting: The Standing Doctrine 
 While skeptics of Roberts‘ confirmation to the Supreme Court identified his 
Duke Law Journal article as proof that Roberts opposed environmental protections, most 
skeptics‘ arguments overlooked the key point that Roberts‘ advocated: for a Court/court 
to hear a case, the plaintiff must prove that an action of the defendant resulted in a direct 
harm to the plaintiff; in the absence of such proof, the Court/court lacks standing to hear 
the case. Once seated on the Supreme Court, Roberts had two opportunities to prove that 
he followed his interpretation of the doctrine of standing when resolving cases rather 
than simply when writing about them. 
 During the 2005 Term, Roberts wrote the Court‘s opinion for a case that 
involved a question of a groups‘ standing. To encourage the manufacturer of the Jeep 
line of vehicles to expand its manufacturing facilities in Ohio, both the city of Toledo 
and the state offered tax breaks to DaimlerChrysler if the company agreed to expand 
there. A group of Toledo citizens filed suit, in which they argued that their state tax 
burdens increased as a result of the tax breaks given to DaimlerChrysler, and the citizens 
claimed that under Ohio law, the tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. 
 In his DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno opinion,
743
 Roberts‘ held that the Supreme Court 
is ―obligated before reaching this Commerce Clause question to determine whether the 
taxpayers who objected to the credit have standing to press their complaint in federal 
court. We conclude that they do not, and we can therefore proceed no further.‖744 
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Roberts offered a three-part rationale for denying the taxpayers‘ standing under Article 
III. 
 Roberts applies the separation of powers doctrine as the first reason for why the 
taxpayers lack standing. Roberts offers two arguments from authority and an argument 
from coherence within the historical and structural modalities to explain why the case 
falls outside the Court‘s appellate jurisdiction. As Roberts explains, 
 Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,
745
 . . . grounded the Federal 
 Judiciary‘s authority to exercise judicial review and interpret the Constitution on 
 the necessity to do so in the course of carrying out the judicial function of 
 deciding cases. . . . If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts 
 have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so. 
 
 This Court has recognized that the case-or-controversy limitation is crucial in 
 maintaining the ―tripartite allocation of power‖ set forth in the Constitution746       
 . . . . We have been asked to decide an important question of constitutional law 
 concerning the Commerce Clause. But before we do so, we must find that the 
 question is presented in a ―case‖ or ―controversy‖ that is, in James Madison‘s 
 words, ―of a Judiciary Nature.‖747 
  
According to Roberts‘ interpretation, the Constitution‘s directive that the legislative 
branch has the authority to make law and the judicial branch has the authority to review 
law precludes the Court from evaluating the merits of the law. Roberts thus frames the 
first reason for denying standing from an original intent and a precedential position, and 
he advances his rationale by arguing that the Court exceeds its authority, and therefore 
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directly violates a constitutional directive, if the Court engages in the legislative 
function. 
 Roberts further develops the legislative/judicial branch distinctions to ground the 
second reason for why the taxpayers lack standing. Roberts argues that taxpayers cannot 
dictate to the government how it utilizes any revenue it gains from the tax credits, such 
as reducing the taxpayers‘ burdens or increasing services for them. In fact, Roberts 
argues, ―the decision how to allocate any such savings is the very epitome of a policy 
judgment‖ that falls under the authority of ―lawmakers,‖ and courts lack the authority to 
tell those lawmakers how to exercise their spending powers.
748
 Consequently, ―[f]ederal 
courts may not assume a particular exercise of this state fiscal discretion in establishing 
standing,‖ and therefore ―state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge 
state tax or spending decisions simply by their virtue of their status as taxpayers.‖749 
Roberts uses an institutional argument within the structural modality to demonstrate that 
the core requirement for a claim of standing—an actual injury caused by a direct action 
of another party—is absent from the taxpayers‘ case, and the Court will not create a 
potential harm to provide standing for the taxpayers. 
 For his final reason for denying standing, Roberts evaluates the taxpayers‘ 
interpretation of Court precedent. The taxpayers primarily rely on Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs,
750
 which they argue allows the Court to extend ―supplemental jurisdiction‖ to 
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address group state-law claims. Roberts notes that in applying Gibbs, the Court takes a 
―markedly more cautious‖ approach and rarely invokes Gibbs to allow a diversity of 
plaintiffs to claim standing. ―What we have never done,‖ Roberts explains, is apply 
Gibbs and extend supplemental jurisdiction to ―a claim that does not itself satisfy those 
elements of the Article III inquiry,‖ as is the situation with the instant case.751 Agreeing 
with the taxpayers‘ reading of Gibbs ―would amount to a significant revision of our 
precedent interpreting Article III,‖ and Roberts concludes that such a reading would alter 
the existing balance of power continually reaffirmed by precedent, and creating a new 
ground for standing would make future Court efforts that attempt to protect the 
separation of powers sound like ―hollow rhetoric.‖752 Roberts thus offers an argument 
from analogy within the doctrinal and prudential modalities to demonstrate, once again, 
that the Court should exercise judicial restraint. 
 In his opinion for the DaimlerChrysler Court, Roberts appears to resolve the case 
from a positivist and prudentialist approach. Consistent with his testimony during his 
confirmation hearings, Roberts refuses to overturn precedent, as so doing would alter the 
stability and predictability of the law. Consistent with how he interprets the doctrine of 
standing in both Lujan opinions, Roberts refuses to judicially-create a new claim for 
standing in the absence of an actual injury. Roberts‘ biggest test on standing, however, 
was yet to come. 
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 In what many critics viewed as a political and ideological decision, Roberts 
wrote the dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.
753
 In 
the case, the petitioners argued that the EPA‘s failure to enact stricter motor vehicle 
emissions standards to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions contravened provisions of 
the Clean Air Act and therefore placed Massachusetts‘ coastal land at risk from the 
effects of global warming. On its face, the case appeared to be the perfect opportunity 
for Roberts to demonstrate that he did not oppose efforts to protect the environment. 
Roberts, however, would not capitulate to his critics when the Court faced an equally 
important issue: creating a new ground for invoking the standing doctrine. 
 Roberts begins his dissent by agreeing with the petitioners: ―Global warming 
may be a ‗crisis‘ . . . [that] may ultimately affect everyone on the planet. . . .‖754 His 
agreement with them, however, ends there. Roberts‘ cites Scalia‘s Lujan opinion and 
Roberts stakes out his position on the question the Court faces: ―This Court‘s standing 
jurisprudence simply recognizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue here ‗is the 
function of Congress and the Chief Executive,‘ not the federal courts.‖755 Roberts thus 
frames his interpretation and resolution of the case in the same manner as he did in his 
DaimlerChrysler opinion: the separation of powers doctrine provides guidance to the 
Court about which branch of the government possesses the authority to combat global 
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warming, and standing requires proof of an actual harm caused by a direct action of 
another party.  
 Roberts initially structures his defense from a positivist perspective. A ‗rule of 
recognition‘ controls the case: petitioners must prove that the harm they incur can be 
corrected by the redress they seek in court. In other words, if the state enacts stricter 
motor vehicle emissions standards, those standards will reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
enough to protect the coastal lands. Roberts argues that ―[b]efore determining whether 
petitioners can meet this familiar test, however, the Court changes the rules.‖756 The 
Massachusetts majority found that the petitioners faced a potential harm, at some point 
in the future, from global warming, a clear break from prior Court standing requirements 
and from Court precedent. With its decision, Roberts believes the Court therefore creates 
an invalid rule. As Roberts explains, ―Relaxing Article III standing requirements because 
asserted injuries are pressed by a State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence;‖ the 
Court‘s jurisprudence, and the obligation of petitioners, is ―the bedrock requirement of 
showing injury, causation, and redressability to satisfy Article III.‖757 For Roberts, the 
central issue in the case does not involve the debate about the existence of global 
warming or its impacts; rather, the central issues are first, whether the petitioners can 
prove that the absence of stricter standards directly causes their injury and that the 
enactment of stricter standards will alleviate the injury, and second, which branch of the 
government possesses the authority to enforce those standards. 
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 As he did in his DaimlerChrysler opinion, Roberts then frames the issue within 
the separation of powers doctrine. The Massachusetts majority considered the 
conflicting evidence about the globalized versus localized sources for greenhouse gas 
emissions, and they conceded that the emissions from other nations will continue and 
that a host of different feedback mechanisms influence global warming. As Roberts 
explains, the academic and scientific disagreements about global warming contribute to 
the problem the Court faces: ―The constitutional role of the courts, however, is to decide 
concrete cases—not to serve as a convenient forum for policy debates.‖758 For Roberts, 
the uncertainties associated with which emissions, global or local, will impact 
Massachusetts‘ coastal land demonstrates that the petitioners cannot prove that local 
emissions are the cause of coastal land destruction and that stricter emissions standards 
will alleviate the impacts to global warming. Thus, the petitioners have not met the 
injury, causation, and redressability requirements necessary for a standing claim. Failure 
to meet this requirement, as Roberts argues, raises ―cases and controversies‖ questions, 
and when the Court decides to act based on the merits of a case, the Court undermines 
―the tripartite allocation of powers set forth in the Constitution‖759 (the phrase Roberts 
used in his DaimlerChrysler opinion, which he includes in his Massachusetts dissent), 
and Roberts concludes his dissent by lamenting the majority‘s failure to limit its 
discretion. 
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 As his DaimlerChrysler and Massachusetts opinions demonstrate, whether 
Roberts writes an opinion on the same issue for either the majority or the dissenting 
Justices, he approaches each case from the same philosophical perspective, and to 
resolve the competing claims he applies his positivism and prudentialism in a consistent 
manner. In both cases, Article III standing requirements established the ‗rule of 
recognition,‘ constitutional directives provided guidance as to whether the legislative or 
the judicial branch possessed the authority to alter the valid rule/law, and Roberts‘ 
advocated for judicial restraint in both cases. While people may disagree with how 
Roberts resolved the questions in the cases, at the same time they should recognize that 
his memoranda, testimony, and opinions all reflect that he consistently applied his 
judicial philosophies to resolve constitutional and statutory questions about the standing 
doctrine.  
Now Batting: International Law 
 Two cases before the Court provided critics an opportunity to assess whether 
Roberts would resolve cases that raised international law and precedent issues consistent 
with the testimony he provided to the Judiciary Committee during his Court 
confirmation hearings. The first case, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
760
 involved whether 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations afforded nationals detained 
by another country access to their consular officials. The second case, Medellin v. 
Texas,
761
 addressed the question of whether a judgment of the International Court of 
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Justice is enforceable as domestic law. In both cases, Roberts faced a significant 
challenge: how to balance the United States Constitution and its directives and 
protections with international law. 
 Writing for the Sanchez Court, Roberts approached the questions in the cases 
from a Justice Butler-like originalist perspective: he (figuratively) placed the texts of the 
Constitution and the Vienna Convention and Article 36 side-by-side and accordingly 
resolved the issues. For example, Sanchez-Llamas claimed that because the police never 
advised him of his rights, his statements to the police therefore were inadmissible and 
should be suppressed. Sanchez-Llamas did not claim the Convention afforded him that 
right, which Roberts noted was ―a wise concession. The Convention does not prescribe 
specific remedies for violations of Article 36. Rather, it expressly leaves the 
implementation of Article 36 to domestic law . . . As far as the text of the Convention is 
concerned . . . [i]t would be startling if the Convention were read to require suppression. 
The exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely American legal creation.‖762 Roberts 
thus places both the international text and the domestic text within the original meaning 
perspective, and he uses the historical and textual modalities to differentiate between the 
two with respect to their protection of rights. Later in his opinion, Roberts switches to 
the prudentialist perspective, and he quotes the United States v. Leon opinion, on which 
he wrote a memorandum twenty years earlier, and he advises that ―[u]nder our domestic 
law, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy we apply lightly. . . . Because the rule‘s social 
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costs are considerable, ‗remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.‘‖763 
Roberts‘ switch allows him to place the rights‘ violation claim within the context of 
domestic constitutional law, a strategy he uses to support his conclusion to the case. 
 Roberts also addresses Sanchez-Llamas‘ claim that the Supreme Court should 
invoke its ―supervisory authority‖ and require the Oregon courts to suppress the state‘s 
evidence. Roberts shifts to the positivist perspective and he provides an institutional 
argument within the structural and doctrinal modalities to explain that ―the law is clear‖ 
on whether the Court can supervise the judicial proceedings of state courts (it cannot), 
and if the text of the treaty fails to identify specifically how the Court can ―create a 
judicial remedy applicable in state court,‖ then ―it is not for the federal courts to impose 
one on the States through lawmaking of their own.‖764 Roberts explains that in the 
absence of the Convention‘s textual clarity, the Supreme Court possesses the authority, 
as Chief Justice Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, ―to say what the law is.‖765 
Roberts uses the argument from authority to transition into an international doctrinal 
modality, and he explains that ―[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests 
that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts,‖ especially since 
―[a]ny interpretation of the law the ICJ renders in the course of resolving particular 
disputes is thus not binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself; [and] there is accordingly 
                                                          
763
 548 U.S. 331 (2006): 12, quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): 908. 
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 548 U.S. 331 (2006): 11-12. 
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little reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be controlling on our 
courts.‖766 
 Roberts thus resolves the statutory and constitutional questions for the Sanchez 
Court with originalist and positivist components that he incorporates into his 
prudentialist philosophy. His resolution of the case parallels the testimony he gave 
during his hearing and on his written responses, and he effectively reframes an 
international issue within a domestic context. In his final prudentialist act, Roberts 
concludes his opinion with ‗modesty and humility.‘ As Roberts explains, 
 Although these cases involve the delicate question of the application of an 
 international treaty, the issues in many ways turn on established principles of 
 domestic law. Our holding in no way disparages the importance of the Vienna 
 Convention. . . . It is no slight to the Convention to deny petitioners‘ claims 
 under the same principles we would apply to an Act of Congress, or to the 
 Constitution itself.
767
 
 
 In his second case addressing international law, Roberts wrote the Court‘s 
opinion in Medellin v. Texas. One of the key issues in the case was whether President 
Bush (43) possessed the authority to convert a non-self-executing treaty into a self-
executing treaty through his ―Memorandum to the Attorney General.‖768 The interesting 
aspect of the case is that the majority of the opinion addresses presidential power and 
refutes the dissent‘s arguments and the opinion devotes little attention to the petitioner‘s 
habeas corpus claim.  
                                                          
766
 548 U.S. 331 (2006): 19-20. Italics in original. 
767
 548 U.S. 331 (2006): 25. 
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 February 28, 2005. The relevant language was ―that the United States would ‗discharge its international 
obligations‘ under Avena ‗by having State courts give effect to the decision.‘‖ 552 U.S. 491 (2008): 2. See 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) 2004 I.C.J. 12. 
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 Roberts addresses the issues in the case similar to how he addressed issues in his 
appellate opinions. To introduce his rationale for the decision, Roberts opens with a 
familiar sentence: ―The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, 
begins with the text.‖769 The dissent in the case disagrees with this approach, but Roberts 
explains that ―[t]he interpretive approach employed by the Court today—resorting to the 
text—is hardly novel,‖ one which Roberts notes is a ―time-honored textual approach.‖770 
Roberts justifies his originalist approach not with an original intent or an original 
meaning argument, but instead with an ―original writing‖ argument—the text of the 
Constitution. As Roberts explains to the dissent, 
 Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be followed before 
 federal law can be created under the Constitution—vesting that decision in the 
 political branches, subject to checks and balances. U.S. Const., Art. I, §7. They 
 also recognized that treaties could create federal law, but again through the 
 political branches, with the President making the treaty and the Senate approving 
 it. Art. II, §2. The dissent‘s understanding of the treaty route, depending on an ad 
 hoc judgment of the judiciary without looking to the treaty language—the very 
 language negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate—cannot 
 readily be ascribed to those same Framers.
771
 
 
Roberts employs a tactical argumentative strategy: by not grounding his position on the 
ambiguity of the framers‘ and ratifiers‘ intentions or on how the meaning of 
constitutional ideas change with the times, Roberts‘ reliance on the actual text of the 
Constitution provides a clear example of how the dissent‘s approach to the case would 
undermine the separation of powers doctrine and promote court-created law: ―The 
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770
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dissent‘s contrary approach would assign to the courts—not the political branches—the 
primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be enforced. To 
read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes does not 
is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to 
create law.‖772 Roberts later closes this section of his opinion with another similar phrase 
from his appellate court opinions, and he places the dissent‘s lack of judicial restraint, 
and therefore Medellins‘ claim, within the context of a statutory case in which the 
petitioner misread Congress‘ intent. As Roberts notes, ―[s]uch language demonstrates 
that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations when it 
desires such a result.‖773  
 Roberts‘ opinion not only criticizes the dissent‘s ‗bold foray into policy-making,‘ 
it criticizes the president‘s venture into the legislative realm as well. Roberts offers an 
argument from coherence to explain how the president‘s directive in his Memorandum 
exceeded his executive branch authority with respect to the treaty process. As Roberts 
explains, ―The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to 
enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty 
into a self-executing one is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an 
international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls 
to Congress.‖774 Roberts again offers an ―original writing‖ interpretation, and he notes 
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that Article II, §2 only allows the president to ―make‖ a treaty; a Senate vote is required 
for ratification. Moreover, the Constitution vests legislative powers to Congress, not the 
president, and therefore the president lacks the authority to unilaterally implement 
binding law on the states. Roberts supports his contention with an argument from 
authority, and he cites Madison‘s Federalist #47,775 which explains the checks and 
balances system for the Republic‘s government. Roberts therefore concludes that the 
president cannot make and enforce laws. 
 Roberts‘ interpretive approaches in his Sanchez opinion and his Medellin opinion 
ultimately reflect his prudentialist philosophy. He incorporates components from a 
revised originalism and from positivism to advance his positions on judicial restraint, the 
limited breadth of executive and judicial authority, deference to the intent of Congress, 
and the role precedent and the constitutional text play in each of those positions. At the 
same time, Roberts evaluates the costs associated with unsettling the separation of 
powers doctrine and upsetting the system of checks and balances, especially with respect 
to how those costs impact the directives and principles the Constitution establishes. Once 
again, Roberts resolves statutory and constitutional questions consistent with the 
approach he utilized in his memoranda, appellate court opinions, and confirmation 
testimony. 
Assessing the Umpire 
 Chief Justice John Roberts said that when he joined the Supreme Court, he 
wanted to be the umpire no one came to the game to see. He wanted to establish a fair 
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zone over home plate, and he wanted to call balls and strikes to the best of his abilities. 
He announced that he might get some of the calls right and he might get some of the 
calls wrong, but when people played a game in front of him, they knew what to expect 
from the umpire in the black robe. 
 So what kind of umpire is Chief Justice Roberts? A Conservative/conservative 
ideologue who advances his policy agenda and makes the rules according to his personal 
preferences, or is he an objective jurist who promotes the rule of law?  
 A close-reading of his Supreme Court confirmation testimony and his published 
opinions from his first four Terms on the Court paints a different picture than the one 
described by many critics and opponents of his nomination. Roberts consistently 
approached constitutional and statutory questions from the prudentialist philosophy, into 
which he incorporated components of originalism and positivism. He consistently 
rejected the formalist, realist, pragmatist, and Dworkinist philosophies as interpretive 
lenses for viewing competing claims. For Roberts, a Justice is not a technician who 
decides cases in a mechanical way, nor is a Justice empowered to change or create law 
from the bench so that the law fits the goals or ideals that the Justice believes it should 
satisfy; instead, a Justice must follow the valid ‗rules of recognition,‘ practice judicial 
restraint, recognize the ‗limited breadth of judicial authority‘ and avoid ‗bold forays into 
policy-making,‘ exercise ‗modesty and humility,‘ defer to the legitimate decision-
making of other institutions and branches of the government, and remember that the 
statutory text, precedent, and the constitutional text provide the only rulebook needed to 
umpire a case before the Supreme Court.  
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 As this chapter demonstrated, Roberts utilized a variety of argument ‗types‘ and 
argument modalities to advance his prudentialist approach to interpret constitutional and 
statutory questions. At the same time, the chapter demonstrated that Roberts advocated 
consistent positions in his memoranda, in his appellate court and Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, and in his appellate court and Supreme Court opinions. 
Hopefully, rather than ―speaking niceness to power,‖776 the chapter instead reflected that 
Chief Justice John Roberts strives to call a fair game, for petitioners and defenders alike, 
according to the rule of law. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In 1964, communication scholar Warren Wright suggested that with a ―rhetorical 
study‖ of judicial opinions, ―critics may be able to analyze another force at work in the 
American nation and thus transcribe a hitherto unwritten part of the history of American 
rhetoric.‖777 Almost twenty years later, another communication scholar, Richard Rieke, 
noted that for ―the study of law as a field . . . there is no established methodology or 
design‖ to guide such an argumentative or rhetorical study.778 Twenty-five years later, 
legal scholar Eveline Feteris observed, ―One of the major ‗gaps‘ in the study of legal 
argumentation and legal reasoning is the gap between more or less abstract philosophical 
and theoretical studies of legal reasoning on the one hand, and legal arguments as they 
occur in actual legal practice on the other hand.‖779 Legal scholar Francis Mootz 
explains that ―rhetorical knowledge‖ allows critics ―to develop a public discussion along 
new lines of argumentation that motivate action,‖ and he argues that ―[t]he legal system 
is one of the most important fora for the development of rhetorical knowledge in 
contemporary American society. This is true at all levels of legal discourse.‖780 
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 This project attempted to address these scholars‘ concerns by offering a new 
approach for the study of the genre of judicial discourse known as ‗legal rhetoric.‘ 
Rather than viewing legal argument ‗types‘ and argument modalities as independent 
elements of judicial discourse, and rather than viewing a judicial philosophy as an 
interpretive methodology that identifies whether a Justice fits the ‗conservative‘ or 
‗liberal‘ label, this project examined how argument ‗types,‘ argument modalities, and 
judicial philosophies interrelate and therefore provides a more complete and objective 
approach to the study of judicial discourse, and the legal reasoning and decision-making 
process. By first identifying an argument ‗type‘ and then placing it within an argument 
modality, critics can determine how the two fit within or exclude a particular judicial 
philosophy. This methodological approach, therefore, provides a more succinct and 
accurate explanation of the type of interpretive philosophy being used to resolve 
constitutional and statutory questions. 
 At the same time, this study also provided a compelling rationale for reevaluating 
the currently held conceptions about ‗legal rhetoric.‘ Rather than associate pejorative 
connotations with the terms, this project demonstrated that scholars should rethink their 
conceptions and instead assign a more objective and succinct definition for the terms: 
Legal rhetoric is the use of argumentative strategies within a text to advance a position 
and to ground the rationale and reasoning for that position. Viewed through this lens, a 
speaker‘s or writer‘s use of legal rhetoric becomes an integral part of that person‘s 
advocacy and defense for a particular position. This project demonstrated that argument 
‗type‘ and argument modality are the critical elements for the advocacy or defense of a 
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particular position on an issue; when used together, ‗type‘ and modality thereby form the 
basis for the argumentative strategy used to defend or to refute a position. When viewed 
from this perspective, then, scholars and critics should recognize that ‗legal rhetoric‘ 
plays an important role in judicial discourse.  
 This project also contributed to the ―Law and Rhetoric‖ movement and 
demonstrated that scholars can study the field of law from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. The ongoing dialogues and efforts in the fields of law, communication, 
history, and political science provide excellent research that, when incorporated into a 
more exhaustive study, allows these research projects to contribute to a more holistic 
study of judicial discourse. The project contributed to the ongoing discussions in each of 
the independent fields, and it also joined the ―Law and Rhetoric‖ movement by offering 
a new methodological approach for studying the law from a legal and rhetorical 
perspective. Hopefully, the project also demonstrated that the fields can engage one 
another rather than ―talk past‖ one another, or worse yet, ignore one another. More 
productive scholarly endeavors should incorporate elements of each field‘s research into 
a single project, as this one did, to demonstrate how a unified approach provides a more 
complete assessment of the judicial or legal topic that serves as the focus of the study. 
 Finally, this project demonstrated that rhetorical criticism provides scholars with 
an effective methodology for the study of judicial discourse. By conducting a study 
through the paradigm of rhetorical analysis, this project demonstrated that rhetorical 
criticism satisfied three important objectives. First, the project‘s methodological 
approach served an instructive function, as the study identified, analyzed, and evaluated 
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legal discourse from a variety of settings, and therefore offered insight into constructing 
effective (or ineffective) argumentative or persuasive judicial discourse. Second, the 
approach served a reconstructive function, as the study provided new insight into a 
variety of legal texts and offered a new perspective on how to ‗read‘ those legal texts by 
examining why the writer and speaker made certain argumentative choices and how 
those choices served the writer‘s/speaker‘s purpose. Finally, the approach provided an 
evaluative function, as the study explored how the legal texts provided a response to 
problematic constitutional, statutory, political, and judicial situations that required an 
oral or written response.  
A Stealth Umpire? 
In his first commencement address delivered as Chief Justice, John Roberts joked 
to Georgetown Law School‘s graduating class, ―I have no track record when it comes to 
commencement addresses. You might even say I‘m something of a stealth 
commencement speaker.‖781 Roberts‘ quip reflects the view of him that many people 
held prior to Roberts‘ Supreme Court confirmation hearings. This project, therefore, 
attempted to provide an answer to the singular question that dominated the pre-hearing 
judicial and political climate: Was Judge John G. Roberts truly a ‗stealth candidate‘ 
lacking a paper trail for Senate Judiciary Committee members, the media, and interested 
Court followers to examine? 
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As this project demonstrated, John Roberts was not, in fact, a ‗stealth candidate‘ 
who lacked a paper trail for people to follow. His letters and memoranda from his 
service during the Reagan and Bush (41) administrations, his appellate court 
confirmation hearings, his appellate court opinions, and his law review articles actually 
provide a wealth of information on the argumentative strategies and the judicial 
philosophies Roberts‘ utilized to resolve competing claims over constitutional and 
statutory questions. This project, in essence, ―vetted‖ Roberts‘ pre-Court paper trail and 
revealed that Roberts was not an enigmatic jurist waiting to assume a seat on the nation‘s 
highest appellate court; instead, Roberts‘ writings and testimony provided ample 
materials upon which people could make assessments regarding Roberts‘ jurisprudential 
thinking. 
A Fair or Foul Umpire? 
To address the larger issues associated with John Roberts‘ seating on the High 
Court, this project attempted to answer four additional and related questions: What types 
of argumentative and rhetorical strategies does Roberts utilize in his oral and written 
discourse to justify a position on a constitutional or legal issue?; Do Roberts‘ pre-Court 
argumentative and rhetorical strategies reveal his judicial temperament and 
constitutional philosophy?; Do Roberts‘ pre-Court argumentative and rhetorical 
strategies parallel the argumentative and rhetorical strategies he utilizes in his published 
appellate court and Supreme Court opinions?; and, Do Roberts‘ published opinions 
reflect a discernable judicial temperament and constitutional philosophy?  
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A close-reading of Roberts‘ legal texts—his articles, letters, memoranda, 
opinions, and testimony—provides answers for those questions. Roberts possesses a 
sharp wit, and he uses humor to advance arguments on a position. In fact, Roberts‘ 
humor and wit comprise an important element of the overall interpretive approach he 
uses to resolve constitutional and statutory questions.   
 A close-reading of Roberts‘ legal texts also provides insight into whether Roberts 
was/is a Conservative/conservative ideologue who advances his policy agenda and 
changes/makes the rules according to his personal preferences, or whether he was/is an 
objective jurist who promotes the rule of law. Following Roberts‘ paper trail and 
evaluating his Supreme Court confirmation hearing testimony and published opinions 
reveals a portrait of a complex jurist.  
 Roberts incorporates a variety of legal argument ‗types‘ within specific argument 
modalities to frame his resolution of the constitutional or statutory questions at issue. At 
the same time, he constructs his argumentative strategies within a specific interpretive 
paradigm, the paradigm he thus uses to provide the rationale for his decision on the 
questions at issue. As this project demonstrates, Roberts consistently resolved 
constitutional and statutory questions from a multifaceted interpretive approach: he 
incorporated components of originalism and positivism into the prudentialist philosophy. 
For Roberts, the text of the Constitution and the text of statutes provide the only 
rulebooks a judge/Justice needs to resolve competing claims; the Constitution, 
precedent, and statutes create the valid ‗rules of recognition‘ that limit the ‗breadth of 
judicial authority‘ and that require judges/Justices to exercise judicial restraint; and, 
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judges/Justices should avoid ‗bold forays into policy-making,‘ they should exercise 
‗modesty and humility,‘ and they should defer to the legitimate decision-making of other 
institutions and branches of the government, as the system of checks and balances and 
the separation of powers doctrine are vital components of America‘s governmental 
structure.  
 As this project also demonstrated, Roberts consistently discounted or rejected 
other judicial philosophies. Roberts does not agree with the formalists‘ belief that a 
judge/Justice is a technician who resolves cases in a mechanical way, nor does Roberts 
support the realist, pragmatist, or Dworkinist interpretive philosophies since 
judges/Justices lack the authority to change or create law from the bench so that the law 
fits the goals or ideals that the Justice believes it should satisfy. Roberts instead 
consistently advocated throughout his testimony and writing that judges and Justices 
should officiate disputes as neutral arbiters who follow the rule of law, and who should 
let the legislatures create, alter, or nullify rules and laws. 
The Supreme Court‟s Chief Umpire 
 In his review of the Roberts Court after five Terms, Roger Parloff made an 
observation about the future of the Court that parallels a contention advanced throughout 
this project:  
 What will certainly happen is that labels like ‗liberal‘ and ‗conservative‘ will 
 become inadequate to describe the Court‘s divisions on many key questions as 
 they emerge . . . When those tough questions of the future arrive, we‘ll have the 
 comfort of knowing that there will be a smart guy with intellectual integrity 
 leading the Court that has to grapple with them.
782
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As this project emphasized, convenient labels do not provide answers to the questions 
about the judicial philosophy to which a Justice subscribes, nor do the labels accurately 
identify the argument ‗types‘ or modalities that a Justice will use to resolve 
constitutional and statutory questions. The Court‘s work is far too difficult, and the 
Justices‘ legal reasoning and decision-making processes are far too complex, for 
interested Court followers to make ideological assumptions about a Justice simply based 
on the party affiliation of the president who nominated the Justice. As Chief Justice 
Roberts would say, ―Enough is enough.‖ Perhaps more scholarship that engages both the 
study of the law and the Supreme Court from an interdisciplinary perspective and that 
utilizes rhetorical criticism as a methodological approach will provide further insight 
about the men and women who don the black robes ―to do their duty as faithful 
guardians of the Constitution[.]‖783 
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